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JOAN M, FISHER 
Idaho State Bar No. 2854 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho 
201 N. Main 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-01 80 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTIIICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, 
Petitioner, 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
i Case No. SPOT 020071 1D 
) 
1 PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
1 RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 







STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
Plaintiff Case No. HCR 16259 
1 
v. 1 PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
1 RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, 1 STATE'S' MOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendant. 1 
Petitioner, Zane Jack Fields, by and through his attorney, Joan M. Fisher of the Capital 
Habeas Unit of the Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington and Idaho, files this Response in 
Opposition to State's Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner is attaching a copy of the Missouri Supreme 
Court's decision in Missozrri v. Witfield, case no. SC77067,2003 MO LEXIS 105 (June 17, 
2003), and Judge Carison's decision from Idaho's Fifth Judicial District, Jerome County, Thornus 
PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE 
IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
v. I~iaho, case no. SPOT 99-1 12 (Feb. 3, 2003), (attached hereto as Appendices A cYL B, 
respectively). In Whitfkcld, the Missouri Supreme Court held that Ring v. Arizoizu is retroactive 
to cases that were final when Ring was announced, and instead recalled its inandate and granted 
sentencing relief. In Tlzor~ias, the Jerome County District Court, Honorable Monte E3. Carlson 
presiding, invalidated Thomas' death sentence, holding that Idaho's judge sentencing procedure 
in capital cases was unconstitutional under Ring, and that Rirtg is applicable to post-conviction 
proceedings, though in that case those proceedings were prior to completion of the direct appeal. 
Petitioner understmds that these decisions are not binding on this Court, but subinits 
them for the Court's infom~ation. Petitioner previously filed with this Court a Suppleme~ltal 
Authority regarding Porter v. Stale, where Lewis County District Court Judge Bradbury found 
Ir'i~zg to he retroactive to final cases challenging the sentence in a collateral proceeding and 
granted Mr. Porter sentencing relief. In opposition to the State's motion to dismiss and in 
support of his petition, Petitioner incorporates herein the additional legal arguments and authority 
found in 12fissoun v. Wlzitfield and Thomus v. Id~ztzo. 
DATED this I I %ay of July, 2003. 
~ ~ t o r n e ~  for Zane Jack Fields 
PETITIONERS SSUPLEMENTAL RESPONSE 
IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION TO DISAIISS - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that or1 the day of July, 2003, I caused to be served a ttue and 
correct copy of the foregoing docusnent by the method illdicated below, postage prepaid where 
applicable, addressed to: 
Roger Bourne 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 W, Front Street, Room 3 19 1 
Boise ID 83702 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile (208-334-2942) - 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivery 
PE'TITIONER'S SlJPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE 
IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 3 
Appendix A 
1 o f  10 DOCChIENTS 
ST.A'rE OF MISSOCKI, Respondent. \ . JOSEPE-I \% EILTFIELD, '4ppellant. 
SC77067 
SC PRElClE COI. RT OF iClISSOI_'RI 
2003 ilo. LEdWS I0 5 
.June 17.41003, Filed 
NOTICE: 
[*I]  NOT FINAL LWTIL EXPIKATION OF THE REHEXRTNG PERIOD. 
PRIOR HISTORY: 
Stute FVhzrfieIri, 939 S EP' -711 361. 199' .bfo LlZY1.S 13 ! Lfo , 1997) 
COUNSEL: 
For APPELLANT Xlr Charles M. Rogers. hfs Cheryl 1. P~late. Kansas City. ,tllssour~. Mr. C. John Pleban, St. LOUIS, 
Mlssour~. 
For RESPOKDENT. Honorable Jeremah W (Jay) U~xon, 'Any. General, Mr. Stephen D. kiawke, Asilstant 
i2norneyGenera1, Jefferson C~ty ,  Mlssoun. 
JC'BGES: 
LAL'RA DENVlR STITH. K D G E  L.2;hlte. 5Volff and Te~telman. JJ . concur. Pr~ce, J . concurs i n  pal t and dl>ic.nts I r i  
part In separate oplnlon filed, Benton, J , concurs In oplmon of Pr~ce, J , L~mbaugh, C J., concurs In part In o p ~ n ~ o n  f 





ON 31OTIOi\c TO REG-ALL 3IAVDATE 
In 1994. a jury con~lcted Joseph VvTh~tfield of first-degree murder but could not agree on punrshment dur~ng the 
penalty phase, totmg 1 1  to 1 In favor of l~ fe  unpr~sonmtznt. nl  The judge then undertook the four-step process requ~red 
by section 565 030 3 n2 for d e t e m m g  punrshment. He found the presence of statutory and non-statutory aggravatmg 
clrcumstances, d e t s m e d  these cucumstances warranted death, cons~dered uhether there \+ere mltlgstlng 
clrcumstancos and found they d ~ d  not oume~gh  the clrcumstances m aggravanon, and dec~ded under all the 
clrcumstances to Impose a death sentence Thls Court affirmed the convlctlons and sentences and denled post-convlct~on 
rel~et' Stare v. FVkitfield, 939 S. W 2 d  361 IX21 (310. banc 1997), cert. dertied, 522 C'.S. 831 (1997  n3 
111 The J U I )  also found hlr Whltfii-Id gu~ltv of armed L r ~ r m n ~ l  actlon tbr wh~ch e recelled a Like ssnteric? 
913 i l l  starutory referens-s 3re to RSblo 1904 unlss> athemlie :nii~iated 
n3 The f ~ c t s  unclerly~ng blr Whlttizlct's crrrnei dnJ zonttctlons are set out In dctad In this Cotlrt , prior op~lllon '111d 
will not be repeated here 
Last >ear, 111 Rirrg v. 4ri:orra. 536 C.S. 584, I53 L. Ed. 2d 556. 122 S Ct. 2428 (20f12). the I, n ~ r s J  State5 ';ilprerne 
Court held that the S~\riz 41rzentfm~~tit entltles "capital defendants to a jury detemnatlon of an? h u t  or1 .itilich the 
legislature ccitnd~tions an Increase In therr mallmum plrnlshent " Ritrg, 536 L:S. ut 589 Xlr U hitfield contends his 
right under the Siitlz and I-i~urtcentiz Amendments. as set out in ilifrg, was v~olated because the judge r ~ t h e r  than the 
jury made the hctudl determnations on uhtch his el~gsblllty for the death sentence teas 1*3) predlcarcd T'nls Court 
agrees 
Section 565 030 4 requires that the trier of fact engage in a four-step process In d e t e m n m g  whether a death 
sentence shall be imposed As discussed belolt. the first t h e e  of these steps requlre tjctual findings be made In order to 
render the defendant eligible for the death penalty Ifere. the jury deadlocked. and, as requlred by sectton 565 030 4, the 
judge rather than the jury made the requwlte factual findmgs tbr lmposltion of a sentence of death Thls ~ l o l a t r d  hlr 
Whltfield's right to have d jury d e t e m n e  the facts rendering hlm ellgsble for death. 
This Court therefore recalls its mandate a f f i m n g  hls convictton and applies Ring to lnval~date his sentence of 
death because there 1s a conillct between t h ~ s  Court's affirmance of a court-lmposed death sentence on Mr. Whitfield's 
dtrect appeal and the constlrutional principles set out In Ring, under the test set forth In Lirzk1efit.r v. Walker, 351 Lr.S. 
618, 11 L. Ed 2d 601, 85 S. Cf .  1731 (1965). and Stovall v. Deritru, 388 L!S. 293, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199, 87 S. Ct. 1967 
(1967) Under [*4l section 565 040, the onlb posslble sentence 1s life ~n ipnsomenr  Xecordmgly. the Court's mandate 
1s recalled, the sentence of Jeath 1s reverbed, and thls Court sets aslde the sentence of death and resentences the 
defendant to Ilfe lmprrsonnlent wthout e l lg lb i l l~  for probation, parole, or release except by act. of the Gocemor. 
I. ,CfISSOtlRI C4PZl"L DEFE.%rDA4XTS ARE EiYTITLED TO HAVE A JII'RY DETEKCfZ.YE THE F.4CTS 
REIVDERTIVG THE.kI ELIGIBLE FOR THE DE.4 TN PEiVAL. TE' LiNDER SECTION 565.030.4 
Ring Entitles a Capital Defendant to a Jiiry Ddermination of the Facts on FYlrich Eligibility for u Deatlr 
Sentence is Predicated. 
In Apprendi v. hew Jersey, 530 L;.S. 166, 117 L. Ed. 2d 133, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), declded three years after thls 
Court affirmed hfr tl'hltfield's contlctlon and sentence, the Unlted States Supreme Court held that "the S I Y ~ I I  
4rr~t.iltimenl does not p e m t  J defendant to be "exposed .to a penalty ~'~ct. t . t i l t~g ile maximum he 1tould Iecelbe ~f 
punlshed according to the facts reflected In the jury berdlct alone " Apprmdi, 530 C.S. at 183. 
humerous co~lrts and commentators [ * 5 ]  thereafter suggested that the pnnclpleb underl:lng Apprettdi s e r e  
lnconslstent ctlth the prlnclples underlying the Supreme Court's declslon In Raltott v. hi,-otra. 49' L.S. 639, 111 L. 
Ed. 2d 411, 110 S. Ct. 3067 (1990), that a judge could d e t e m n e  the aggravatmg facts necessary to impose the death 
penalty once a jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder. They were correct. 
T u o  years later, the Supreme Court applled the prlnclples underlyng Apprendi to the capltal sentenclng settlng 
The Court reasoned that, "caplral defendants, no less than non-capltal defendants, ... are entltled to a j u n  detemnat ion of 
any fact on whlch the leglslatue condltlons an rncrease In thelr maximum punishment." Ring, 536 L.S. at 589. 
n4 Further, ~t found that Xnzona's practlce of labellng aggracatlng c~rcurnstances as sentenclng factors rather than 
as elements of the offense of iapltal murder was a matter of form over substance and that. under -hzona ' s  statutory 
scheme, "Arizona's enumerated agsavatlng factors operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of a greater 
offense."' Ring. j35 L S ut 609, quoting, I*&] Apprendi, 330 C!S. at 191, n. 19 
n-! Ring tllus 01 cnulcd llirlturt 
.;ippl>lng these pnnilples. the Suprenle C ourt ~ n t ~ l l d d t t d  . lr l~ond's  cdpltdl scntcncln: si!?~ali" ~ ~ ' ; J L I s ~ "  I C  =ermitle~! 
3 judse. rather than J jur;. to deterrnlnz the prebence of3ggrzt~at1ng factor) reqtllrillj. h~ ( \ r lzon~ !;IT :or Inlpo5ltlon or 
the death penal[\ I'ollo\~lng djlurv adiucllcatlon of J deGndantts guilt of first-dczree rll~lriie~ In i o  h o i ~ ; . ; ~ ~ ,  i t  eurended to 
Pdge 3 
1003 110 LESIS 105 * 
the cap~tal  setltenclilg s;cttlng Appr~ttdi's hold~ng that "tilt: St\t/i -Imerrtimclzt d~)eb not permt a de lenda~~t  to be 
'exposed to a penalty eicemirtrg the maximum he uould receive ~f punished according to  the facts reflected In rile Jtlrt 
~ e r d l c t  alone "' K11zg 336 L S izt 598-89, quoting, :ippretidi, 530 D.S. at 483 
The riuprelne Court heid that 11ot j us t  a ttdtutclry dggrat'ltor. but cterq iict thdt th Ieg~slarure leyul1t.s k.2 f ~ ~ n n d  
before death may be ~mposrd  must be found by the jury And. in determln~ng \+h~ch tx tors  fall l l t t h~n  this /*7j rule. 
Ring cautroned that. "the dispos~ti\e yuestron 'IS one not of form, but of effect "' Rrng 336 G f ~ r t  602 qrrotirty 
clpprendi, 5311 L:S. rii 493. "If a Srdtr makes an Increase In J defenddnt's authort~ed punishment cont~ngent on the 
Ilndrng of a h ~ t .  that fact - no nwtter hon the State labels ~t - ntust be found by a jury beyond a reasonabls doubt " 
Ring 536 Ci S ~ r t  602 
Because Mr K ~ n g  did not argue that Arrzona's sentencing bcherne reyulred the jury to rrlahe tactual i ind~ng as to 
mt~gat ing factors. the Supreme Court decl~ned to specifically address whether a jury u a s  also r zq~ i~red  to d e t s m n e  
whether mtlgatlng factors \%ere present that called for len~ency See Riirg, 536 Lr.S. at j97, tz I Instead, ~t set out the 
general pr~nciple that courts murt use In appiylng Rittg to d e t e m n e  ahether a particular Issue must be d e t e m n e d  by 
the jury or  an be de temned  by a judge, stating, "capltal defendants are entrtled to a jury de ten~na t ion  of an? fact on 
~ h ~ c h  the legisiature conditions an Increase in the~r  maulmum punlskment " Ring, -536 t i  S itr 589 
On remand, dpply~ng these pr~nc~ples.  [*81 the Supreme Court of Ar~zona rejected the contention that the 
reqmrements that rmtlgatlng cucumstances be considered and welshed agalnst aggravators were not factual pred~cates 
for ~mposltlon of the death penalty See State V. Ring, 63 P.3d 915, 942-43 (Ariz. 2003) (Ring If) .  It held, therefore, 
that, m e n  ~f the presence of a statutory aggravator was conceded or not contested, resentencmg would be requ~rect unless 
the court tound that the ia~lure of the jury to make these factual find~ngs %as harmless on the part~cular facts of the case. 
Id. 
Under Section j65.030.4 a Defetzclant is Eligible for the Death Penalty Only if the J ~ i r y  iPiake~ tlze Fuctnal 
Defermirratiuns Set Out in Subdivisions 565.030.4(1), (_I), and (31. 
565 030 7 The State and Mr. CVh~tfield agree that. under Ring, a jury must d e t e m n e  all facts on nhlch the 
leg~slature has pred~cated lmposltlon of the death penalty They also agree that sectlons 565 020 and 565 030 set out the 
requirements for ~rnposltlon of the death penalty In M~ssour~  Sect~on 565 020 2 [*9] proL~des that the pun~shment for 
first-degree murder shall be e~ther  death or Imprisonment for l~ fe  wtthout e l ~ g ~ b ~ l i t y  for probat~on or parole Sec. 
565.020.2. Sect~on 365 030 2 reyulres that, m cases In wh~ch the state seeks the death penalty, the case shall be t r ~ e d  In 
two phases In the first phase, the jury shall d e t e m e  gu11t. See. . Sect~on 565 030 4 then prov~des that, " ~ f  the trler 
finds the defendant gu~lty of nlurder In the first-degree. a second stage of the tr~al  shall proceed at ~ ~ h ~ c h  the onll. I S S U ~  
ahail be the p u n ~ s h e n t  to be assessed and declared " Sec. 565.030.4 
In the second. or "penalty" phase. the juq 15 required to be Instructed to fo1lot.i the four-step process set out In 
section 565 030 4 
The trler shall assess and declare the pun~shment at hfe lnlprlsonment w~thout e l ~ g ~ b ~ l ~ t y  for probat~on parole. or 
release except by act of the got ernor: 
( I )  If the trrer does not find beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the statutory aggravating clrcumstancss /*10] 
set out In subsect~on 2 of section 565 032; or 
( 2 )  If the trler does not find that the ev~dence In aggralatlon of pun~shment, ~nclud~ng but not l~rmted to e ~ ~ d e n c e  
supporting the statutory aggravatmg cmmstances  l~sted In subsect~on 2 of sectlon 363.032. warrants Imposing the 
death sentence, or 
(3) If the t r ~ e r  concludes that there 1s ev~dence In nutlgatlon of pun~shrnent. ~nclud~ng but not l~rmted to eL~dence 
supporting the statutorj rmtigatlng clrcurnstances llsted in subsect~on 3 of sectlon 563 032, w h ~ c h  IS suffic~ent to 
outme~gh the e l  ~dence  m aggravation of pun~shment found by the trler, or 
(1) If the trler dec~des under all of the circumstances not to assess and declare the punishment at death 
fd Ssct~on 565 0;O 4 on ~t~ f ~ c r  equlres that steps 1 2. 2 .  ;ind 4 be iieter1111neJ ~ g a ~ r l s t  isr'snd;tn: kcro!,? ;',e~til 
sentenc? <a11 be 1mpozc.d Id see FF7titjieId. S'3-S. fF.2d 503. 51.5 (110. bane 1993) 
Step 1. Step 1 requlres the trler of tact to find the presence of one or more statutoq ASgraLatlng thetors f * l l  j set 
out In section 565 032 2 Both the State and blr Whitfield agree that this 1s a fact that normall> irillst bt: totjnti by the 
jury In order to  Impose a srnrence of death 
State contends that steps 2 ,  3 ,  and 4 n1erel.c id11 for the jur) to g n e  ~ t s  ~ i l b j ~ ~ t l \ e  oplnlon as to nhether the 
death penalty is approprrare howe\er, not to make findings as to tthether the factual predicates fbr lrnposlng the death 
penalt) are present It urges thdt the principles s;rt out In Niirg are not offended eben ~f the judge rather than the jury 
de temnes  those three steps 'I hls Court d m ,  nrees 
Step 2 .  Step 3 requires the tner of fact (6thethrr jury or judge) to tlild that the evidence in aggravation of 
punlsiunent, tncl~idlng but nor llrmted ro et  ~dence stlpporrtng the statutory aggracating factors. Marrants lnlposttlon ot  
the death penalry As noted. the State argues that rh~s  tep merely calls for a subjective oplnion by the trter of fact, not a 
finding But, the State falls to note that thls Court rejected thls lery argument In ~ t s  opinion on klr Whltfield's appeal of 
h ~ s  ln~tlal convlcnon, m u h ~ c h  ~t remanded for the nelt t r~a l  at Issue here In that decision, 1*12] rhls Court held that 
step 3 requlres a "tindlng of fact by the pry.  not a dlscretlanar) dec~slon " tl'hitfiefd, 83'5'. CE2d at 515 This holding 
1s supported by the plaln language of the slatute In order to fulfill its duty, the trler of fact 1s requ~red to nuke a case-by- 
case facrual detemnation based on all the aggrabatrng tacrs the trler of fact finds are present In the case T h ~ s  1s 
necessar~ly a determnatlon to be made on the facts of each case. Accordingly, under Ring, tt 1s not p e m s s ~ b l e  for a 
judge to make thls factual de temnar~on.  The jury is required to d e t e m n e  whether the statutory and other aggracators 
shown by the evidence warrants the lmposlt~on of death. n j  
n5 In 2001, when the legislature rev ised section 565 030 to p r o h ~ b ~ t  the evecurlon of the mentally retarded. ~t also 
ellrmnated step 2 as a required separate finding. Sec. 565.030, RS;Llo Supp. 2002. 
Step 3. In step 3 the jury is requlred [*I31 to determne whether the e t~dence 111 rmtlgat~on outwe~ghs the evldence 
in aggravation found in steps 1 and 2 If it does, the defendant 1s not e l ~ g ~ b l e  for death. and the jury must return a 
sentence of life inlprisonment Wh~le  the State once more argues that t h ~ s  merely calls for the jury to offer ~ t s  ubject~ve 
and discretionarv oplnlon rather than to make a factual tindmg, t h ~ s  Court again disagrees 
The analys~s undertaken In three recent declslons h> other htate courts of last resort. Intrrpretlng slrmlar bt~tutes, 15 
Instructlte. In Ftbldt v. People, 64 P.3d ,756 (Colo. 2001), the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the death bentences 
of &to capttal defendants afrer detem~lnmg that Colorado's three-judge capital sentencing statute was uncot~st~mt~onal In 
l~ght of Ring Coloracio's death penalty statute. l~ke  LIissouri's. requlres the fact-finder to complete a four-step process 
before death may be lmposed first, at least one statutoq aggravator must be found Second, ~vhether rmt~gatlng factors 
exrst must be detemned.  Third. rmtlgating factors must not o u t ~ ~ e ~ g h  the aggravatlng factors Flnally. whether death IS 
the appropriate punlskmrnt 1s cons~dered. I*14] 
The Supreme Court of Colorado descr~bed the first three of these four steps as findings of fact that are 
"prerequlsltes to a findlng by the three-judge panel that a defendant \\as el~gible for death " Uoldt, 61 P.3d at ,765 It 
noted that states are sometimes grouped Into "ue~ghmg states" that requlre the jury to \ % e ~ s h  the aggravatlng 
circumstances agalnst those ~n rmtlgatlon In a m t  Ing at theu d e t e m n a t ~ o n  of punishment. and "non- t te~gh~ng states " It 
euplalned that, t+h~le  In steps 1 ,  2. and 3 the jury 1s p e m t t e d  to consider and w i g h  aggratrttors and mtlgators, and to 
that extent Colorado's process 1s 11ke that used In ue~ghlng states, Colorado is a non-uie~gh~ng state In that, In step 4, In 
\ v l ~ c h  the jury dec~des ~ h e t h e r  to Impose death or to g n e  a life sentence, the jury 1s p e m n e d  to cons~der all of the 
ev~dence u~ thou t  belng requlred to give speclal s~gn~ficance to the weight of statutory ag,ora\ators or rmtlgators CVoirft. 
64 P 3d izt ,763-64 T h ~ s  last step thus "affords the sentencing body unllrmted dlscret~on to sentence the defendant to 11fe 
lmprlsonment Instead of death " Ct'oidr 64 P 3ri irt 263 Because Colorado's death penalq, [*l5] statute requ~red a 
three-judge panel to nrabe the tirst three of these findings. the statute \*as declared ~mcon5t1n1tlonal CPol~lt. 64 P 311 t rr  
366-6' 
Sirn~larl:, In Jrrhttsott L: State. 59 P.3d 450 (\,I, ,7002). Vebada', Supreme Court cx)r,s:dereL! :he ;oi~st~n~t~onrtl!t- 
of ~ t s  iap~ta l  sentenclng ;<heme In i1$1t of Ritiy Irs kcntenclng achemi. pro\~des  for 3 tnrx-judsr panel t o  drtelrillne 
punlbhnlent ~i the lur) 1s unable to do so Juiitiro~i noted that Letada 'stamtor! la\\ iI:;uires txo  i i l s t ~ ~ i t  ' ndlngs to 
render a det'rlld~nt death-el~g~bie the jur.. or the pane! ofjudges ma!, Impose a sentence. of d e ~ r h  o n l ~  ~f ~t tincts ~t 1e;lht 
orre aggra\ating clrcumstarice and further firlci: that there are no nutlgatlng clrcunutances sutfi-icleni to uurv,r~gil tile 
dggratatilly clriumstanie 01 circunlstarrees hund  "' Jolrtrsoit, 59 P.3J at -1150 (citation ormtted) 
J~lzri.$on detemlned the requlsltc 5tarntory firrcirng rhdt the mlrlpating clrcumtancer are not sutfiiienr to outxselgh 
the aggravating circumctanceb 15 at ledsr "in psrt a fd~rual dcrermrnat~on, not mere11 di>crctloi~itr> \\tig!1111g ~ , i [ l ) ' \ , ) l t  
59 P 3if  tir 460 I t  held that. [ " f k l  as a restlit, the rule announced in Ring reqttlred a jury rather that1 a judge to 
deternilne the mtlgatlng as %ell as the aggra\atlng factor 1s5ues Id. 
Finally on remand from the Cnlted States Suprcme Court, the Supreme Court of hrl tona rqeoted the itate's 
contention that the reyulrement of -4rlrona Iiiw - t h ~ t  he court ~ e l g h  mlttgatmg c~rcumsrances agairi'jt aggra l~t ing 
ctrcuntsta~~ces - did not requlre a frlctual detcrmlndtron, stnrlng 
In both the stiperseded and current capltal sentencing schemes. tire legr~fcrrirre ci~szgaed to titc rcznre f~rcl-jintfer. 
tespun.rrbtlin~ jot- ~.on\rtlt~rzng bctrl~ trggrciicrtwy ~ r t l i f  ~tzzrigczrrtzg fiicfors. as xell trs jor cit.t~.rtrrztz:irg ~ L / Z L " ~ \ I L " I  the 
mltzqntt?ly fcrcrotli. &then cot?lparetf utrh rite clggrciiiirolu cizii for fei l ien~! heltiler a judge, under the supe~seded 
statutes, nor the jury. under the nen statutes. cart lmpose the death penalty unless that entity concludes that the 
mtlgatlng factors are not sufficiently substantlal to call for lenlenty A 19 S [ \ c L ~ I o ~ ~ . ~ /  13-703 E (Supp 2002) and 13-  
7133 F (Supp 2001) Phe process ~ n ~ o l v e d  In d e t e r m ~ n g  $%herher mtlgating factors prohlblt lmposlng the death penalty 
plays an Important part In Arrzona's cap~tal [*I71 sentenctng scheme 
Ring 11, 665 P.3d at 9-13 (emphasis added). The Court conrlnued: 
We M I I I  nor speculate about ho* the State's proposal [to allow the judge to make these t?nd~ngsj .;could Impact this 
essential process Clemi~ns v , L ~ I J J I J S  lppt. 494 C'S -33 -54 110 S CI 1431 1 4 j l  108 L Ed 3ri 725 (1  990) ('In sonle 
sltuatlons, a state appellate court may conclude that pecul~arltles in a case make appellate. harmless error a~ralysls 
extremely specuIatlve or lrnposslble '1; see also Jolir~son c ~Vevarhz, 59 P 3ci 450 (fVrv 2002) (as applled to Ne-.ada law, 
Ring requlres [a] jury to welgh rmtlgatlng and aggratarlng factors under Nevada's statute requlnng the fact-tinder to 
further find whether rmtigatmg c~rcumstances are sufficient to oubvelgh the agpratatlng c~rcurnstances). 
Id. LAcc~rdlngly, the Court held that, even were the presence of a statutory aggravator conceded or not contested, 
resentenclng t\.ould be requlred unless the court found that the failure of the jury to make these factual findln, 0s was 
harmless on tne particular facts of the case. Id. Thls \%as a necessary result of applyrng [*I81 Ring's holdlng that 
"cap~tal defencianrs are entlrled to a jury detemnatlun of any fact on wh~ch  the legislature condlt~ons an increase In 
thelr mavlrnum punlshnlent " Riitg, 5336 C.S. at 589 
Missouri's steps 1. 7 .  and 3 are the equivalent of the first three factual de temna t~ons  requlred under Colorado's 
death penal5 sutute, so that. as 111 Colorado, the j u p  15 told to find v.hether there are rmtlzatlng and aggra-.stmg 
circumstances and to \lielgh them to declde whether the defendant 1s ellglble for the death penalty These three steps are 
also slrrnlar to the aggravatmg and rmtlgatlng clrcurnstance findlngs requlred under Nevada and Xrrzona law. '4s In 
those states. these three steps requlre fhctual findln,os that are prerequisites to the trler of fact's de temnat lon that a 
defendant 1s death-ellglble 
Step 4. Flnally, In step 4 of sectlon 565 030 4, the trler of fact is instructed that ~t must assess and declare the 
punishment at 11fe lmpr~sonment rf ~t decldes under all of the c~rcurnstances not to assess and declare the punishment at 
death 4s under Colorado's statute, ~t 1s not untrl t h s  fourth step that the trler [*19] of fact 1s glien d~scretlon to make 
the final detemnatlon lvhether to glte a llfe sentence even ~f he or she has already found that the aggratators and 
rmtlgators would qualib defendant for lmposlt~on of the death penalty As In Colorado, hllssourl 1s considered a non- 
welghlng state because of the dlscretlon gnen  to the jur), at thls polnt to lmpose a life sentence without regard to the 
welght ~t gave to aggravators and rmtlgators ~t found See Whitfield, 537 S. CE2d at 515 ("The jury does not make any 
dlscretlonary declslon In imposlng the death penalty On the other hand. the jury 1s glven the constltu~onally-requlred 
unl~rmted dlscret~on to eyerclse mercy and reduce the sentence to life [[Src ] 565 030 J(4)") 
C Tlie Trial Jiidge Erred iti Hint~elf Waking tlte Fucriral Fittditz,q~ tlzat urr n Predicate to lntpo\irioa uf' Wi.mxiril\ 
Drsutlz Penrrt@ 
Turnlng to !lo\\ :lle\r: ?our ztcps nele ianieci out he:: rhe record reteals that LL: i b  hlt5elii's J L ! ~ .  rsnlmed ~ e r d l c t  
stdring that ~t ;o~ild not a:r:e on punls!unent The r t ~ o r d  relilals that the jur; ..\a\ kplit 1 1  to ! !n f a ~ o r  ot' ilre 
~mpr~sitnment i C  hen 2 lur: returns J ~ t i d i i t  [*101 S ~ J ~ : C G  the juror? cannot dccl~ii. upon p~lnlshrnent bilc:~all - . ( ,  o Z 0  4 
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requlres the judge to declde punishment and prot~des  that "the court shdil foilolb the same procedure as set ou t  ln thii 
section [steps 1-41 whenever ~t 1s requlred to detel-mine punlshnlent for murder In the first degree " Sec. 565.030.4 The 
stature requtred the ~ u d g e  to independently go through the four statutory steps and rnalie hls or her o n n  iieternunatlun 
whether tire death penalty or life irnpr~sctri~x-tent shoiild be Imposed 
X s  required by sectlon 565 030 4. once the jitry deadlocked on Xlr Whttiield's pun~shment. the t r ~ ~ t l  judge 
Independently \vent through each of the four statutor? steps. independently determined each fact against C11 ii h~tfield 
and ~mposed a death sentence As a result. the death sentence Imposed on XLr Whltfzld uas  not based on a j u n  tindtng 
of' an) fact, bur rather was ent~rely based on the judge's findlngs that all four steps i j \ored lmposltlon of ths death 
penalty See 5ec 565.030.4 7h1s process clrarl:, vlolated the requlremertt of Ritrg that the jury rather /*21] t h ~ n  the 
judge deternine the facts on uhlch the death penalty 1s based nb 
n6 Judge Prlce's separate oplnlon ignores the fact that thls eonstltured cor~stltutlonal error when the oplnlon suggests 
that Xlr CVhltlizld has nor met h ~ s  burden ofprovlng that const~tuttonal error occurred. 
D. The Error Was not Harmless. 
Vlolatlon of Ring may not In Itself automarically lnvalldate lmposltion of the death penalty Foi. nhllr  Riizg 
requlres that a jury rather than a judge make the factual findings necessary for imposltlon ol'a death senrence, ~t unpiles 
that a court may find that the hllure to requlre jury Iindlngs was h a d e s s  enor. Ring, 536 E!S. at 609, n. : We 
therefore turn to that Issue 
In deterrmn~ng whether tkderal const~tut~onal error may be constdered h a d e s s ,  Lflssouri has followed the rest set 
out by the Un~red States Supreme Court In Chapman v. California, 386 Cr.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 82-f 
(1967). See, e.g. State v. l)riscoll, 55 S. M3d 350, 356 /*221 (Mo. bane 2001). "Before a federal eonstltut~onal error 
can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a bellef that ~t was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. L'nder thls test, the "bencficlary of a const~tut~onal error," the State, must "prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the enor complained of did not contribute ro the verdict obta~ned." Id. 
Step 1. In some otl~er ease In n h ~ c h  the facts on ~vhlch the jur? based ~ t s  finding of staturory aggral  tors \\err not 
prior sonvlctlons. a hamdess error analjsls nould ilale to be undertaken In step 1 based on the abobe prlnclple.; On the 
facts of thls case. however. ~t was not error. hamdess or otherw~se, for the judge to kind the presence of statutory 
aggraTators under step 1.  because here, the statutory agsravators subrmtted were blr Whltfielil's pre\ lous con\ l~ t lons  
tbr second-degree murder and manslaughter Ritig and .-fpprendi do not okermle prlor Supreme Court case lam holding 
that the presence of prlor conticaons, whlch are a matter of court record, may be found by the judge rather than by the 
jury filthout 1 lolatlng the Slsih and Fottrteerith Amendments ("231 That law thus governs here 117 
n7 See .ipprenifr. 530 Lr S ut 390 ("Clti'zer tJtun tlzefi~ct of i z  prlor convlctron, any fact that Increases the  penal^ for 
a crlme beyond the prescribed statutory maxlmum must be subrmned to a jury, and probed beyond a reasonable doubt ")  
(emphasis provided); Ring, 536 GS. at 597, n. 4 ("R~ng's ilalm IS t~ghtly delineated He contends only that the Srrtll 
Anzencilnent requlred jury findlngs on the aggravating circumstances asserted agalnst him. No aggralatlng clrcurnstanees 
related to past convlctlons In h ~ s  case, Rlng therefore does not challenge .limeniiarez-Torres 1 Lfniteii State$. 133 C S 
23-1 118 S Ct 121 9. 130 L Eci 2tl330 (1 998). n h ~ c h  eld that the fact of prlor convlctlon may be found by the judge 
even if ~t Increases the statutory mavlmum sentence "i 
Step 2 lyhether the trial court's f k i l n z  of s ~ e p  7 \\as harmless error brq.nnd a reasonable doubt 3 111~iih nmis 
i i ~ f f i c ~ ~ l t  issue for the State .;tppl!~ng step {*?4j 3. ~ n d  In ~c~ordanc :  ~%1th 11.11-CRZd 1 1 2  41. Ins~r~ic t io~i  \I) 2.4 
lnfornied the jiir? that ~f ~t thund ;l starutory aggraxator. then ~t mould be ~ t s  "~iut? ro decide uhetlittr the a'icrxb3t:ng - - 
cIrcumtances .ire s~ifiiirent o thanant the lmposltlon i)t'Ltearh as a punishment o f  defendant " 
2003 hlo LEXIS 105. * 
Here, the jirry tlds ~n>tnlctcd tildt ~t could ~onsider dl1 the evidence, incluii~ng statututy and non-smtutor) 
aggratarors, rn maklng this dec~s~oi i  anci that tf '  the ~ u i y  dtd "ntlt rindtltmo~isly kind from the ex~dctlce beyond a 
reasonable doubt that thore aggravatitlp clrcurnstdrlces you have found warrant the Imposition of death a i  del;rnddnt's 
pi~ntshnlenr you must return a verd~ct fiulng hls punishment at Imprtscrnment for ltte " Yet, rhe jnr> d ~ d  not return a 
11fe sentence but returned a terdlct stattng that the jurors could not undnlnlously agree on punlslment The ludgc then 
reconsidered the four stafutors ~teps .  found then1 dgdlnst hIr Whittieid, and sentenced htrn to death 
In dectding \;chether the error in perm~ttlng the judge rather than the jury to make the second step detfrm~ndtlon \%as 
li~armless beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court 1s cognizant of the h c t  that normally a jury IS presumcd to folio\\ the 
jur> instructtons [*251 See e.g. State v. dfadisorr. 997 3'. Ft:2d 16, 31 (&lo. bane 1999) Here, the jury tcas lnsrmcted 
to return a verdlct of life tnlprisomcnt if ~t could not agree on step 2. The St& argues t h ~ s  Cuurt should presurne that 
the jury fo'olloned t h ~ s  tnsmtctton even though the Issue here IS the ~mpostt~on f the death penalty, cltlng a case applytng 
such a presunlptlon In a death penalty case where the jnry could nor agree on puntslm~ent and the Issue of puntshment 
fell to the judge. State v. Snzitk, 94.1 S. W:2d 901, 919-9211 (310. bane 1997). cert. denied, 522 b.S. 954 (1997) Snritlz 
1s disttngulshable, however It p e m t t c d  a presunlptlon that the jury found the presence of an aggratating ikctor under 
step I Whether such factors existed was relartbely stra~ghttonvard Snritlr did not address wheyher such a presunlptlon 
could be made as to the findlngs required In steps 2 or 3 
More ~mporlantly, Smith was declded prtor to Rirtg's holdtng that the jury must make each factual finding 
necessary for ~mposltlon of a death sentence Smith dtd not address whether a const~tut~onally-mandated factual [*26]  
findmg can ever be presmed to have been made, or whether an express findlng 1s required In those clrcumstances And, 
tclllngly, ~t found a presumptlon proper ds to the findings required tn step 1 under a standard of reliew that placed the 
burden of proof on dekndant to probe prejudic~al enor Smith, 944 S. tF7.Zd at 919-9-70. 
Here, howeter, because the judgment \+as entered based on the judge's find~ngs of fact rather than those of the jury, 
Ring was violated, nnri the burlfen shlfteri to the Sf~rte to show the Ring error wrrs ficzrmle~s beyond rz rerisonrrbie tinribr. 
h presumpnon 1s simply Inadequate to meet thls hlgh standard, and no affimattve proof suffic~ent o meet thts ~tdndard 
has been offered by the Stare, as the record 1s sllent In regard to the jury's findmgs. 
Tellingly. perhaps for thls reason, the statute does not permit a trlal judge to presume, based on the jury's deadlock, 
that the jury has dec~ded any part~cular steps agalnst defendant. Rather. the judge must go through each of the four steps 
and independently make h ~ s  or her own factual determination as to each step, not merely steps 3 and 4. 
Step 3. Elen \\ere there a bas~s  [*3,71 for thls Court to hold. based on the jury lnstructlons and xerd~ct. thdt ~t can 
be presumed the jury unanlmousl) found agalnst defendant under step 2. and that such a presumptlon const~tuted proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of harmless error, no slrmlar determinat~on. much less presumptlon, can be made as to step 3 
In regard to step 3. the jury has  instructed that  fit found that aggrabators \+anantlng the lmposltlon of death mere 
present. "each of you must then determine mhether one or more rmtlgatlng clrcumstances exlst v+h~ch outwetgh the 
aggravating clrcumtance or clrcumstances so found to eulst." The jury was Informed that ~f all of the jurors agreed that 
one or more rmtlgators were present that mere suffic~ent o outwe~gh the factors In aggravation. then ~t nlust rerum a 
verdlct of ltfe tmprtsonment 
Gnllke for step 2,  houever, the jurq was not told In rezard to step 3 that ~t had to return a verdtct of l ~ f e  
lmprlsonrnent ~f it could not unammously agree whether the rmtlgattng facts outwe~ghed the aggralatlng facts Sec. 
565.1130.4.; see also kI.-U-CR3d 313.48; State v. Tliompson, 85 S.W.3d 635, 2002 .Wo. LELWS 90. t n d e r  the 
lnstructlon, ~f 1*28] eben one juror, but not all. determined "there 1s ev~dence In rmtlgatlon of punlshment. whlch 1s 
suffiz~lrnt o oumelgh the eb~dence In aggravation of punlshment. .." the jurors nould be unable to agree on punlhnent  
and, under the ~nstruct~ons. the jury would be deadlocked and \+auld return a ~ e r d ~ c t  form so statlng 
Here. the jury rerurned a xerd~ct statlng that ~t was unable to agree on puntshment. This Court. and any court. can only 
act on the record. and the record does not show that the jury deadlocked after rather than before ~t made the requlslte 
find~ng under step 3 n3 
nS In regard to btcp 4. +he juri T.+as Instructed th31 i t  must return J i z rd~c t  of 11te Imprilonment I! i t  il~~anlnlousi) 
decided under dl1 ot  the clrcumtances not to a 5 ~ e ~ s  and declare tile p u n ~ s h e n t  at d e ~ t h  I t  nas not. llo\\eirr [oici rt, 
teturn a Iife terdlcl it  ~t could 1101 lit~art~moitily agree on a dear11 sentence, hut rather \\as instructed t o  retuin a 
deadlocked kerdlit ~n ~ u t h  circumstance 
In sum, "clr \iL h~tfield's r ~ g l ~ t  under the Sivtil and Fortrree~zrir Amendments to 3 p ~ r ?  iieterrrl~natlon of  the iacts 
render~ng h i n ~  eliglble tor the death penalt) a a s  ~ ~ o l a t c d ,  3s h l ~  death senten~e LIJS etlrcltd not based on a jury ZiriJlng 
of any tact, but rather entirely on the judge's findings Brc;iuse the record does not corltaln an) basls for the Court to 
conclude the ~ 1 1 1 3  made the reclulsite detemlnanons In steps 1, 2 ,  and 3 aga~nst Mr \;l'hittleld before dcaJlochlng, the 
State 14 undbie to meet ~ t s  bnrden of shonlng that this :nnsr~turlonal error 1larmlt"t b q o n d  a rcasonabie doubt nli 
n9 'The confusion that the complex death penalrt subm~sslon can cause eien tor a trtal judge. much less a jury. 1s 
evident from Tltornpsun v. State, 85 S. FV.3d 635 (510. banc 2002) In Thonrp~un, the jury returned verdlcrs tor life 
~mpr~sonment on each of defendant1$ &lo counts of tirst-degree rnurder The court then polled the jury, askmg each 
juror, "Is that your verdict'" When all but one stated that ~t was not his or her verdict, answering "no," the cotirt rehsed 
to accept the 11fe verdicts and ordered the jury to r e n m  for hrther dellberatlons. Ultimately, the jury deadlocked and 
sentenclng passed to the coun, which imposed two death sentences. Because the trlal court ordered the jurors to return 
for further dellberat~ons after they returned verdlcts for llfe ~mpr~sonment wthout tlrst asking the jurors any hrther 
questions In an attempt to clar~fy thelr Intent or ascertain at what polnt the )urors may have lacked unanlmq.  thls Court 
reversed the sentences of death and remanded for a new sentenclng hearlnp Tlrompson, 85 S, CE2d ut 640-641 LVhlle 
here, unl~ke in Tltontpson, the jury dld not first return a 11fe sentence, ~t did dlvlde 1 1 ro 1 In fator of life imprlsonnlent 
rather than death. 
IL RETRO.4CTIVE APPLICATION OF RIC'G TO DE.1 TI2 PEN.4L TY C.4SES 
The S t ~ t e  argues that. elen if hlr U'hltfield's rlght under r h  S i \ i h  and Folitt~~crrtiz tmendments. as recoanl~ed In 
R h g ,  Mas vlolated because the judge made the factuai tindlnps supporting a sentence of death. Rirrp c;lnnot bs applied 
to hlr LVhlttleld's sentence. and thls Court's mandate at'firmng that sentence should not be recalled. 
iVhile thls Court has neler fully delineated the scope of an appellate court's pomer to recall ~ t s  mandate. ~t 1s nell- 
established that. althouph an appellate court dltests ltszlfof j u r ~ s d ~ c t ~ o n  of a cause %hen the court transimts ~ t s  rmndate. 
junsdlctlon may be reacquired by means of "'the judlclal power to recall a mandate for certain purposes "' State v. 
Thompson, 659 S. FK2d 766, 768 (hlo. banc 1983). quotitrg. Reimers v. fiatzk B. Connet Llrmber Co., 273 S. W.2d 
343, 349 (l$lo. 1954) Thus, "our courts have properly recognized that a mandare may be recalled in order to remedy a 
deprlvatlon of the federal constltutlonal rlghts of a c n m a l  defendant." Thompson, 659 S.W.Zd at 768-769 Most 
commonly, [*311 thls rule IS applied to recall a mandate when defendant shows that appellate counsel was lneffectlte 
Thls places the case In the procedural posture ~t was In at the tlme of the orlglnal appeal, and effectl~e appellate counsel 
can rase  the issues not properly ralsed on the ~nltlal appeal See id. nIO 
tr 10 Srrclz clainzs trow mrrst be raised by nrotiorr rrtrder Rule 29.1 5 or Rrrle 21.035 ratlzer tlzatr by niutiotz to recall 
mandate. 
'15 Tltotnp~utr noted. houel r r  another Instancs in nhleh a mandate ~ 1 1 1  bt: recalled IS "nhel: the iii.sls~t)n o r  J 
!o\\er appelldtt. iourt ~ i l r t~ t l :  :ontllccs nith a iie~lsloi? of :he L nlttd Starts Suprsnle Court upholdl~:? tile 11zhtb or t~ 
aciused " Id.. cititr y. Srizt~* 1.. CfcRej~tzoltl~, 581 S. FF .3ri f 65  (Ch. 4pp. 19-9):  Stclt~ I.. tetqi?l 5 ,  j8 I S. 1P.311 138 I Ilo. 
tpp. 19'9). Cf. Srnte v.  Trrer. ' 4 -  S. Il.fii 30'. 31 I t Ifo. -1pp. ?l..D. 1998) (01 crrulln; motlon to rzc;tIl rnand;tie x ,~l~er ;  
the mutton tdlled to demonstrate 1*32) lhdt "the ducrslon ds rendered dbndgei an) consr~tt~tlonal rlght of  d ;rrmlnai 
~iefendant as declared by the Ln~ted  States Supreme Court") 
,tlcRt.~-noids and ,'tevels are particularly lliustrati\e of ii court's poser  to rciall ~ t s  nianciate \\hen th. nlandatc 
abridges const~tutional right, that habe been recognlzcd by tlie I_. nited Stares Supreme Court In Uiri~,tt I b i l i \ c i . l ,  I .i;o 
C S 357. 58 L El -7ri 579 99 S Cf 564 (1979), the Unlted Stares Suprenlc Courr held that the systemdrlc evclusrori of  
women rn a way that resulted In jury xen~res averagtng less than 15"O females c~oldted the Constiriittnn'c; fdlr cross- 
irctlon rsyutretnent Dtiren, 439 C:S at 360 In both ,ZfcRe~-'nulds and Xevels. the court of appeals recalled 115 
mandates a f t j m n g  defendants' convictions m trldls ln which volr dire hdd proceeded In a \+ay not p e m ~ r t e d  tinder 
Drrrett. afier the Supreme Court held m Lee v. .%fissoriri, 439 C:S 461, 58 L. Ed. 2d 736, 99 S. C't. 710 (19-9). that 
Dtiretz %a5 rctroactit e 
LVhile the State recognizes that Tliompson allows this Court to recall its mandate if lk33j rrs prlor decis~on 
conflicts w ~ t h  a United States Supreme Court decision tipholding the rlghts of the accused, the Stare dcn~es  that such 
confltct exlsts, arguing that Ring does not apply to cases such as rhls one. that have become final Indeed, the State goes 
so t j r  3s to argue that a dectsion announcing a new procedural npht of the accused can n e v ~ l ~  be applted to cases on 
collateral reclew, asserttng 
Slnce the [blissouri] Supreme Court decls~on in Tlrtzmpson, the [Un~ted States] Supreme Court's jur~sprudence on 
retroactlvlty has been greatly sln~pl~fied by ~ t s  declslon In Griffith v. Kenincky, 479 6 ' 3 .  314, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 107 S. 
Ct. 708 (198") In GrqJith. the Supreme Court held that a new rule for the conduct tbr c r m n a l  prosecuttons is to be 
applied retroacttvely only to cases, slate or federal, pending on direct revlew or not yet final. Grrffith 479 b'S lzt 328 
Since appellant's appeal \>as nor pending on dlrect revlew and 11 was Endl in June 3002. Nitig does not apply 
retroactt\ ely to appellant's case 
The State's argument roo nanowly consmtes both the law applicable In federdl courts governmg retroactlve appl~cation 
of newly [*34] stated federal procedural rules and thls Court's duty and authorlnr to apply federal constttut~onal law 
retroactlvely 
As to the first concern. Griffith did not set a Ilrmt, or celllng, on when new procedural rules will be applied to other 
cases, but rather a floor It. set out when new procedural rules nzusf be applied to other cases, sratlng. "a neu rule for 
conduct ofcr~rmnal prosecutions 1s to be applzed retroactlvely to all cases, state or federal, pending on rizrect ~e1~lew or 
not vet finiil " Griyfitlt, 479 U.S. at 328 (emphans added) Griffith at no polnt satd that a stare cannot apply new 
crirmnal procedural rules to cases on colldtsral re.ilec\ - ~ndeed. that Issue \%as not before lt, as GriJfitli \%as a direct 
appeal 
After Gr$jitIr. the test lisr when a nr\\ constlhltlonal procedural r~ght  \%;could be applied to cases on colldtsral rsl le\b 
at first conttnued to be the thee-part analys~s developed by the Un~ted States Supreme Court In hvo cases Linkletrer v. 
tl-alher, 381 L:S. 618, I4 L. Ed. 2d 601, 85 S. Ct. 1731 (1965), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 C:S. 293. I8 L. Ed. 2d 1199, 
87 S. Ct. 1967 f196-' ')*33] The Litikletter-StuvaN analys~s requlres a court to evaluate three factors when 
d e t e m l l n g  lvhether retroactlve appllcatlon should be glven to a new constitut~onal standard. Those factors are 
(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the rellance by law enforcement author~ties on 
the old standards, and (c) the effect on the admn~stra t~on fjustlce of a retroactlve appltcdt~on of the nen standards. 
Stovull, 388 L.S. at 297. The three-part rest set forth In these cases 1s the analys~s that this Court historically has appl~ed 
In determnlnp whether a decision should be appl~ed retroactlvely See e.g. Sptrile 1 Stare. 446 S IP 2d 793. 1969 ,\to 
LEdYIS 700; State v. L'ssety, 452 S. W.2d 146 (Jfo. 1970): .ClcCitlley v. State, 486 S. IF12d 419 f,bI~. 1972) 
Tmo years after Griffiih, the Un~ted  States Supreme Court d ~ d  adopt a ne% test for detemnlng \\henfi~iferni courts 
u~ll  apply neu constitut~onal rules to cases subject to federal habeas reblew Teagiie v. Lane, $89 L.S. 288, I03 L. Ed. 
2rl 334, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989). Under Tengiie [*361 . federal courts may not apply a ne- ~ 0 n S t l t u t l ~ n a ~  rule
retroactivel> unless the rule 1s a maner of subs tan t~~e  la\\ or, ~f procedural. ~t thlli nlthln one of txo  rtuceptlons ( I )  ~t 
places "certaln klnds of prlmary. prnate ~ n d ~ ~ ~ d u a l  conduct beyonci the pones of tbs crirmnal l anm~klny  au thor~n  to 
proscrtbe" 
ni ! - i'or Instance. projcr~b~ng the death penalty ;or those who s e r e  mentall.: rttardeii at d ~ e  t~nle  of the~r  ir:mt.. or 
( 7 )  ~t :btabl~bhes procell~~re\ that "1mu11cate the fundamental fd~mess ot'tllz tr:di. ' 1117 "n~thout  ~blllch :he I ~ k ~ l ~ l ~ o o c !  of 
an accurdtr co~i\:ctlon 15 ser:o~~slq dlnunlshed " r$.l1,+!i$ 4;iV j 5 L I I  i ' ; 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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Tengrie narroneci the >iniations in uhrcts a kderal court uill apply a new procedural rule retroactitel-) to cases on 
collateral review, setting forth a generdllj applicable rest rather than p e m m n g  federal courts to continue to m ~ k r  a 
case-by-case detemnatlon based on the l*3?) Linkletter-Stovall factors. There are numerous reasons lt adopted this 
new nlle. As the Supreme Court of Nevada noted in Gblwell v. State, 59 9.3d 463 (!\'ev. 2002). 
111 Tcciyuc, the Supreme Court, ~nstead of facus~ng on the purpose rind impact of a ne% constimtional rule. looked to 
the function of federal habeas revien, ~xhich is to ensure that state courts conscientiously follow federal constitutional 
standards Tlx Court de temned  that thts function is met by testing state concicrions agalnst the constitutional ~ A L Q  
recognized at the time of rrial and dlrect appellate review, . . Therefore. once a conviction has become final, federal 
habeas courts should generally not Interfere with the state courrs by applying new rules retroactively 
'4s Colwell also noted. houewr.  ''Tetig11e 1s not controlling on this court. other than in the minimum constrtutional 
protections established by its two exceptions." Id. This follows from the fact "states are free to procide greater 
protections in their c r ~ m n a l  justice system than the Federal Constitution requires " CaliJornia v. Rarnos, 463 L:S. 992, 
lU1-1, 77L.  Ed. 22d 11 71, 103 S. Ct. 3446 (1983) [*381 . For this reason, "the Supreme Court has recognized that states 
may apply nelc constirurional standards 'in a broader range of cases than is required' by the Court's decision not to apply 
the standards retroactlbely " Colwell, 59 P.3d at 470-71, quoting, Johnson v. ~Ven*Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 16 L. Ed. 1d 
882, 86 S. Ct. 1772 (1 966); see also State v. Fair, 263 Ore. 383, 502 P.2d 11 50, 11 52 (Or. 1972) ("% e ale free to 
choose the degree of retroactivity or prospectivity which we believe appropriate to the particular rule under 
conslderation, so long as u e  give federal constitutional rights at least as broad a scope as the linited States Supreme 
Court requires"). 
It is to each state to detemune whether to apply the rule set out in Teugue, to connnue to appli tile nile out 1x1 
Linkletter-Stovall, oi to apply ?et some other rule appropriate for deternuning retroactivity of a ne\x constitutional rule 
to cases on collateral review So long as the state's test is not narro\xer than that set forth in Tengtre. it v,i11 pass 
const~mtioi~al muster 
While this Court has on occasion cited federal 1*39] cases dealing with retroactivity that in turn re l~ed on Teague, 
n l3  this Court has never been presented with a case requiring it to decide bemeen the Linkletler-Stc~vail aild Teaglie 
tests heither has the State asked us to adopt the Teague test, nor even cited Teague to us in its brlef While kfissouri 
shares many of the policy concerns Tenglte discusses concerning the finality of convictions, these concerns are well 
protected by the three-factor test set out in Linkletter- Stovall and tradrtionally apphed by this Court Further. the latter 
test p e m t s  rhis Court to consider the particular facts and legal issues relebant to the specilic issue before the Court - for 
instance, here, to cons~der that the right asserted 1s the fundamental right to trial by jury and that the stakz is of the 
highest magnitude - the defendant's life n l J  
n 13 See e.g. State ex rel. iVi~on v. Sprick, 59 S. FK3d 51 5, 5211 (310. bane 2001), citing, Dukes v. C'rzited States, 
35.5 F.3d 912, 913 (8th Cir. 1001) (reco,on~zing that iipprendi presents a nexc rule of constitutional law that 1s not of 
"\\atershed" magnitude and. consequently, uill not be applied on collateral re\ ictx in federal courts) [*40] 
nl-l In Teaque, the L nited States Supreme Court reserteii the question  thet tiler the ne\c test it ~iloptc,i lsould hc 
applicabie to dec~sions in\ol:ing the death penalt). Tengne, -189 C.S. at 314, it. 2. C ' i t ~ m t s l ~ .  rh; Supr,-n;e Court 
Jetemuned to ~ p p l )  the nile in death penaln cases also. Penry v. Lyltaliglz, 493 C.S. 302, 313-14. 106 L. Ed. 2d 2j6, 
109 S. Ct. -7934 (1 999). bur the fait that it did so in a separate cle:ision constitxited 1 rscognioor! t l i ~ t .  b-, i r ~  :r- wnii-t 
death is different 
1003 *.la LEMIS 105, * 
Flnallj. tllii i d x !  in\itl\cs a mot~on to recall mandate -\i ~ I S C U S S C ~  iib~ctre, .llissouri has nacitrionctll) i e ~ o g n ~ s c d  
that a n?otic)n to recall ma~idate may be used to obtrtin rcltet from con\ict~ons and suritencrs that arc Incon>i>tent with 
federal constitutional rules T/tampson, 653 S. ?K2d at "68 
For these reasons, ab u matter of state lart, this Corm choose:, not to adopt the Teagrre analys~s but in.itead chooses 
to conrlnue applylng the Li~tkletter- Stuvall approach to the issue of the retroactivity of Ring, an approach j*Jll that 
comports better ~11 th  lissouri's legal tradrt~on n15 4pplyitlg the analysis set out tn Linkletter-Stuvtlll hore. t h ~ s  Court 
must oonstder i I ) the purpose to be served by the neb rule, (1) the extent of rehmce by law enforcernent on the old nrle, 
and ( 3 )  the effect on the admn~stratlon of~usrice ofretloactive appllcat~on of the neu standards n l 6  
nl S 'l\ihile Teagrre'~ restrictite federal approach TO retroactivirj may effect a "proper allocation of responsibility 
between the state and federal courts in the area of cor~stitutional crlmnal procedure" and elim~nate the "perceived 
encroachlent of federal habeas on srate courts," Mary C. Wutton, Retroactivi~~? In The States: Tke Impact uf Teagne 
v. Lane On State Pustcvnvictiun Remedies, 44 ALA. L. REV. 421, 449 (1993). it has been suggested that "the Teagut: 
test essenrially p re~en t s  state courts from achieving their goal [of correcting qustlce],  for through its focus on the 
impropr~ety of disturbing a final conviction. ~t diverts attent-ton from constitutional violations and prohibits relief except 
in the ' ~ e v r a r e  case " 44;ILA L REL L U - I ~ U  [*421 
1116 This Court is not the only state court to chose not to adopt Teaglie or to adopt a modified form of Teaglie. See 
e g .  Cotvell v. Leupley, 458 1V. K 2 d  514 (S.D. 1990) ( ' I &  e find the Tengue rule to be unduly narrow as to what issues it 
rvlll consider on collateral review."); State v. Lark, 11 7 X.J. 331, 567.4.2d 197 (X.J. 1989); Ex Purte Cuker, 575 So. 
2d 43 (,4/u. 1990): Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463 (!kev. 2002). 
The purpose to be served by the rule set out in Ring is to ensure a jury of defendant's peers finds each of the factual 
elements necessary to his canvlction and sentence of death. The Supreme Court and thls Court have both held that the 
right to trial b~ j u q  is 3 fundamental right rn serious crirmnal prosecutions Bentun v ,Ciary/and, 395 C!S. -84, 23 L. 
Ed. 2d "07, 89 5. Ct. 2t1.56 (I969), Spidle v. State, 4d6 S.W.2d T 3 ,  794-95 f,Vlu. 1969). In a case not inxolcing the 
death penalty, the Supreme Court held that this was not a suffic~ent I*J31 basis in itself to require regoactive 
appiicat~on of the rule requiring a jury trial in such cases DeStefhizo v. FPuuds, 392 C:S. 631, 633-34, 20 L. Ed Zd 
1308, 88 S. Cf. ,?093 (1968) It uent on to consider the impact of its new rule on the adrmnistration ofjustice and the 
extent of  reliance on the old rule and d e t e m n e d  that the effect %as so great that the new rule would not be applied 
retroaetir ely Id. 
B? contrast, here, the second and thud factors clearly favor retroactivity l ~ n l ~ k e  new constitutional rules dealing 
with Fourth An~eniimenr violatrons, the rule at issue here ~ 1 1 1  not invalidate any searches or preclude the adrmssion of 
any evidence And, unlike in states such as Xrvona in which the statutes required judges to d e t e m n e  whether to 
Impose the death penalty. in bIissoun juries hale alna)s made the decision >+hether to impose the death penalty except 
in those few cases in whtch the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Moreo.ier, under Griffitlt. Ring must be applied to 
all future death penalty Cases and to those not yet final or still on direct appeal. 
Thus, oniy those few \ifissouri death penalty cases that are no longer on direct dppeal and in which [*-I41 the j u q  
was unable to reach a verdict and the judge made the required factual detemnations and imposed the death penalty will 
be affected by the retroactive application of Ring. As a result, the effect of application of Ring to cases on collateral 
reviem \\ill not cause dislocation of the judicial or prosecutorial system. This Court's prelirmnury review of its iecords 
has identified only five potential such cases n1 
ii!- Sture I.. Ervi~t ,  9'9 S. Ik:2d 149 (310. banc 1998). cert. denied, 52.5 L.5. 1169, 143 L. Ed. 2J 91. 119 S. C-t. 
1090 (19991; State s. .kforrow, 968 S. ICL2d 100 (510. banc 1998). cert. denied. 52.5 C.S. 896. 142 L. Ed. 311 182. 1 19 
S. Cr. 232 11998); State v. Lyons. 951 S.ICZ2J 584 (\ lo.  banc 1997). cerr. denied, 522 C'.S. 1130. Id11 L. Eti. 2ri IdO, 
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14'8 S. Ci. 1082 (1998); Srufe v. Smitlr, 944 S.@:2if 901 (510. banc 1997). cert. deltieri, 552 L.S. 951. 199") (all 
sltbrtuttrd pursuant to KSMo 1994). and State v. Richardson, 923 S I.V-Zd 301, f 996 .Ifo. f-E.YiS 16. cdt-t. rfetiird, 519 
U.S. 972, 136 L. Ed. 2d 31: 117s. C"f. 4Q3 (1996) (\ubm~tted under RS?yto 1986) The versions of sectloll j65 OZCJ 111 
effect at tile time of these con\ ictions were icietttlcal to that in effect at the tlme of hlr IVh~tliclit '~ con\ lctlons 
Eben In those five cJse5. the effect 011 the adm~nlstratron of justice of  retroactlbe appircatiori of Riltg \\111 be 
m ~ m a l .  as 1s ebldent from applicat~on of the nevb rule to the Instant case -4lthough the sentence tmposed by the trtal 
court is reversed, no neiv gu~lr  or penalty phase trldl need be held nlS T h ~ s  rs because section 565 030 -1, for the reasor15 
d~scusssd above, does not p e m t  the death penalty to be imposed unless the fait finder finds the first three factors set 
out in that subsection against defendant, and as noted, the record only shows that the judge made these findrngs C i~der  
the prtnciples set out iln Riag which apply retroact~\ely to klr 'LVhitfield on this rnotlon to recall mandate, the court 
befou xiolated his constlruttonal right In making the requisite findlngs itself and sentencing him to death The onlv 
option \%as to impose a l~ ik  sentence n l9  
n18 Cumpare State st. Tuwery, 64 P.3d 825, 835 (..lriz 2003) ("Arizona has approximately ninety prisoners on 
death row whose cases hace become final and ~ h o  recelved a sentence based upon the aggravatrng circumstances found 
by the r ia l  judge and affimed on appeal. Conducting new sentenzlng hearings, many requlrlng bvimessrs no longer 
ava~lable, ~vould rmpose a substantla1 and unjustlfied burden on Arizona's admn~stration ofjusttce") ("461 
n19 Thrs Court further notes that even were a recall of mandate not available, defendant \vould be entitled to the 
same remedy In habeas corpus. In sentencing Mr. Whttlield to death without a jury finding of factors 1, 2, and 3 a= ~ a r n s t  
defendant, the court below Imposed a sentence in excess of that permitted bv law. "If a court Imposes a sentence that is 
m excess of that authorized by law, habeas corpus 1s a proper remedy." State ex r d  Usowski 1;. Purkert, 908 S. FK2d 
690, 691 (310. bane 1995), citing, State ex rel. Duttun v. Sevier, 336 hie. 1236, 83 S. FE2d 581, 582-83 (;tlo. 1935) In 
such a case, the rules regarding presenation of error by raislng the error on direct appeal or In authorized post- 
conviction mot~ons do not apply, for "those waivers do not affect h s  objection that the sentence exceeds the maxlrnum 
alloured by law." id. Such an error 1s jurlsdictional, and cannot be walved. See e.g. Merriweatlter v. Grandison, 904 
S. FK2d 185, 459 (Mu. App. IKD. 1995). 
The Lnlted State5 Supreme Court has also refubed to find waver where the claim is based on d decis~on that, as dld 
Ring. announces a nzw conslirutional rule that evpllcitly overrules a past decision of the Court See Reed v. Ross, 468 
C!S. 1, 16, 82 L. Ed: Zd 1, 104 S. Ct. 2901 (1984) ("\\here a constitutional claim is so n o ~ e l  rhat its legal basis IS not 
reasonably available to counsel, a defendant has cause for h ~ s  failure to raise the claim in accordance with appliiablt: 
state procedures") 
The State disagrees It argues that, even if Ring applies retroactively, the remedy is to remand tor a ne\v penal5 
phase trial, not to Impose a sentence of life imprisonment. In support, the State notes that on remand of Ring itself the 
.4rrzona Supreme Court held that nexv penalty phase rnals are pemssible  The State suggests that there IS no reason 
v+hy the result should be different under Mssouri lam This argument ignores the fundamental distinction bet~been the 
death penalty processes In Lflssourl and m Anzona. In Arlzona. once a jury de temned  guilt, a judze detemuned 
punishment Therefore, the defendant in Ring and 111 other Arlzona death penalty cases never had the opportunity to 
hale a jury consider penalty phase evidence and d e t e m n e  whether to Impose a llfe sentence or death It IS therefore 
quite appropriate that the remedy the Arizona courts have ordered is that such a trlal be held 
In lfissouri, by contrast, ?ilr 'Lt;hltiield and other defendants hate allsays been entitled to j u q  sentencing under 
section 565 030 4 .A:, set out in detall aboce, the jurj must undertake four steps in determnlnp defendant's sentence. 
(*381 the first three or'~1hich require factual findlngs If the j u q  1s undble to tind each such fact falors d s ~ t h ,  then it 
must Impose a life sentence Here, the record falls to sho~v that the jurk made these tindlngs. bct does ~T'firrnat:\el> 
sho1v that the j i~dge entered a judgment of death based on ills own findings rzther than those of the j u r  '.5 3rattd. under 
Rill,o and miss our^ lzs\ this  as ei-ror that ?as nctt harmless Therefore. the j ~ ~ d g e ' s  (inll oprron n a b  [ii 11xr,o2e a 
sentence of life 
Ihe separate oplnltlil ot Judge Prtce bugpests that this is not the casc, and that. at least tintil Missour1 s jury irrstraictrons 
require jurors to specify at >\hat point they habe deadlocked, by making separate uriMen iindlngs A:, to each i ~ c p  521 otit 
in section 565 030 -1. the remedy $\ i l l  be to order a riel\ tiidl arxi glee the State J second opportunlt:, to con.. ince A 
different jury to find the facts necessary for tmposirron ol the death penalty But. hlissour~'s tatutes do nor proi ide for 
thrs second brte at the apple n20 
n?O The separate oplnlon cites to the L'nlted States Supreme Court's decision rn Saftffzaltn v. P~ettizsylva~tia. 53" 
C.S. 101, 15J L. Ed. 2d 588. I23 S. Ct. 732 (2003). m bxhtch a defendant successfully argued that he should haxe hii 
conLrctiun reversed and remanded for a new trial due to trlal error. He cla~med that slnce tn the first trial the ~ u r y  had 
deadlocked on 5mtence and the judge had sentenced him to life, he should be considered to hare been acquirtsci of the 
death penally and a life sentence should be tire maximum sentence on remand The Court disagreed. holdtng that it 
could not presume at uhat point m the process the jury had deadlocked on p ~ i n i s h e n t  and therefore ~t uas der'crndant's 
burden to shes nhere the deadlock came tf he wanted to argue that the jury acquitted hlm of the elements of the death 
penalty 
This analysis would apply had Mr. &%rrfield sought a new ma1 on the basis of some separate trial error that caused 
this Court to reverse and remand his convictton, and argued that the death penalty could not be sought in the ne.cc trial 
But, here. the error alleged at Issue IS not some unrelated ma1 error, but the tery entry of a judgment of death based on 
the judge's findings, nor those of a jury, as requlred by secrlon 565.030. In &IS circumstance, it is irrelevant whether one 
can presume from the deadlock that the jury acqutned defenda~~t of the death penalty. Presumptions play no part in this 
case. The death sentence was unconst~mtlonal, and. the judge was required to enter a sentence of ilk inlprisomnent. In 
thrs circumtance, rt would make defendant's vlctory a hollow one Indeed ~f this Court were to hold that the remedy for 
the trlal judge's farlure to enter a life sentence is to remand to allow the State to seek the death penalty again at a new 
trral. The remedy nlust be to correct the error by imposing the sentence the judge should hate lmposed - life 
impnsonnlent wlthour the poss~bility of probation or parole except by act of the Governor. 
The separate optnion seems to assume that the judgment IS based on the jury's factual findings, and the issue IS what 
presumptions can be rnduigsd in about at &hat point the jury deadlocked But, section 5b5 030 -1 provides that a 
defendant shall be sentenced to 111;: rmprisonment r~iz1rs.s the jury finds steps 1, 2, 3, and 4 agalnst him or her It also 
prot ides that, when the jurt deadlocks, the jury's findings simply disappear from the case and the court is to make rts 
o m  independent tindmp That 1s uhat occurred here Thus, any presumptions as to what the j u g  ma! hate found are 
simply irrelevant. Here. tile judgment of death, based on the court's findmngs, constituted constitutional error For the 
reasons set out above. that error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. n2 1 Therefore, had thls case been tried 
after Ring, the proper course of action for the judge to fo110%+ txonld hate been to sentence defendant to life 
imprisonment. The fact rhac the appllcabillry of Ring \%as not detemned until later does not change the remed-t In the 
present case It is st111 to enter the judgment the trral court should have entered - a sentence [*501 of llfe Imprisonment 
w~thout eligibility for probatron or parole n22 
n21 Indeed. even uere the error harmless, a nlal court has a duty to refuse to intentionally c o m t  error, e\en 
"harmless" error. See State v. Cullen, 39 S. W.3d 899, 906 (i2.1~. ..ipp. E.D. 2001). 
n22 Indeed, perhaps in response to Ring, this Spring the \lissour~ Senate, by a vote of 31 to 0,  passed HB 198, 
which contarned an amendment, SX-19, expressly protiding for just this resu'it - thdt if the jury deadlocks, the judge 
shall enter a life sentence ./(>rlr.nczr of rile Scntltc 1tf1n I4 2003 Tno d a ~ s  later the \.llssouri House of Representatires 
passed the confkrence report on HB 198 b\i a xote of 129 to 29 J o ~ i ~ ~ z i l l  of I I IL]  I L I O I I J ~  lfm. I6 2/iOi' The confereilce 
report on HB 194 al,o proxided for approizi o f t l l l ~  amendment, but the bill. tvhich contzmeii nun:erou.; orhc.; :><Lies 
~ l s o  \\. as ldld o'i er in !he Senare on the last ofthe ,essicn Joiii-,r(~i ii ~ l : ~ ,  -5, I I , L ' L ~  5 :IJIJ-: 
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I htr resulr 1s ant~clpated, and [*51] reyu~red, by sectlor1 565 040 2, which prolides In pertinent part. 
"111 tire evertt fljnt ulty deatlt sentence iniposed pitrcfiatzt to tliir chapter ir Iteld to he rcircuttstiilttiottul, the trltl 
court \ \hi ih pret~ouslif sentenced the defendant to d e ~ t h  shall cduse tlie dejendunt to he hruugltt he31re the corrrt urltf 
sltult setrrence tlre deJenduftt lo lqe itrtprisonment t t~tho~ir  eli~ibilit!, for probat~on, parole, or releare except hi. act of  
the goiernor " 
Sec. 565.040.2 remphas~s added) Because the imposition of blr iVh~tfield's death sentence has been determined to be 
in violanon of his right under the S ~ l t h  and Fourteentfz Amendments to a jury deternunation of the facts rendering hlrn 
el~gtble .for death, section 565 040 2 clearly applies It expressly states that a defendant %hose sentence is vacated on 
constitutional grounds shall be resentenced to Iife in prison. It does nor, as the separate oplnlon suggests, state that a 
defexi-ndant shall bz sentenced to life imprtsoment only d hts death sentence ts held unconst~tutional on the basis that the 
defendant was never really el ig~ble tor the 1*521 death penalty in the first place, such as defendants who are mentally 
retarded or as to \\horn no statutop aggrakator applies, and that defendants whose sentences are ovemmed  on 
procedural grounds shall receive new trials. Rather, it states that "in the event that an-y deirth Sentence ~nzpos~ltl  put.szrant 
to t h i ~  cIz(yt<r IJ hdd to be 14nc;onstlturronui, the crral court. .shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment." Id. 
(emphasis added) 
Mr CLhltticld's death sentence, imposed pursuant to chapter 565, is herein held to be unconstitutional becatise it t ~olates 
his right to be sentenced on detenmations made by a jury n23 Sect~on 565 040 2 states that in the event that a death 
sentence imposed pursuant to chapter 565 is held to be unconstitutional, the defendant shall he sentenced to ht'e 
lmprlsomenr lifr Wh~tfield accord~ngi> 1s entitled to be resentenced to a term of Iife imprisonment filthout eliglb~l~ty 
for probation, parole, or release except by act of the gobernor 
1123 This IS to be distinguished from situations l k e  State v. .lfayes, 63 S.FK3d 615, 635 (310. banc 2001), and 
other cases cited by the separate opmlon, in which a new trial was ordered because of unrelated trial error of 
constrtutional dunemion. Here, as dlscussed, it is the very entry of the death sentence that is held to be unconstitutional, 
sirtee made without the very jury find~ngs required for inlposition of the death penalty under Missoun law, dnd hence 
the only remedy is to order Imposition of the proper penalty - a life sentence. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court recalls its mandate in Wltirfieldd 939 S. W2d 361, sets a s ~ d e  hlr U hitfield's 
sentence of death, and pursuant to section 565 040 2, Rule 84 13, and &s Court's author~ty under section 565 035 j(2).  
sets a s ~ d e  the sentence of death and resentences defendant to life imprisonment without eiigibility for probation. parole, 
or release except by act of the gobemor In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed as provided in this Court's 
opinion of Jdnuaq 2 1, 1997 
LALIRA DEhT IR STITW, JUDGE 
White. LVolffand Teitelman, JJ., concur; Price, J., concurs in part and dissents in part in separate opinion filed: 
Benton, J.. concurs in opinion of 
Price. J , Limbaugh, G J . concurs in part in opinion of Price. J . Limoaugh, C J , dissents in sepxatr  opinion tilc,i 
DISSENTBY: 
bi'ILLI=\bI R%Y PRICE. ;R i In Part). Stephen 5 Limbilligh. Jr 
The rnajorlty decrsion conclude3 thilt Rlrig i2 .-!I iziiilrr j36 L's' 584 1.5-3 L ilil 2ri j j r i  132 5 2121' (_7/j03/ 
[*54i requires separate jury detemnatioiis concerning the first three steps ot section 565 030 4 nl The majorrt.\i illso 
concludes that Rlrrg should apply rehoactively In this cabe 
n l  ,411 statutof); references are to RSklo 1994 unless otherwise tndicated, 
To this extent, I agree with the majority oplnion. I do not agree, houever, that automanc comutat lon of 
Whrtfield's death sentence to life rmpnsonment is required 
pursuant to section 565 040. The procedural error that occurred in the penalty phase of Wh~tfield's trial can be fully 
cured by remand for a new sentencing phase trlal. 
The majorrty contends that the trial court committed constitutional enor in itself makrng the findings under steps 1, 
2, 3, and 4 of section 565.030.4 when the j u r ~  did not do so. However, this was error only if the jury deadlocked prlor to 
step 4. If not, the jur~i made all the necessary factual findings requrred by Rlng to de temne  [*53] that Whitfield was 
death elrgible .4ny findings thereafter by the judge only confirm hls separate agreement with the jury, an addltlonal 
safeguard. 
It 1s clear that the srate has not shown that the jury deadlocked at step -1. after rnaklng the requ~red findings at steps 
1, 2, and 3 Home>er, rt is equally clear that Mr. Whitfield has failed to show that the jury did not find steps 1, 2, or 3 
The record 1s completely devoid of fact regarding at nhich step the jury deadlocked. The burden of proof lies on 
Il'h~tfield. not the srate See Strtt~rzilirri I, P ~ . n n ~ ) l ~ c u i r i ~  ji7L, S 1 0 1  l j J  L Eii 211 333, 1-73 5 Cr -32 (_7//03/ ( i l lp  
op at 7) ("Petitioner here cannot estdblish that the jury or the court 'acqulrted' hlm during hls first capital-sentencing 
proceeding "1 Thus, the q o r i t y  must presume. expresslv or not, that the jury deadlocked prror to step 4 
Based upon ~ t s  presumption, the majonr) finds constrtutronal error and ~ n ~ o k e s  section 565 040 to require 
automatic commutation to a llk sentence. However, even assurmng the valrdrty of rts presumptron, the majonry reads 
section 565 040 too broadly and ignores sectron [*56] 563 035 
Sectron 565.035 describes this Court's general duty to review death penalty sentences. This section authorizes and 
allows to this Court the full latltude necessary to remedy error in capital cases by provrding three alternatr.~es for 
resolution. It states in pertrnent pan: 
I W3enever the death penalty 1s imposed In any case, and upon the judgment becom~ng tinal In the trial court, tlze 
sentence shall be reviewed on the record by the supreme court of ?vIissouri .... 
2. Thc supreme court of blusour~ shall conslder the punishment as uell as any errors enumerated bq ttayoof appeal 
The supreme ionit . &*izh rc.qard to review of dgatlt setztelzces, rilnll he autlzori;ed rct 
i 1 ifin rile sentence of death. or 
( 2 )  Set tlte sentence aittde and rcseiltence the defendant to life ~mprisom~ent  u~rhout  eliglb~llry for prob~tron, parole, or 
release except by act of the governor, ur 
( 3 )  Ser tile sentence aside and remand the case h r  retrial 01 the pun~shment hearlng .A net\1 lury ~ h ~ l l  be selected or ;1 
jury nay  be w a ~ ~ e d  by agteenleilt of both parties 
Sect1011 1*57) 565 035 (emphasis added) 
Sectton 565 040, on the other hand, applies in just two veryr linuted situations where only conmutation to a life 
sentence can remedy the enor of a substantr\ely unconstitut~onal sentence It provldes 
1 In the ebent that the death pmafq  proclded in this chapter 1s held to be unconst~tutional, any person con\ iited ot 
murder in the first degree shall be sentenced by the courr to life imprisonnlent wthout eligibliity for probarion parole, 
or release except by act of the governor . 
1. En the event that any deatli penalty Aetrteitce in?po.sed purstlant to thls chapter is held to be unconstinitional, the 
trial court \%hlch previouslv sentenced the defendant to death ... shall sentence the defendant to Itfe ttmprisor~xenr 11 ithout 
cliglb~lity for probation, parole, or release except by act of the governor ...." 
(emphasts added). 
Sections 565 040 and 565 035 must be read together ln pnrl tnnrerlrl to provide this Court w ~ t h  the full panoply of 
remed~es to correct error in capital murder cases. Vl'here e~ther  the death [*58] penalty itself is unconst~tutional. section 
565.040 1, or uhere a death penalty sentence cannot constitutionally be imposed upon a particular defendant, sectlon 
565 040 2, situations of substantive uncons&tutionalrty that cannot be corrected by any retrial, the only adequate remedy 
is to commute the death sentence to life imprisonment. Hotvever, uhere procedural error occurs that can be h l ly  
remedied by a new penalty phase n ~ a l ,  section 565.040 is not necessary and was ob~iously not intended to be applied. 
nZ 
n? It is interesting that the majaritt is concerned that the state mght  get a "second bite at the ~ p p l e "  \\hen the 
tndjority retroactl~ely applies nen precedent to a trial that was conducted in accordance wit11 the procedurdl 
requirements known at the tlme and to which Whitfield made no object~on. 
Section 543 040 \%as enacted to apply in response to detemnations such as F~lrnlczn v Geor;oitz 408 1 S -738 33 
L Eti 2ii 346 92 S Cr 2726 1/97?] 1*59] and 4rkzn~ v Lirglrzla 536 L S 304 15-7 L Eri 2tf 335 :3? S Ct -3242 
(20021 Section 565 040 1 applies only in the event that the death penalty, in its totality. is deemed unconstitutional, 
such as in Frrrman or in this Court's decision in State v Dzlren 547 S P Zd 476 (kIo banc 1977) Sirmlarly, section 
565 040 11 governs only \%here a death sentence cannot constitutionally be imposed upon a particuldr offender. such as 
where the offender is mentally retarded. ;ltk1nlns 536 L S 304 153 L Eri 2ci 335 1-33 S Ct 224-7, where the offinder is 
not competent, Folri v CPczrtrwrrght 4'7 L'S 399 91 L Etl 2tI 335 106 S Ct 2.595 (1986). where there is insufficient 
evidence to sustain the eulstence of a statutory aggravating circumstance if the sentencer found only one such 
circumstance, Ls:.tul~ L Jeffers 49- b S 764 111 L Elf 2rl 606 110 S Cr 31192 (1990). or uhere a slngle statutory 
aggravating circumstance is found to be constitutionally \ague, Gorifiey v Georgln 446 L:S 420 64 L ELI 3rl 395 
1 0 0 s  Ct 1759 11980) 
Section 565 040, [*60) houeber, does not apply to situations of mere procedural error, e\en ~f such error is rooted 
In constitutional principles First, the plain words of the statute l m t  its application to e5ents in which "the death  penal^ 
[m ~ t s  totaliQ] is held to be unconstitutional" or in ~ b h ~ c h  "an? death sentence impo\cd [as to a particulal offender: is 
held to be unionstitution~i" Second, there IS no polrct reason to mandate 3 particular more exireme reme& >\hen J 
lesser, more moderate remeci:. is suffic~ent o guard the procedural r~ghts of the offender 
Indeed. this Court'> precedents indicate that remand fix a nen penaitli proceeiiing is the approprljr; renle: l~ l len  
there 1s proceiiural error iu\inp constitutional ~rnplicatlons during the penalrq phase ot a trial In Sr,r:'~ , t! :7 ,,i. rhis 
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Court fa~tr-rd a procedural error in the penalty phase from the trial court's hilure to gitc & "no adterse inicrencefl 
tnstructlon Sttile v  mule^ 63 S W'3d 6 l j .  63.5 ("Lo banc 2001) (citing CIS Con~r  anrenri V )  Tl-tts Courr coniiudcd 
that the procedural elror required remand for a new penalty phase. even though the error had constitutional implicanons 
[*61) ,zilincr, (ii S I t  i i f  c r t  640 StVe izlrii S t l ~ t ~ .  S t n r ~ ~ t  986 S Ef'2rJ 462 (410 bartc 1999) (same issue and rtbult), 
S i ~ t t ~ "  E Rhotiei YSY S k ! ~ ' ? ~ l  321 328-29 (hlo barlc 1999) (error In prosecutor's penalty phase clo\tng arguillenr ha~l i lg  
constitutional lmpllcattons resulted in remand for netv penalty phase hearing) 
Stm~larly, in Stirt~> L. lhonlpsorz Sj S CV"3rf 635 (blo  banc 2002). cited by the myority, this Court found the trial 
court's failure to poll the j u q  sufficiently about its initial verdict resulted in J. constitutionally unreliable sznteilce 
Tirorrtproli 85 S D'3ti tri 6-12 (citation3 omitted) This Court ordered a new sentencing hearing to renledt the 
constituticrnal ~ ~ o l a t l o n  Tl~(~lonapron, 8.5 S Ct 3il at 64-1 In 50 remanding, thls Court avoided cons~deratlon of an Issue 
under Ring 536 U S  at 644 n.8 
The major19 did not find that section 565 030 4 cannot be constitutionally applied slrnply by requiring explicit jury 
find~ngs of steps 1, 2, and 3 Nor did it find that a judge could not constltut~onally sentence an offender to death if the 
jury deadlocked at step 4 of sectlon 565 030 4 [*621 . Nor did the majority find that it was unconstitutional to assess the 
death penalty against lVhitfield because of any factors lndicidual to hlm. Rather, the reallty of the majority opinion is 
merelv that procedural error. aibeit of a constitutional nature, occurred during the sentencing phase of Vvhirfield's trial. 
That procedural error can be fi-llly remedied by renlaid for a new penalty phase trial with separate evplicit jury 
detemnations b a n g  made for each of the three fact-finding steps of section 565 030 1( 1). (2), and (3). 
For these reasons I would remand this case for retrial of the penalty phase and allow a jury to dctemune rhe 
appropr~ate level of punlskmrnt. 
\VILLIX&l R A Y  PRICE, JR., Judge 
DISSENTING OPGI'ION 
1 respectfully dissent. 
Prelimmarily, I have great concern that the majority has efkctnely displaced the time-honored principle of finality 
b l  pemtt ing Khitfield to challenge the const~tutionalin- of kfissoun's death penalty statute for the first time in a motion 
to recall the mandate In accordance w t h  established procedures for collateral reblew of a procedurally defaulted clalm, 
lbhittield instead must [*631 seek habeas relief on grounds of cause and prejudice. Brown v Stute, 66 S CC'3i1 --'I 736 
(Mo, banc 2002) 
4 s  this Court recognized tn Stare v Thompson 659 S W2ri 766 769 (Mo. banc 19831, an appellatt: court is 
d~tiested of jur isd~~t ion oker a case upon issuance of its mandate, with only limted exceptions One such exception, and 
the exception that cominces the majorltv of the propriety of reasserting jurisdictton over this case, is nhere "the 
declsion of a lolher appellate court dtrectly contlicts with a decision of the United States Supreme Court upholding thc 
rights of the accused." Irl 
In its abbre~iated discussion of the appropriateness of reasserting jurisdiction over Vvhittield's claims, the majorlty 
cltes Stute v ~ClcRcrynoltO j8 1 S CV 3 t l 4 6 j  (rtfo rlpp 1979). and Stilte v Neveh 58 I S W 2ri 135 (.Vo fpp I9-9), as 
"illustrative of a court's pov+er to recall its mandate when the manddte abridges constitutional rights that ha le  been 
recognized by the Unlted States Supreme Court" The majority explains that in both L/cRc.\no/rl~ and C P l < l i ,  "the court 
of appeals recalled its mandates [+641 afirrmng defendants' conblctlons in trials In nhich Lair dire had procredeii in .i 
~va?  not pemurted under Dlll-etl I Iir~so~lr 1 i-J1) I S 3j' iS L Etl 3tl -7'9 99  S Cr 66.i /!9-9), after tl-re \Llcri ir  
Court held in L?e \* li~\\oun 439 C .i 161 55 L Eql 211 -36 99 S C I  -iO (19-91 that Drr~clr 11.~5 retroact!' e ' :<\hat 
the majorie tails to acL-nonlt:dge. houe:el-, ir that the m~ndares that \\ere recalled in both 01 these iJSL'5 t'.zlliiti7, 
rejected the particular cvnstinttional claim later recognized b? the D ~ ~ I L I I I  C'o~ir~ 111 thts respec:. the ~ p p e i l ~ t ?  
alfirm~ng oplnlon5 "~iirectly conflicted x ~ t h  J. decision (II the Pntted States Suprcme Court ~ ~ p h o l d t ~ ~ g  he rtghtr o f  thc 
accused " Tfronip\or~, 659 f I C ~  _'ti rrt '60 
B> ioiltrast, in this case. tlhitficld d~af nut a g u e  or1 d~rect  appeal thar 'llissoriri'i cilpitill ientenzing proceiiutei are 
~incotl~titnti~)nai lice Sriltz 1 Ith~tfreiii Y?!, S i f  261 J I , !  ('40 banc 19971 Tl-tus. tllrre is no incor~gniit> bet-;teen t l l i j  
Court's sarller mandate and Rirrg's subsequent holdlng Because the mandate, and the opinlon on ahlch 11 \-\as based, 
does nor uphold. oi eten address, the ionstrrtlttonalit) [*651 ot the c;tpiral sentencing statute. Ir  cannot be s a d  to 
"dlrecrly conttict nlth a decls~on of the L nited States Supreme Court," Tlzotnp~i~t? 659 S 1V .?ti ar '69 ,  and as such, a 
recall ot  the mandate is not appropriate 
A-or is il recall of the mandate appropriate, as the majority suggests, because this Court's Jecirion affirrmng 
Whitfield's con\ictton and sentence resulted in a "drpriration of the federal consritut~onal rlghts of a crinunal 
defendant " i t1  To hold that a prior mndate ,  that does not facially confllct ~ s - ~ t h  a L'ntted Stares Supreme Court deciston 
ri-phoidlng the rights of the accused, can nonetheless be recalled merely because it 1s later determined rhat the conviction 
or sentence should not haxe been affirmed in light of a constirut~onal c l a ~ m  that was not asserted, would be to 
completely eQiseerate the time limtations imposed on raising cla~rns of error on direct appeal and in post-conr~ction 
mottons I cannot support such a blatant ox erhaul of the rules of post-comiction practice 
As the majorrry correctly notes, habeas relief is ahailable to a defendant \%hose sentence is unlalsful State Ltr t e i  
itrxon I Spr zih 59 S it' 3d 315 519 [*661 (>lo banc 7001) Houexer, the majorlty incorrectly concludes Whitfield 
would be entltled to habeas rrllef, desplte his procedural default, because "the court below imposed a sentence in excess 
of thar permitted by law" Lnlthe the cases cited by the majority, the error Whitfield asserts 1s not jurisd~ctional in 
nature In both ibferrttc~ntlze~ 11 Grciniiirot~. 904 S IY 2tI 485 (.Clo ,4pp 15)93), and State eu re1 O S O I ~ J ~ I  v Pltrketr 9118 
S W2t i  690 (Xlo bane 1995). the hlal court had erroneously imposed sentences that exceeded the maximum sentence 
expressly provided by statute for the charged offenses. Although the defendants failed to timely challenge the 
unauthorized sentences, their claims of error were addressed, because a jurisdictronal defect cannot be waived. 
itfer?nteaahtlr 904 S W 2rt at 489, OsowXr 908 S W Z d  [it 691 In this case, however, the authonty to sentence a 
defendant to death 1s expressly granted by statute, thus, the court did not Impose a sentence in excess of that p e m t t e d  
by law. Rather, the claim of error asserted by Whitfield is grounded on the court's failure to follow the procedures 
necessary [*671 to Impose the dearh sentence under Ring v ;Irrzorzn, 536 L S 58-1 l j 3  L Ed 2 t l 5 j 6  I22 S Ct 2423 
/_300.?1 
In se\eral different contexts, Lfissouri courts habe recognized that procedural irregularities a111 not driest the court 
of a u t h o r i ~  to sentence ;l defendant withln the range allo\%ed by law For instance, in Clrzv L D O ~ T E I I  e 37 S CY3d 214 
(blo banc 2000). t h ~ s  Court noted that the defendant's clalm that he %as improperly denied jury sentencing and that the 
sentencing court had erroneously considered an expunged pnor conviction did not amount to a jurisdicaonal claim [hat 
"the sentence imposed exceeded that authorized by lau " Cia$ 37 S W3rf nt 218 Simlarly, m Starc v T1ncht.r 797 
S W 2tl 794 ("Llo ilpp 1990). the court of appeals rejected the argument that the trial court's departure from procedures 
mandated by statute for imposlng enhanced punishment depribed the court of jurisdiction and held that such procedural 
errors winant reversal only if the error -as prejudicial T~ncher 797 S bV2ii at 7Y7, see also Stare L Jetznrng~ 8 / j  
S W 2cl -134 446 I,l.(o App 1991). Stitte \. B g  ant, 633 S i t  2ri 935, 940 (,blo 4pp 1933) [*681 
.4lthough the alleged error dld not deprile the sentencing court of jurisdiction to impose death, Whittield 
nonetheless may be ent~tled to have his procedurally defaulted claim addressed in a habeas proceeding b~ demonstrating 
"cause for the failure to timel? raise the claim at an earlier juncture and prejudice resulting from the error that forms the 
basis o f  the claim " Bro~rn 66 S CC. 3tf nr '26 But in an\ ?bent, he should be required to follow the firmly established 
procedures set forth for collateral recie~s LVhltfield "is bound to raise all challen,oes in accordance with the 
procedures established for that purpose." and none of these procedures, including a motion to recall the mandate, are 
"designed for Juplicati\e and unending challenges to the finalit) of a judgment." Sturtl 2-i rei Sir?lnlons v CVhzr~ 866 
S iV2d 443 1-16 (blo banc 1993) Yet today this Court has chosen to depart from our establ~shed crimnal re\ie\v 
system by inlenting an entirely nelv aLenue for challenging untimel> constitutional claims I dr:line to tollov+ the 
mAjorln do\\m 7111s m s y i d e d  path 
1 frirthrr deilirle to f'ollo\~ the rnajor~t.c's applicarlon of [*69) R~it:. I l/.lzc>~ztr that miitcl~araiter~zes ; t l ~ i ~ o t ~ r t ' ~  
caprtal sentenclng scheme The mandate of Krrrg 1s iirnply that a jury must mabe a tinding of "any fact on lbhich the 
Iegisldttlre condittons an tncrsd.;e In [the] maximum pun l shen t  " 536 1 S at 589 1 isould hold that step 3 of tllc 
capltal senrertclng statute, nhich drrects that the trter corlduct a bltlancing of the aggraxatiny and rrutig~ting 
clrcumtances, amounts to neither a facrual find~ng, nor a finding that increases the maximum punishment 
As noted 1Iissouri's capital sentencing statute, sect~on 565 030 4, RShfo 1994, irquires a tour-step process b e f ~ > ~ e  a 
death sentence nzay be ~ t n p o ~ e d  
The trier shall assess and declare the pun~slrmsnt at ltfe imprisonment w~thout e1iplbrIlty for probatton, parole, or 
release except bc act of the governor. 
If the trter does not find beyond 4 reasonable doubt at least one of the statutory agPra\ ating circumjrances set out In 
subsection 2 of sectroil 565.033. or 
If the trier does not find that the ebldence in aggra\ation of punishment, tncluding but not llrmted to e ~ i d e n c e  supporting 
the starutory aggravating 1*70] circumstances l~sted in subsection 2 of sectlon 565.032, wanants imposing the death 
sentence. or 
If the trier concludes that there is evidence in mtigation of punishment, including but not lirmted to evidence supporting 
the statutory rmtigating c~rcumstances ltsted in subsect~on 3 of sectlon 565.032, which is sutTiclent to outweigh the 
ev~dence in aggravation of punishment found by the aier, or 
If the tner dec~des under all of the circumtanccs not to assess and declare the p~inishment at death. 
I agree with the majority that steps 1 and 2 - which require that the trier find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of 
at least one stamtory aggavator that warrants the death penalty - constimte factual findings subject to Ring's 
proscriptions, and 1 further agree that step J - nhich glces the j u q  unfertered d~scretion to exercise m e r a  and reduce the 
sentence to life - in\ol\ ts  a J r s i r e t iona~  detemnation immune from the Ring holding. Step 3 1s more aLin to step -1 
than steps 1 and 2 
By requiring the jun to ~ e i g h  the evidence, that is, to balance and a s s e s  the re la t i~e  degree ot the e ~ i d r n c c ,  [*711 
step 3 entails a tcholly subjcctlbe and discretionary analysis See Stme v Snzltlz 649 S U 2ri 417 43:) {LIo banc 1988) 
In rebiewing an earlier, but essentially slrmlar version of the capital sentenclng statute, thls Court stated 
The purpose of the reasonable doubt standard is to reduce the risk of convictions and executions based onjcrctlttri 
error In blissowi. before a jury can conslder a sentence of death, it must unanimously find beyond a reasonable 
doubt eQery fact necessary to establish guilt of a capital crime and the existence of at least one statutory aggrakatmg 
clrcumstance, [section] 565 012, RSMo Cum. Supp 1982. Once these factual thresholds are crossed, howecer, the issue 
ceases to be one ofproor and becomes one of dzscrrtlon %ill the jury, after considering all the evidence and aggral ating 
and mtigating clrcumtances re le~ant  o the cnme and the defendant, recommend a sentence of death or life \+ithour 
eligibility for probation or parole for fifty bears The standard mandated by the Fozlrreentlz Anzenrirnmt for proof of 
ultrrnate facts does not control such an exercise of d~scretion 
Srnrrh. 649 S I t  -3rl at 430 [*72) (emphasis in originall See n l ~ o  Er Purre CV(z1rirop 2002 A1r1 LE'k1.S 336 at * 18 (41a. 
2002) ("The neighing process is not a factual detemnation or element of an offense, instead. it is a moral or legal 
judgment that takes into account a theoreticall) limtless set of facts that cannot be reduced to a scientiric formula or the 
discoven of a discrete. obsen able datum "\. People i PI t t ' t ~  31) Cr~i 4th 226 133 Ctrl Rprl J11 i + 66 P 3(1 / /.?3 
i : 4 ' /Cral l l i i  ii ("The pendlri phase Jetemunation 'is inherenil> moral and normati1 e. not factual " f citation onutted). 
Foi.tl i S'rl-lii!rr~~rl f i96 FJt i  804 319 i i d 1 1  Clr. 1993/  ("While the existence of an aggralatlng or mitigating 
circumstallce is a her su>ccpt~ble to proof imder J itasonable doubt or preponderance siandard rh i .  ;c!ari\i. '\elsilt is 
not " 1  
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Flnall?, there is A dtstincr~on, ;tlbe~t J subtle orre bet~cecn the legislatuie'i direitlolls in thew ~lteps '[he S ~ J ~ U ~ C  5311, 
for a "finding" In steps I and 2. uhereai the trter must arrrte at a "conclusion" irt step 3 Ihese dirkrent reyuirenrents 
hdte different ctrnnotatlnns rt findlng iuygests the ascertainment of an observable fact. rce LIEBS'TCR'S /*731 TI-IIRD 
\EM, INTER\ 'iTlOd;.4L LtlCTIOY IRI '  852 ( l % G )  (defining "finding" as "the rc.sult ot a J U J I L I ~ I   ti ~ i ld5l - )u~~i i ld l  
examnation or inquiry espcclally into matters of fact 3s embodied in the terdlct o f a  jury or decislon of a court, referee, 
or admii~istratice body ' 1 ,  t ~ h ~ l c  a onclus~on implies the evercrse ofjudgment, >CL' I(( at 471 (defining "cnnclusion" 
as "a reasoned judgment or expression of one inference ") In short. Step 3 requires that the tiler conduct a 
balancing of the aggra\atrng and mtlzatmg circumstances and reach ;l conclusion as to their rel;tri\c u e ~ g h t  S ~ c h  a 
detemnation neccssanly irnolves the exercise of judgll~ent. nor fast-finding 
Eten if '  the mqorlty is correct and itep 3 does entail a factual finding, it cannot be construed as the kind of f~c tua l  
finding under Rrng that increases the maxrmum pttnishmenr Instead, a firldlng in fabor of the dei;zndant under step 3 
acts only to decrease the punishent .  ~ubjecrlng an otherwise death-elig~ble defendant to life iilzprisomenr The 
language of the statute bears this out. The ljcrual findings requrred under steps 1 and 2 - uhether there exists at least one 
statutory aggravator and i"7-1) whether that aggrata~r-warrants the death penalty - are findings that are necessary to 
increase the m x m u m  pumshment from iife to death. Stnte v Worth~ngton 8 S CV3rJ 33, 88 (Mo. banc 1999) ("The 
finding of a starutory aggrasatlng circumstance sertes the purpose of determin~ng tthich defendants are eligible for the 
death penalty "1, Stute v Sh~zw 636 S CV3d 667 673; (b io  banc 1982) ("The jury's finding that one or more stanttor? 
aggraiatlng clrcumtances exist is the threshold requirement that must be met before the jury can. after considering all 
the evidence, recornlend the death sentence ") Howe~er ,  unlike the language in steps 1 and 2, step 3 is not couched as 
a prerequisite to the imposition of the death penalty. The "finding" required under step 3 is not cshether apgiavatlng 
factors outtve~gh rmtigaring factors in order to subject defendant to the death penalt-y, but whether rmtigating factors 
outweigh aggravating factors in order for defendant to avoid the death penalty despite being death-eligible. See 51 E L E  v 
Sture 815 ,4 -711 31.1 333 (Del 2003 (holdmg that "the ueighing of aggravating circumstances against [*751 rmtigating 
circumstances does not increase the pumshent") ;  Torre5 v State 2002 OK CR 35 58 P 3d -71.1, 216 iORlcz Crlm .4pp 
,7002) (holding that it is the "jury's fmdrng of the aggravating circumstance necessary to support a capital sentence. . . 
not the weighing of aggravating and rmtigating circumstances, that authorizes jurors to consider imposing a senteilce of 
dea th )  
blissouti's sqstcrn olproportlonalit~ ret ~ e w  for dcath sentences lend5 further support for this concl~is~un The object 
of this sLsten1 is to ensure that the dcath penalty 1s marranted in any giten case. and "to preccnt fre;tLi>h ~ n d  nanron 
application of the death penalty " St~zte I' Bltrck, j0  S CF3ii 778, 793 (!do banc 2001 linder section 565 035, t h ~ s  
Coun revie\ts all death sentences ~mposed vrrthln the state. and In doing so considers "nhether the e i  ;dence suppons the 
jury or judzs's finding of a statutory agpravating cu-cumstance and any other circumstance found." I t  is telling. 
houever, that the Court is not dlrected to consider the degree to uhich evidence in aggrabation outweighs tlie ebidence 
in mitigation if a relat~ve balancing [*761 of aggrabators and rmtigators %ere necessary to impose the death penalty. i t  
t.iould seem as though this Court. as tinal arbiter of the propriety of capital punishment, would be obliged to undertake 
t h ~ s  crucial analysis 
Hacing determined that R ~ n g  does not require a jurq finding in step 3. the trial court was justified in inlposlng the 
punishment of death. The e\ent that triggers judge sentencing is a jury's ~nab~l i ty  o arrive at a declsion on punishment 
The judge is then required to independently repeat the four-step process. but the judge's reconsideration of all four steps 
is not error -4though under R~ng .  steps 1 and 2 are fact-findings that the j u q  not the judge. must make, the j u ~  
necessarily made those findings in accordance uith the penalty-phase terdict directing instructions -And, a5 prek ~ously 
explamed, once the jury has made these tlrst P.LO findings the defendant is ellgible for the death penaly, 
The majority, hottetcr. holds that the judicial dctemnations in stcpr 1 and 2 constlhrteJ error. and that the 
presumptron that juries abide by the court's lnstructlons "1s slmpiy inadequate" to shorn that thls errar %.ca5 h~rrnles, 
beyond a re~sonable do~lbr [*771 But i t  15 prt'c~se!? because of this presumption that the jud~e ' s  i ind~ng %\as not 2 3 o r  11 
JI! 
The cc.nfict directing rnatnlcrrons, ~ h t z h  are h ~ s c d  011 section 565 030 4, PSXfo 1994, expLicitIy proltde tliat 11 J Jur? 
cannor decide unanrrno~isl:, on either step 1 or \tcp 1 i t  must return a verdict of l ~ f e  without probatton or parolc Thus, tn 
the abltence of J tetcitct ot life cctithitut probatioi~ or parole. the jury necessarrly found ~tnantmotlsly tile eul5tencc: of an 
dggrax attng f ~ c t o r  that \ldiTJiltS the death penalty 
4.11 this IS dependent, of course, on the well-settled and indispensable presumption that jurlec act in accordance ~blth 
the soun's instructions. a proposition that the majority no\% effectively rejects In doing 50. the majoriry tac i t i~  ~\c.mlIsi 
well-senled precedent In death cases For Instance, in Srizrc. I Stnltii, 934 S CV2tl 901 (Mo banc l"35)7), this Court held 
that because the jury deadlocked on the ibsue of punnlment. it necessarily found the extstence of ;1t least one trtdhrtor~ 
dggra5attng factor Snzrriz 94-1 S W2tf [ l i  9 /9-20  Sinularl). in Stdzte iJ Grfirt. 7 j d  S L L ' f d  375 (410 banc 1983). tliis 
Court ("781 rejected the dr:umcxit rhar a deadlocked jury chould be requrred to dellneate the statutory aggravatitrs it has 
found m order to ensure thal: ail the jurors agreed upon at least one aggravarlng circumstance before reaching an 
impasse Crdfin. "56 S 11; 31J (it -138 In dtsposing of thts argunient. this Court held 
The jury instnlctions fom~uidted to comply w t h  the requirenlents of [eection] 565 030 4 1 ) .  provide the assurance 
that the jury has found at least one dggralattng circumstance If the jury had not found the existence of any aggrd\atlng 
circumstance, it would ha\e  been requlred to impose a I i l i  sentence under MAI-CR 3d 313 40. Only tf the jury had 
inttlally found the existence of an aggrabating circumstance could tt. under the instructions, return a verdict announcrng 
thdt 1t was unable to agree upon punishment. It is presumed thar juries follow thelr instmcttons. Stnic v Preston. 673 
S W 2 d  1.  7 finnc), cert. denied. -169 C'S 893. 105 S Ct -769. 83 L Etf Id 205 (198.1). As there is already 
assurance that a jury returnmg a verdict announcing kt cannot agree upon punishment has made the prerequisite finding 
[*791 of at least one agsravating ctrcurnstance, procedural due process does not require the jury to subnur the 
aggravatrng circumstances i t  has found in writing. 
Iii. This assurance, h o s e ~ e r .  is no longer enough for the majority, which ref-uses to acknowledge that. in accordance 
ev~th the ~ e r d i c t  directtng instructions. the jury made the requisite findings under steps 1 and 2. 
The majority'c, rejection of tile presumptlon thdt juries follow the court's instructions is based. at least in part, on the 
perceibed "confusion that the complex death penalty subrmssron can cause even for a trial judge, much less a jury " In 
that regard, the majority relies on this Court's decision in T/zo~tzpson v State. 85 S W 3rJ 635 (Mo. banc 2002). albeit in a 
footnote. Thompson. howver ,  hardly demonstrates the necessity of abandoning the presumption that juries abide by the 
court's lnstnlct~ons. as the confusion in Thompson stemmed from an ambiguous polling question Here, on rhe other 
hand, the instructions are in no nay ambl$uous lnsrruction \o 22. uhich corresponds to step 1. pro\ ided 
If \ ou  do not unanimously find from the eciiience be>ond a reasonable doubt that at least ("801 one of the 
Foregoing circumstances exists, you must return a verdict tising the punishment of the defendant at imprisonment for 
life by the Division oFCorrections without eligibility fbr probation or parole 
Likewise. Insmction No. 114. whtch corresponds to step 1, provided: 
If ~ o u  do not unanimously find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that those aggravatin, - circumtdnies 
you have found PQarrant the imposition of death as defendant's punishment, you must rerum a verdict tixlng his 
punishment at Imprisomenr for life by the Divis~on of Corrections wrthout eligibility for probatton or parole 
These instructions are neither compl~cated nor confusing. and there is simpl? no reason to believe that a jury - especially 
a capital jury - did not follow the law 
Our entire system of crirmnal jurisprudence is prermsed upon the notion that jurors perform their dutles 
conscientiously and in accordance ~ i t h  the 1dcv See Cl~~rsl~all Lonberger -159 0 S 423. 438 n 6 74 L Elf 3ii 636. 
103 S Ct SJ3 (1953) (quoting Parker 11 Rnnilolpn, 4-13 C S 6-7 73 60 L Etl 311 713 99 S Ct 2 / 3 3  1/379))  ("The 
'crucial assumprion' underl~,ing [*ti11 the system of trial b ~ ,  jury 'is that juries ~vi11 follow the Instructions y e e n  them by 
the trial judge " ' ) .  JircL~orr i Dttrlno 3-3 C'S 365 434 I.? L Eti -711 908 34 .' Ti l"'3 l/9ci4/ ("Unless \%e proceed 
on the basis tiiat the lur? lcti11 follo~% the court's Instructions \%here those Instructions are clear and the circumstance> are 
buih that the jur) cdn reasonably be e~pected to f o l l o ~  them. the jur? iqstem makes little sense " r If n e  call no longer 
presume t h ~ t  .I jurj ernpanelled for the gratest of purposes - that o i d e ~ i d ~ n g  whether J fello\\- human being desenes r o  
die - strlctl? iornpll~.d iblth the la$\ \chiie undert~kmg this solemn task. contidei~ci' in c"~t'r4 iapital bentencs handed 
do\%n in the <tat< of Llihsouri ~ ~ 1 1 1  hs s:r:oubl unJerniined -?scoriiln~i!, I am ~~nu i l l lng  to disregxd the pr:sumption 
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that juries cntruiteif ~ l t h  n~abing life o r  dcdtit declstons follol~ tile court'i, ~ristructions, and I \ t i l l  not lrtdulge 1x1 t!je 
counter-prtsun~ptron tlrat jurors dssigntrd to perform rhts gr1n.t duty proceed ~ l t h o u t  regdrti h r  rhc strrctures of tile 
Fli~aliy, 1 ~t.ish to address the rndjorir)'r rejei'tltm of the c,tandards articulated bq tile Supreme Court In Tctrrjlrc, 1 
LLI~IL' i198P C'S 388, 10.3 L Eti 21f 71-1 109 S CI iO60 / i ' ) S ( l i  f X 8 2 ]  for drternuning nhether 2 nrnlq dnrliruncrd 
constitutronal rille should be retroactixciy applied Although 1 real~ze that thls Court is not bound to adopt these 
standards, I see no reason to depart from Teagtre's sound rerroactlvlty andlysls, as the iinaliry conslderatrons that 
dlctated the 7bugzre standards hate equal force ~vlthln the context of state court collateral proceedings Sri. 7;rror~zpro,t, 
659 S i C  20 trl 768 Whether at the state or federal letel 
appl~clition of constirutional rules not ~n e'intence at the time a conllction became final seriously underlnlnes the 
principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our crimlnal justlce sqstem Without finalit?. the crimnal law 
IS depr i~ed  of much of its deterrent effect The fact that 11fe and liberty are at stlikr in cilrrunal prosecutio~~s 'shous only 
that the coilventlonal notions of finality "should not have u5 ) n i i ~ l j z  place tn sr~rninal as In crvil Iitigatron. not that they 
should hate  notie " 
Teagrit.. 489 CrS L I ~  309 tquorlng Henry J Friendly. Is Innocence In-rit.\trnt> Collrlterczl .-1trrrcXs on Ct*~minr~l 
Jttclgment~, 38 U CNI L REG' 133 I50 (1970j). 
Cnder the [*83] Teiig~tti standards. a new procedural rule w111 not be rerroacti~ely applied on collateral revlew, 
unless the nile tmplicates hndamental fairness or dlsallous the crtmnalization of certaln conduct This is a standard 
that strlkes the proper balance between the state's Interest in finality and the crmunal defendant's right to procedures that 
ensure h d a m e n t a l  fairness By contrast. rhe rule of law espoused by the majority. the Llnkketter-Stotull test. does not 
give adequate deference to conslderattons of finality It gives little guidance by using such vague standards as (a) the 
purpose to be served by the new standards. Ib) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old 
standards, and (c) the effect on the a b n ~ s t r a t ~ o n  f justtce. Stoval1 v Denno 388 b S 293. 297 18 L Erl 2ii 1 / 9 9  87 
S Ct 1967 (1967) 111 t h ~ s  respect, the Lznkletter-Stovnll test is amorphous, largely unstructured, and has been rightly 
criticized - by its very oxtn arch~tects - as leading to "unfortunate disparities in the treatment of s m l a r l y  sltuated 
defendants on collateral retiew " Tt.uylre 489 U S  at 3/13, see nlso Teagrre 489 C'S czt 303 [*841 ("The Llnkfetter 
retroactivity standard has not led to consistent results "). Sfrrtc-. er rr.1 T~~kkor v kVhrtle~~ 606 So 3ri 1393 1397 (Liz 
1993) (describing the L~tiXleriet--5toci11 test as unduly \ague) "Tl-ts h a m  caused by the failure to ti-cat similarly situated 
defendants alike camlor be exaggerared such inequitable treatment 'hardly conlports \\ith the ideal of adminisnat~on of 
justice uith an even hand."' Terigrrc 489 C'S at 3 i j  (quoting f-lutzher~on v ~VortA C'i~t-oilnil. 432 I '5 233 -36' j3 L 
Eti ,711 3116. 9 - S  Ct 2339 (1g77) (Poctell. J . concunlng)) 
In add~tlon. the imprecise standards employed by the Litlhlciaer-Stocall test may lead not only to disparate 
treatment. but also to uncertainty and unnecessary confusion in the application of neu const~tutional rules As the 
Supreme Court of Arizona aptly obsemed. 
The law regarding retroactivity 1s complex enough. without requiring counsel and trial judges to apply different 
retroactnity rules, dependtng on tthether the substantive declsion is grounded on state law or federal ionstltut~onal 
princ~ple - espec~ally when many declslons are grounded on both. 
Srnte c Sienznzrr, 1 7 0  '41-1: 1-4, 8 ?3 P ,7iJ 4 I ,  49 (11r1: 1991) [*851 
I recognize that the federaltst concerns that informed the Tr~~gi le  standard bear no releiance in state court 
proceedings. and prlnsiples o fcomty  do not dictate application of Tci~gzre in state courts. However. I must agree that " ~ t  
\+auld be a penersion [of these principles]. not a service to them. to adopt rules of retroact~vlty that are broader than 
those adopted by federal courts. therefore according less respect to the finality of state court judgments than the federal 
courts thernselsrs reyulre " Tri~yitr v Pahniltrer. 184 Or .4pp j'7 5 7  P Jti 176 183 (Or,. App _'/li/fi (empl~asis in 
original, Because srate cotln application of the Tc.ugrie analysis ~kould serse Important jurisprudet~rial ptlrposes. ~ n d  
r\pec~all> adLance soclet)'i ~onslderable Interest in finality. I x~ould follo\v the o\er+\helming major!?" of our slster 
>rates In the~r  nsil-~easoneii xioption ofthe T~>clgtie standards. SLJL* c>g Srtlri' i Z ~ I I I I ~ I  .i.i/j L C SOiY 444 S E 2ii 44.; 
4J6 (1 C 1994) Ttn101 606 50 ?il 129- Pi1t11ti \ [ t)\d 6/13 4 .?(l -3S -4-' f R  ! i992). -5l~iizit1~*1 x2-; P :t i  ' 1 1  49.  
l o  S t  0 . ! ' 1  1 4 '  I I i  6 P L ~ D / L .  i Floil i t~ i 3  3 11: .'ti .'i ': ;h ? E 6--1 (iY 
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2003 &lo LENIS 105. * 
Cnder these standards, Whitfield 1s not entitled to hate Rlrig rerroactrrely applied to hii case Dcrerrnlni~~g 51hcther 
a rulc applic, retroactitely under Tt.riglic in.iol\es d multi-step analysis First, the court muit dctemzine ~thctl lrr  rile 
petit~orrer's caslc 1s final. li3r if it IS not, Gnftrflz v Keitr~rckv 4 79 C S 3 14. 322 03 1- Ft1 3ii 639 1 i1" S Ct 708 i 108-, 
mmdares rrtroaLt1ve ~pplicatlon Next, the court must deremxne t5hether the petttioner asserts ;I "nen" proceiftir~l ruic: 
for tf the rulc is not new, or if ~t 1s substant~ve. tt must be rehoactirrely applied Sc.e Bo~ulev  i C t ~ ~ r ~ ~ i i  .sttlrc.c jl'i C 
614, 620. 1411 L Eii 2ri 3-73, / [ S  S Ct 1603 (/%+!?i However, ~f the rule IS characterized as both procedural artd nc\t I I  
generally \vdl not be applied retroactively in collateral proceedings Tetrgue. 389 C S trr 310 
Undisputedly. Whltfeld's IX871 case is tinal, and even the majority concedes that Ring did not create a substantire 
rtght, bur instead announced a rule of crinunal procedure Moreover, there is no dtspure that Rlng constlhited a neu rule 
"[A] case announces a new rule ~ f t l i e  result was not dictated by precedent existing dt the time the defendant's convlctlon 
became tlnal " Teczgrre, 489 U S  irf 301 Wifhoiit question, precedent dld not dictate Rrtty's holding at the time that 
Whitfieid's conviction became final, as Rltzg expressf) okerruled CVufton v At-zzorzcz 197 k S 639. 1 1  I L Eii _'ii 511, 
1 10 S Ct 304: (1090). In bhtch the Court had specifically validated judicial findings of death eilglb~ltty 
Because Whltfield's ease is tinal. and Ring constituted a nevi rule of- crimnal procedure, the question of 
retroacrlvity n m s  on ~ h e t h e r  this new rule fits *ithm one of "two nanoB eexceptlons to the general rule of  
nonretroactlvlty " filler v Cam, 533 U S  656 665, !SO L Eti 2ri 63?, f21 S Ci 2475 /2002). Under the Teilyzre 
framework, new procedural rules do not apply retroact~vely unless. (1) the new rule "places certain kinds of primac.  
prnate [*88) individual conduct b e ~ o n d  the potver of the la~v-makmg authonty to proscribe," Tengire, 489 C;S crr 307. 
or (2)  the rule announced is a "watershed rule" ofcrirmnal procedure that is "implicit in the concept of ordered Ilberty." 
Teugrie 459 C' S ~ z r  31 I .  
The Ring rule clearly does not mplicate the first exception by requiring a jury detemnation of any fact that 
increases the rnaxlmum punishment, the Court did not purport to insulate certain conduct from the ~tlteidiction of the 
law See Srrrre v Towety. 63 P Jt1528. 833 ( A r c  2003); Colwell v ~Vevuiia 59 P 3if 463 473 (Mes -70112). Jee  n l ~ o  
Lhrred Smltrs v Sunchc-Centnnt~s.  382 F 3tl 664 665 f9rh Crr 2002) (stattng that Apprmrit, the basls of the R z ~ g  
holding, does not hi1 wltlrin the first Teugur exception). 
Pvor did Rzng announce a watershed rule of crirmnal procedure To  qualifL as a watershed rule, "the rule must alrer 
our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding," and "infringement of  
the rule musr sxiorisly dirmnish the likelihood of obraininz an accurate conviction " {*89] TI j31 C.5 (zt 66j -4 
vtolation of the R ~ n g  rule oh\ lously does not impair the accuracy of J conviction, as the failure to rzyulre a jury finding 
of facts necessary to increase the punlshn~ent In no way affects the reliability of the jury's determlnatlon of guilt 
Ho*e\cr, e\  en if TeirgllL"~ second euceprion encompasses rules that Improve the accuracy of a sentence. as opposed to a 
conviction. I cannot conclude that allo~%ing a judicidl detemnation of facts subject to Rrng's proscriptions \\auld 
seriously d~rmnish the likelihood of imposing accurate and fair sentences As the Supreme Court of Xrrzcna has 
recognized post-Rrng. there 1s "no reason to believe that ~mpartial juries will reach more accurxr conclusions regarding 
the presence of aggravating circumstances than d ~ d  an ~mpartial judge " T O L ~ ~ I ?  64 P 3iJ trt 834 
But regardless of whether judiclal detemnations are indeed equally reliable, a rule must "also alter our 
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to a fair trial" to come witlun the purtiew of Teuguc's 
second euceptlon. Tj1t.r j33 U S  at 665 In other uords. the rule "must implicate [*901 the fundamental fairness of the 
trial " Teiigttr 459 LfS  at 313 Questions of hndamental fairness are not tmplicated by the rule announced in Rlng 
houever, because the Supreme Court itself has acknorvledged that the right to a jury trial. even as extended under Rrrlg. 
"does not turn on the relative rationalig. fa~rness, or efficiency of potent131 facttinders " Rrrzg j36 C S at 60' 
T h ~ s  IS the import of the Supreme Court's hold~ng In DeStrfano v ~F'OLILJS 393 C S 631 (19691. Dilnrel v 
Loitutnna. 430 t l S  31 43 L Eti -711 790 05 S Ct 704 l197ji. and thts Court's holding in State ex rt.1 cbzson L SprrcX 
j 7  S Ct 3if j l j  (Mo banc 2001) In DeSiej/il~ro. the Court concluded that the basic Srrlil 41nenli~iz~nt right to a jur? t r~al  
as applied in crlrmnal contempt actions - did not apply retroactlveiy. and in d o n g  so it refused to presuppose that "a 
defendant may neher be as fairl) treated bk a judge as he would be b> 3 j u q  " DcStqt~no -192 L 5 trt 633 (quoting 
D L L I I L ~ I I ~  i Lo li\:il)liz, 391 C S !45 158 .'(I L Ed l i l  J 3 ;  88 5 Cl 1444 iirllidli In Dtitz!i.l. the Court ("9 11 held tha! 
the f a r  cross-section reytiiremtnt of the Si-~ri: 4 ~ t ~ e ~ ~ ~ i ~ t ~ ~ t ~ t  M J S  not to be gi\en retroactite effect. 3s r h ! ~  reqLiirenleIlt 
does not "rest on the prermsz that e\e~:. crrminal trial. or an) particular rial. [is] necessanl) ~inf.i;r bccaiisc i t  ,151 not 
conducted in accordance ~ ~ i t h  \ hat us detemuned to be the requirements of the 5 1 ~ i i 1  I~tr~*t~tlri:~~r~r ' 470 i 5 s L r  3? 
Log~call>. if the Supreme Court has heid ihdt the Srvit~ -I~t~c.tzrl~tz~.t1t risht to a jui? trlal is not zo fi~ndamcotal ~s :o !:,juir: 
retrodctiec appllcat~on, it follous that the anctiiary right to a jui3 detcmnatlon of facts that increases pui~lshment IS r~ot 
rule of such cvarershed magnitude as to tliarrant retroactive appllcatlon tinder T~.irgzre's econd eltceptlon Finally, rills 
Court, cittng Dtrlte~ v 1 'nilcd S f i l f ~ s  25.5 F'3ff 912 913 /Qth Cii 201111, dn F~ghth Gircult case utrlizing the I;~llgue 
analysts, has evplicttly rejected the argument that the holdiilg of .-lppri~ntf~ v f i t t  J ~ I  ( ~ 1  j.311 1 5 366 / 4;" 1- _)d 
435. 120 S l'i 23-18 (21100). must be retroactnely applled to cases on collateral re.iietli Spr-lch j Y  S I t ' J i l  i ~ t  530 
,.lppretrili held that "other than [*921 the fact o f a  prior convlctron, any Fact thar Increases the penaltl for a crlnle bcyorici 
the prescribed statutory maxlnlum nlust be submtted ro a jury, and proved beyond reasonabie doubt " .lpi?rentll, 330 
U S  af 4YO If this holding is not to be rerroactlvely applied 111 2.lissouri court collateral proceedings. it uould seem as 
though Rzng - mhich 1s nothing more than the logical extension of -Ipp~-i-'ttii~ - cannot ~ustlfiablq be retroztcuiely applied 
to cases on colldteral review 
In conclusion, I disagree wtth the majority's disregard for established post-conviction procedures. I dlsagrri: ccirh 
the m a j o r i ~ ' s  appllcat~on of Rrrrg v ..lr~:onir to hlissoun's capital sentencing statute, and I disztgree with the nlajorlty'c 
rejection of fe~zgtri-' v Lanes reasoned renoactrcity analysls I v,ould hold that there was no error, and refuse to recall 
the Court's mandate All rhat said, glcen the majority's detemnation that error was coinmltted. I concur m the separate 
oprnion of Judge Price to the extent rhat ~t would hdld that the proper remedy IS a new penalty phase tnal rather than 
comuta t ion  to a life sentence. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL, DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, 
Petitioner, 
VS. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent, 
1 Case No. SPOT020071 ID 
) 
1 STATE'S MOTION TO DISlClISS 
1 SUCCESSIVE PETITION AND 
1 MOTION FOR WRIT OF 





and 1 Case No. HCR 16259 
1 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1 STATE'S MOTION TO DISRilISS 
1 MOTIONS TO COJGWCT 
Plaintiff, ) ILLEGAL SENTENCES, TO 
vs. 1 VACATE SENTENCES OF 
) DEATH AND FOR A NEW 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, 1 SENTENCING TRIAL 
) 
Defendant, 1 
COMES NOW, Roger Bourne, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of 
Ada, State of Idaho, Respondent, and moves the Court to dismiss the Defendant's Petition for 
STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS SUCCESSIVE PETITION AND RilOTION FOR WRIT 
OF HABEAS CORPUS AND STATE'S MOTION TO COlUWCT ILLEGAL 
SENTENCES, TO VACATE SENTENCES OF DEATH AND FOR A NEW 
SENTENCING TRIAL (]FIELDS), Page 1 
-+ 1. 
Post-Conviction Relief and for Writ of Habeas Corpus and to dismiss his Motions to Correct 
Illegal Sentences, to Vacate Sentences of Death, and for a New Sentencing Trial. The reasons 
for the State's motion are set out below. 
The petitioner, defendant Illed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief or Writ of Habeas 
Corpus and Motions to Correct Illegal Sentences, to Vacate the Sentences of Death and for a 
New Sentencing Trial on August 2, 3003. The stated grounds for relief in general were the 
United State's Supreme Court Opinion in Rif-tg v. Arizonu, 536 US 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (June 
2002). 
The State replied to the petition and niotions and moved the Court to dismiss them in a 
response filed in August 2002. 
The petitioner responded to the State's Motion to Dismiss in November 2002. The State 
made a response in January 2003. The petitioner made additional response in April 2003. The 
State provided additional authority in April of 2003. Ultimately, the petitioner made a 
supplemental response in July 2003, and the State made a response in that same month. 
To the State's understanding, there has been no further action taken by the petitioner on 
this case since July 2003. 
Since that time, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that the King case is not to be applied 
retroactively to cases that were already final on direct review. Porter v. State, Docket No. 29559 
(S.Ct. October 28, 2004). The Porter case is based in part on the United States Supreme Court 
case of Schriro v. Suvnnzerlin, US - , 124 S.Ct. 25 19 (2004) which held that "Ring 
announced a new procedural rule that does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct 
review." 124 S.Ct. at 2526. This case was not on direct review when Ring was decided Based 
STATE'S MOTION TO DISiliLISS SUCCESSIVE PETITION AND RIOTION FOR WFUT 
OF HABEAS CORPUS AND STATE'S MOTION TO CORRECT ILLEGAL 
SENTENCES, TO VACATE SENTENCES OF DEATH AND FOR A NEW 
SENTENCING TRIAL (FIELDS), Page 2 
upon the holdings in the Il"orfer and Scht-iro cases, the petition and motions for new seiltencing 
should be denied. 
Additionally, since no action has been taken by the petitio~ler in more than six months, 
this inactive case should be dismissed pursuant to Idaho Civil Rule 40(c). 
Based upon the above, the State moves this Court for it's order dismissing the petition 
and motions as set out above. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this y of November 2004. 
GREG W. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecutor 
Roger Bourne 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Motion to 
Dismiss Successive Petition and to Dismiss Motions to Correct Illegal Sentences, to Vacate 
Sentences of Death and for a New Sentencing Trial was delivered to Joan M. Fisher, Capital 
Habeas Unit, Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho, 201 N. Main, Moscow, ID 
83843, this 2 day of November 2004. 
STATE'S MOTION TO DISMlSS SUCCESSIVE PETITION AND MOTION FOR WRIT 
OF HABEAS CORPUS AND STATE'S MOTION TO CORRECT ILLEGAL 
SENTENCES, TO VACATE SENTENCES OF DEATH AND FOR A NEW' 
SENTENCING TRIAL (FIELDS), Page 3 
G m C  H. BOWER 
Ada CowQ Prosecuting Attorney 
Roger Bourne 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Idaho State Bar No. 2 127 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3 19 1 
Boise, Id. 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE F0IJRTE-I Jt-JDICIAL, DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent, 
1 Case No. SPOT02007 1 1D 








THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, 
Defendant, 
Case No. HCR 16259 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO: ZANE JACK FIELDS, JOAN FISHER, his Attorneys of Record, you 
will please take notice that on the 1 4 ~ ~  day of January 2005, at the hour of 9:00 of said 
day, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Roger 
Bourne will move this Honorable Court for it's order to dismiss successive petitions in 
the above-entitled action. 
NOTICE OF HEARING (FIELDS), Page i 
+ 73 
DATED this 7 day of December 2004. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
By: Roger Bourne 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Notice of Hearing to Joan Fisher, Capital Habeaus Unit, Federeal Defenders of Eastern 
Washington and Idaho, 317 West 6th Street Suite 204, Moscow Idaho 83843 by 
.t-L- 
depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, this $8 day of 
December 2004. 
NOTICE OF HEXRING (FIELDS), Page 2 
JOAN M. FISmR 
Idaho State Bar No. 2854 
Capital H a w  Unit 
Federal Defendem of Eastan Washhgton & Idaho 
317 W. riu" Street, Suite 204 
Mosutw, 113 83843 
(208) 883-01 80 ' 
Il\r THE DISTmCT COURT OF FOmTH mICIAJ^, DIS1rNCT OF 












STATE OF DAL"IO, 
1 







2juvE JACK FIELDS, ) 
Defendant. 1 
Case No. SPOT 0200711r) 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO STKCX'S MOTION 
TO DXSliCSISS SUCCESliR.7E PETITION 
FOR POST-CON'VICTLON RELIEF 
Case No. HCR 16259 
PETW0mRyS BRXEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION 
TO DISIMISS SUCCES SrVlE PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVXCT:ION FtELmF 
Petitioner Zane Jack Fields opposes Respondent's Motion to Dismiss !juccessive 
Petitions for Post Conviction Relief. For the reasons set forth below Respondent's motion 
should be denied and relief under Petitioner's petitions should be granted. 
Ths action involves a petition for post-conviction relief and motion to correct an illegal 
sentence, both seekmg rdief under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Thz State's motion to 
&miss is not hec ted  to another pendurg action, Fields v. State, No. SPOT 03590D, which is a 
DNA scientrfs.~ testing case. 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS SUCCESSIVE PETITON 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 1 
01 /07 /2005  11:12  FIX 208 FEDEML DEFENDERS 
The Sme offes two gounds for d i s ~ s s d .  First, the State mmes that. ,?chn'ro v. 
SummerZin, -U S.-, 124 4;. Ct, 25 19 (2004) and Poser v. State, - P. 3d-i 2004 VJL 241 6229 
(Supreme Court No. 29559, Oct 28,2004) mandate &mjssd of this case. Sec;lnd, the State 
wgaes for dismissal pu r swt  to Idaho Ciml Rule 401 c) became p&Goner has taken no action 
'k ova six monb." The State is wrong on both pohb. 
1. TIXIS CASE IS NOT m A C T m  SZTBmGT TO DISmSSA3,. 
T h  w e  should not be &missed fbr inacbvit;y. The State only recent~y called its own 
motion to hearing. Moreover, tius is not the State's first motion to &srniss In 1h.s case, and the 
prior motion has not beexl heard either. Petitioner responded to the prior moticta. with 
supplemmd briefing md authority on three previous occasions, as noted in the State's current 
motion. Petihoaer incorporates that prior bnefmg and au&o~@ iato this respcmse. 
Any "'izlativity'?~ also cow-&posed as a result of the other cases pe11hg in the hgher 
state and federal courts raising the same ff :b:oad~@ issue. FiJure to act on pending motions 
was an appropriate exercise of ju&cid economy and is "good cause" excwhg &missal under 
R C P  40( c) .  Defening to higher cow&- before proceeding did not reader tlus case "inactive;" 
awaiting those decisions wisely conserved scarce juchcial resources. I>lsznissal on the ground of 
inactivity is plainly kappropriate. 
11. PORTER DOES NOT RESOLVE ALL ISSUES RAISED IN FIE1,DS' PETITION. 
W e  it is true that Petitioner's Ring postconviction proceedmg is paxtly controlled by 
SummerEin and Porter, related issues still must be resolved before thts Court llas clear guidaslce 
as to how to proceed on the pending issues. In Porter the Idaho Supreme Court opted to defer to 
the United States Supreme Court's deteimimhon that the United States Consitation did not 
PETITIONER'S BRIEl3 TN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION TO DIS-S S U C ~ ~ ~ S W  PETITON 
FOR POST-CONVICTION JKEXJEF - 2 
require re~0acti.v~ application of Bing v. Arkona to ppc=1.sons whose cases were Final at the time 
the opdon war rendered. It is reasonable to assme &at disposition of Be~fioirer's Ring 
postconvi&oa proceedjngs may be govmed by the Porter decision. Porter v. State,- P.3d -, 
2004 WL 24 16229 (Idaho Supreme Cour$ No. 29559 Oct. 28,2004). how eve^, the Porter case 
&d not raise, and ~~, the opinion does not reach, the jurisdictional issues rais ?d in peti~oner's 
Rule 35 M o ~ o n .  The Rule 35 Moljon quest-ions will, premmably be hectly addressed by the 
Xddho Supreme C o w  in the appeal al Hogman v. State, Idaho Supreme Court Nos 29354129355, 
now pendmg, whcb raises the s a c  Rde 35 issues. 
S U M M B E m  DID NOT m S m R  TIiE QUESTION OF mTI30ER RlNG 
A4.PPLES mTROIICTmLY TO FIINAL, IDkEXO CASES. 
Although the Supreme Court jg. Sumerlin decked to apply Ring v. Ai-izona 
retroactively to S m r W s  case, the reasoning underlying Summedin dictates that Ring should 
apply retroactively in Idaho. SummerZin's holding that Ring is not retroactive rests on the 
premise that all~wing ajudge, instead of a jury, to determine aggravating circumstmces 
necessary to find a defendant de A-eEgible does not seriously dunmssh the ace rracy of the 
proceebgs. Summmlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2525. 
Summerlin reached this conclusion after scrutinizing a statute m whrdh a judge finds the 
aggravating factors based on the same type and qulity of evidence a jury wouid hear, e.g., no 
hearsay and no consideration of presmtence reports, Sea SchriPo v. Swmerlia,  No. 03-526, 
Trmcript of Oral Argument at 4-5 (U.S. A@ 19,2004), (hereinafter "Scbtlro Tsastscript"), 
a v w l e  on-he, 2004 Westlaw 937652 (U.S.) (attoi-ney for 'Narden S c h o ) .  In Idaho, by 
contrast, the judge can consider hearsay evidence, presentatence reports, and unconfronted 
statements ftom non-testmg co-defendant witnesses to h d  the aggravating factors - evidence 
PETITXONER'S BMEF IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS SUCCESSl'E PETJTON 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 3 
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wsch dSers r a d i d y  in quality and reliab&w &om the evidence that both an I c d o  jury and an 
&<ZO= judge would consider DealP-eligibsiv h&ags by a judge in Idaho thus do not have 
the pzantees of accwxy present in those same judtcial detedatiorls in Arizona. 
Accorbgly, the very reason for Surnrnerli~" denid of re&ostive applicat.ian of Ring in ArLzona 
- the kelihood that ~5th~- judge or jury hctfrahg of aggrava&g factors was ::imilarly accurate 
in Arizona - supports retroactJve appliealcion in Idafio. But see Porter, slip op. at: 3. 
Uncle1 tbe Arizona statute in Smmerlin, "[tlhe ssibgity of domai.ion rekvmt to 
avatiag c h . c w c e s  . . . shall be governed by the rules governing the d s s i o n  
of evidence at c h  trials." A. R. S. $13 -70303). At oral x m m t  in the S~ipren~e C o w  both 
parties conceded that "Arizona law doesn't permit hearsay evidence to establish the aggravaor." 
Schriro Transcript at 5 (attorney Eor Warden Schmo). See id at 39-40 (attorney for S m e r l i n ) .  
Of paticular q o m c c t ,  the Arizona schcxne included the right of an accused to codkont 
adverse witnesses as guaranteed by the Sixth h e n k t  and excluded post-a-rest statcmnts by 
non-testifyng co-defendants against the accused under Bmton v. United Statere, 391 U.S 123 
(1968). State v. Robinsort, 796 P.2d 853, 861 (Ariz. 1990). In Arizona, ajudige c m o t  use 
hearsay in determining whether a defmdant is death-eligible. State v. Greeew y, 523 P.2d 22, 28 
n. 1 (Ariz. 1992) (co-defendant's statement introduced to establish an aggravaking factor at 
sentenciag proceedrug violates defendant's coxlstitutiod nght to cadi-ont witzess); State v. 
RockIZ,  775 P.2d 1069, 1078 (Anz 1988) (findmg of prior conviction aggrrlvator reversed 
because based on inadmissible hearsay). 
U&ke Arizona, a sentencing judge jn Idaho considered a whole varietr o f  less reliable 
evidence that a jury would not consider, incfuhg hearsay in presatence reports and statements 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF LN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS SUCCESSIVE PETITON 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 4 
witnascs whom tbe defenh t  c m o t  co&ont. See State v. 
Szvak, 105 Idztho 900,907,674 P.2d 396,403 (Idaho 1983); Stare v, Creech, :.05 Ickho 362, 
367, 670 P.2d 4.63,468 (Idaho 1983), ovemled on other pomt&, 947 F.2d 873 (gLh Cir 1991), 
reversed in part on other grozcnds, 507 U.S. 463 (1993); Stnte v. Osborn, 102 I d&o 405,411-12, 
63 1 P.2d 187, 193-94 (I&o 195 1). In con&&, Xdaha's judge-sentenca method provided no 
asswance of a factual det rx;tian of aggrav&hg circmtances which would be as accurate or 
as rebbly constraked by the rules of evidence as a jury's would be. 
"The & b g s  of the trial judge in sentencing are based not only on w b ~ :  he has heard 
d e g  the trial, but also oa the mfomtion he gathers &om many other SOW~~: ; . "  State v. Slvuk, 
674 P .2d at 403 @emay in presentence report and uaswom, unconfx onted stat ernent of co- 
&=feudant used to sapport h & g  of aggravahg ckcurustance); see also, Stat& v, Creech, 105 
Idaho at 367-68 @res&ence report filled with hearsay to support hdmg that sentence! of death 
was qpropriate admtted over defendant's objection}; Osbom, 102 Idaho at 4 17 ("@]ere we are 
not concerned with proof of aa element of the offme but rather are exlgaged in an inquiry into all 
relevant facts and circums~ces which might weigh upon the propriety of capital puni.shment."). 
Contrary to Axkona's requirement that the same evidence rules apply to  both judicd 
determina,tioa of aggravating factors and the juiy's guilt phase %dmgs, Idaho whole-heartedly 
approved of sigmficant evidentiary Merences between the jury's guilt phase proceedtngs and 
the judge's determination of aggravating circcumstances at sentencing. 
The sentencing judge is entitled to consider a wde range of relevant aidenee in 
determining an appropriate sentexlce. Rober~  v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 100 
S.Ct. 1358, 63 L.Ed2d 622 (1980); Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho I97,73 1 P.2d 192 
(1986); see also State v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 581, 618 P.2d 759 (I  980) (district 
court has broad dxscrction in detcrmiajng what evidence is to be admit;ed at 
sentencing hearing); State v. Pierce, 100 Idaho 57,593 P.2d 392 (19'i9) (the strict 
PETMTONER'S BRIEF IN OPPOSmIOXV TO STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS SUCCESSWE PETXTON 
FOR POST-CONWCTIOH RELIEF - 5 
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evldentiw d m  whicb govern guilt proc 
sent each& proceehg) . 
State v. Piauto, 11 5, Idaho 742, 765, 8 10 P.2d 680, 703 (1991). 
The smtencing judge in this case considmed a presentmet report rife with mco&onted 
hearsay staten~ene. The tmd judge excluded some hearsay statemeats but colz;idered mimy 
ot-hws in the n m r o u s  police and h s ~ a ~ o d  repom, i a c l u m  but not l idecl  to statemeats 
that Xvlr . Fielck had sex with , bad a faschation w& h v e s ,  we s ke1y to be 
violent, had not sbown appropriate concern for acts he had co e& and othm su temna  that 
were Wc;ely to prejudice the Ba-hdex aad lead to inappropriate f i n b g s  h t  Itk. Fields was 
guilty of the thee aiggramting c i r cmmces  found in ftus case, utter disregard for human life, 
propensity to conxnit mwder, and speclfic iylzent to kill in the perpetration of a robbery. 
In Idaho there is no evidentiary restriction on the fact&derts consideration of facts 
relating to the defenht's ' t ~ t ' 7  of death-e~gibfiQ. Any evidence could be k~oduced  and 
considered to est&kh m aggravating ckcumstance, a fact that "e%ectively" is an elmeat of the 
crime. See Surnmerlin, 124 S. Ct. at 2524. But see Porter v. State, No. 29529, - P.3d -, 2004 
WL 2416229 (Idaho Oct. 28,2004) ( c l d g  thal w a v a h g  circwtaaces in Idaho are not 
elements of the crime). Thus, in Idaho the juchcid %ctfi.nderis accmacy Fn dete-g 
aggravating circumstances, freed &om the rules of evidence, was indeed sefiotsly b i s h e d  
See U.S. v. R. Enterprkes, Inc., 498 U.S. 292,298 (1991) (noting the "inereat:e[d] Itkel.lhood of 
accurate determinations of guilt or innocence" in proceehgs where rules of evidence apply).' 
I By relieving the State of its obligation to prove stabtory aggravatiq~ factors by 
stringent evidentiary rules unposed to improve the truth seeking function, Idaho's pre-liing 
statute failed in its due process as well as j jury trial p~otections. See liz re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 
( 1 970). "Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt ;md by evidence 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS SUCC~SSWE PETXTON 
FOR POST-CONWCTXON .R)'2LlEF - 6 
In su , a judge's ultconseained dete ation of ;t&&sibvahg fxtors in Idaho 
included the review of subsm~allly less reliable evidence than a jury was dlowed to consider in 
. . 
dete the other efemeab of first degree murder., That mconstrrtined reviim seduced the 
accuracy of the judge's h c a b g  d e t e l ~ a a k n  of aggavathg factors in Idaho, as compwad to 
on of those factors in M o t l a  under the more reliable codc;tr&t of thtl rules 
of evidmce. Given the less reliable aggavaLiag fmor &(&ion mder Idal~o's procedures, 
t b  Court should apply R i ~ g  v. Amiona retroactively to I2.m case. 
W- DEI'WMC mTROACTXVE APPLXCATION OF ZUiVG VIOLATISS FEDERAL 
AND STATE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS. 
The Idaho Supreme Court: has granted relief to death sentenced inmate$: whose 
convicrions were not final on appeal at the time Ring was announced, e.g., State v. Lovelace, 140 
Idaho 53, 67, 90 P.3d 278,292 (Idaho 2004); State v- Fettcrly, 137 Idaho 725, 52 P.3d 874 
(Idaho 2002), properly upholhg the amst sacred right o f  trial by jury in those cases. This Court 
ought to extad that right to all c a p i w  sentenced inmates whose aggravating circumstance 
~ ~ g s  were found by a judge, in violation of Ring and the state and federal ct3nstitutions. 
Denying retroactive application of Ring violates petitioner's nghts to a jury uj;d, due process and 
equal protection. U.S. Const. Amends. V, VI, m, Idaho Const. kt. I, 5 tj 2: 7, 13 
confined to that vvluch long experience in the common-law trdtion, to some extent emboded in 
the ConsGtution, bas ciystallized into d e s  of evidence consistent with that stmdard. These rules 
are lustoncally grounded rights of our system, developed to safeguard fpenoxls] from dubious 
and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and properly " Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). As a result of the broad array in form and substance of 
evidence and lnfo~mation which a judge could and did consider to determine the existence of 
statutory aggmvating circumftazlces necessary for &a&-eligib&ty, the ju&ci;il factfidmg 
procedures unconstim~ondly dminished the State's burdm of proof in a waJp not present or 
presmtedin Smmcrlin. Summedin, 124 S.Ct. at2522n.l. 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO STATEyS MOTIION TO DISNCISS SUCCESSIVE PETITON 
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If pehtioner were not under sentence of death, Idaho Code 9 19-27 13(5)'s anti- 
r e & o x ~ ~ t y  provjsioa would not apply See Avag~n v. State, 1 14 Idatao 758, 7.56 n. 12,760 P . 2 4  
1 173, 1 1 82 n. 1 2 (Idaho 1 988). Under the U d o m  Post Gon~ction Procedure Act ("mCPA'"), 
i 
'"post-conviction reliefis not barred where a m  e ~ d m c e  .is discove-red, or wher-e Eater case law 
suggesb a conviction is urzla.rfu1." Arago~ ,  supra, (cithg I.C.4 19-4901) ( q j h s i s  added) 
To the extextt Idaho Code $ 19-2719(5)(c) is construed to preclude revim of petitioner's 
, the s t a t e  is m~onstitutional, along with the Idaho Suprem Court's Pt~rter decision 
denpg  rersoactjve application of Ring. Both violate M. Porter's rights to equal protection and 
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu~o.1, and Article 1, 
Sections 2 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution, ja that Qere js no rational basis, fctr the dtsparate 
treabnmt of non-cqia  prisoners who do not need to daonstrrrte the "hekht1:aed burden" for 
post-con~ction relief which capital pditioners must meet, e-g., P a  v. State, 12.3 Idaho 7 5 8, 760, 
552 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Idaho 1993), or met the hta t ions  imposed by I.C. 4 19-2719(5), see, 
e.g., Szvak v. Stare, 134 Idaho 641,648-49,8 P.3d 636, 643-44 (Idaha 2000); Pizzuto v. State, 
134 Idaho 793,796-97, 10 P.3d 742,745-46 (Idaho 1995). Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,63 1- 
36 (1995); City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,446-51 (1985); Zohel v. 
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61-63 (1982); U.S.D.A. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535 (1973); Sterling H. 
Nelson & Sons, Inc. v Bender, 95 Idaho 8 13, 8 15-16, 520 P.2d 860, 861-62 (Idaho 1974). 
'Under the UPCPA, LC. 19-4908, a clam can. only be waived ifthe .vaiver is howirtg, 
volufztary and intelligent. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700-01, 922 P.:!d 144, 149-50 
(Idaho 1999). Idaho Code $ 19-2719 coatrols, when it conflicts with the UPC1PA. Id. Petitioner 
drd not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelhgmtly waive his july trial right. Applymg the strict 
waiver standard of I.C. 19-27 19 likewise violates equal protection. U.S Const. Amend XTV. 
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Moreover, because id ah^" sbtutory post,-csnGctioa, schew &es available &%erat 
m c h m k m  for edorchg h h m d  rights - here, tbe right to a jury trial - de:pen&g on 
. . 
whether fie petitions st=& sent;mced to death, &at atory scheme must be assessed 
with strict scmtky See Van Yalkmburgh Y. Citizens for Tern Limits, 135 J&ho 12 1, 126, 1 5 
P.3d 1129, 1 134 (Idabo 2000) (ifa hWen.tal right is at issue, appropriae st;mdard of yevim 
of law i n b & g  on &at: right is strict scmtiny); State v, Breed, 1 1 l Idaho 497, 500, 725 P.2d 
202, 205 (Idaho Ct. App 1986) (strict scmtjny of statutoly schemes that &kige upon a 
rjght' such as vobng, procreation, or c o n s t i b ~ o d  safe ds fi)r persons accused 
of crimes"). See ge~teratb Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise On Constitutional 
Law 8 18 4 1 at 800-0 1(3'* ed. 1999) ("Wen the g o v m e n t  takes actions h: burden the rights 
of a classficatlon of persons ia tarns of their treament in a c*al justice system it is proper to 
review these: laws under the strict scrutiny standard for equal protection.") 
Idaho's &parate treatment of capital, as compared to non-capital, post -conviction 
petitioners fails under a rational, basis analysis, and certamly f& under strict scautiuy analysis as 
well. "[A] law which inikinges on a h k e n t a l  ri&t will be upheld ody where Lhe State can 
demonstrate the law is necessary to promote a cosnpelling scate interest." Van Yalkenbur,ah, 135 
Idaho at 126, 15 P.3d at 1134. The stale's mterest in expe&tious handhug of capital cases, the 
purpose of the of5enduy: provision, Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)(c), is not a sufficiently 
c o q e b g  interest to just* the violation of petitiona's fimdammtal right to xkd by jury. 
To preclude petitioner's clams would violate lm state and federal conr;titutional rights to 
equal protection, because it would deny h m  the ab&ty to obtain relief for the violation of his 
hdamental constitutional right to Qjal  by jury, based on retroactive application of Ring, solely 
PETlTIONER'S BRIEF IN ORPOSITION TO STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS SUCCESSIVE PETITON 
FOR POST-CONWWON It3XJEF - 9 
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because ftis j u d m a t  is f ind Denial ofrehroac~ve applicatiaa of Ring is a denial o f  equal 
protec~on with respect to both non-kd capibny sentenced h m e s  (includkg Fettmly whose 
c o n ~ c ~ o n  psece&d phtioner's) and non-capital h a t e s  who m y  benefit front tbe retroactive 
appIJc&oa of new law undes Aragon. 
Thrs Cout should and must apply Ring rewoactively to this case, too. 
CONCLUSION 
For the forego& reasom, this court shodd &my all of the State's m o ~ ~ n s  to &miss and 
grant petitiorzer relief from his sentence 
iJ/ 
Dated this 7 . day of January, 2005. 
CAPITAL W E A S  UNXT 
Attorney %r Zane Jack Fields 
)cc 
I hereby cnufy that on the day of Jm~~ary, 2005,J caused to be r.erved a copy of the 
foregoing d o c m a t  by the method incheated below, postage prepaid where aglplicable, and 
addressed to: 
Roger Bourne - U.S. Mail 
DquV Prosecuting Attorney 4 F a c s d e  
200 W. Front Street, Room 3 19 1 Federal Express 
Boise ID 83702 - Hand Delivery 
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IN THE DISTHGT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDANO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ZANE JACK: FIELDS, 1 
Petitioner, 
1 
1 Case No. SPOT 020071 ID 
YS. 
1 
1 CAPITAL CASE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) NOTICE OF FILING OF IDAHO 
1 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
Respondents. ) 
1 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, 1 
1 Case No. HCR 16259 
Petitioner, 1 
1 CAPITAL CASE 
VS. 1 
1 NOTICE OF FILING OF I D M O  
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
) 
Respondents. ) 
NOTICE OF FILING OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS - 1 
Pursuant to this Court's request at the January 14,2005 hearing, notice is hereby given 
that in the matters of Lenvirt v State, 120 P.3d 283 (2005) and Hofiinnn I). State, - P.3d -, 
2005 Westla%? 2220025 (2005) the Idaho Supreme Court denied the petitioners' claims for relief 
under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Copies of the opin~ons are anached hereto as 
Appendices A & B, respectively. 
DATED this 4th day of November, 2005. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
NOTICE OF FILING OF SUPREAWE COURT DECISIONS - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 4' day of November. 2005,I caused to be served a true and 
conect copy of the foregoing document by the metllod indicated below, postage prepaid where 
apgllcable, &dressed to: 
Roger Bourne U.S. Mail 
Deputy Prosecuting Anorney Hand Delivery 
Ada County Prosecuting Aaomey's Office Facsimile 
200 West Front Street, Roo111 3 191 - Overnight Nail Boise ID 83702 
NOTICE OF PILLNG OF SUPREm COURT DECISIONS - 3 
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W 
Supremc Court of Idaho, 
Base. March 2005 Tern1 
STATE of Idaho. PLairtt~if-Rospondcnt, 
\ 
Richard A LkAVITT, Defendant-Appellant. 
Richard A Leav~tt, Platnt~ff-Appellant, 
1'. 
State ofldaho, Defendant-Respondent. 
Nos. 29158.29159. 
Backgroand: Aiicr defefendanr's murder convict1011 
and tlie dellla1 of b ~ s  first petition for postconvict~on 
ilclief Rere affimled, 116 Idaho 285. 775 P 2d 599, 
iuld hls death sentence was affirmed fooilowmg 
rcrnand foi rcsentcncmg, 121 Idaho 4, 822 P 2d 523, 
defendant filed lnot~on to correct ~licgal sentcncc 
and sccond pet~tlan for postcon-, I ctlon rel~ef The 
Dlstr~ct Court, Sevel~th .ludlcial Dlstrlct, R~ngharn 
County, James C Hemdon, J., dented the motlot] to 
correct rllegal sentence and granted Slate's inotlon 
to d~smlsa the pet~tion for postconvlcaon rel~cf 
Defendant appealed. 
Nold~ngs: The Suprelne Court. E~stnann, J., held 
that. 
(1 )  statute govemtng legal challenges to death 
sentences, and not marlon to correct illegal 
sentence. governed defendant's claim that death 
sentence blolated rcquuement of Ring 1'. Arzzonu 
that juiy. rather than judge, detenn~ne aggravating 
circumstances necessary for imposition of' death 
penalty; 
(2) Ring d ~ d  not apply rctrodct~vely to defendant's 
postcon%lctton challct~ge to dcath sentence. and 
(3) doctrine of ics judlcata barred chalienge to 





[I J Criminal Law 4=;"$15116 
1 10k156 Most C~ted Cases 
111 Sentencing and Punishment -2215 
3 5 0 W 2 2 5  Most Cited Cases 
Statute govcmlng legal chailenges to death 
sentences. rather' than the rule governing lnotions to 
correct ~Ilcgal sentence, governed defendant's cla~ln 
that 111s death sentence violated requlrelnent of Rtng 
v. Arzzona that jury, rathcr than judge, deterrnmr: 
aggravating circumstances necessary for irnposltron 
of death penalty, and thus defendant's failure to file 
challenge to death sentence within 42 days of 
judgment lrnposlng death sentence precluded relief 
I.C. $ 19-271 9(3); Criminal Rule 35 
121 Courts -100(1) 
106k100(1) Most Cited Cases 
tlnltcd States Supreme Court's dec~slon In Rzng IJ 
Arzzona, requlrtng jury. rather than judge. to 
detemlne the agjgmvatlng c~reutnstances necessary 
for imposit~on of death penalty, d ~ d  not apply 
retroactively to defendant's posteonv~ctlon 
challenge to ~mpohibon of death sentence. 
P1 Crin~inal Law -1433~2) 
110k1433(2) Most Clted Cases 
Doctnne or rcs judicata barred cla~ln 111 
postconvletlon proceedings that state constitution 
requlred jury parbcipatlon m cap~tal scnte~lclng, 
where such cla~m was raised and rejected on direct 
appeal. 
*284 Andrew Pames, Retchunl. and Ncvin, 
Benjamm &: McKay LLP, Bo~se, for appellant 
Andrew Parnes argued. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attonley Generial, 
Boise, for respondent. LaMont Anderson argued. 
SUBSTITUTE OPINlOIU, THE COIJRT'S 
PIUOR OPINION DATED JUNE 15,2001 IS 
I.IEREBY 
WITHDRAWN 
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Page 3 of 5 
Page 2 
(Cite as: 120 P.3d 283) 
EISMAn1,  Justice. 
Rlchard Leavttt challet~gcs his death scntcncc oti 
the ground that the j~1t-y was not involved Ilr the 
sentenctng pnxess 111 his ctlmlnal CASC', be filed a 
inof~on to correct an lilcgal sentence, contendmg 
that his death sentence was illegal hecause the jury 
was not Involved in the sentencing. He also filed a 
successlve pet)tftlorl for post-coi~~ietlon rellef raisiitg 
the same rhsue We lost in the dtstrict court and then 
appealed Because both clalins are barred by Idaho 
Code 5 19-2719, we dism~ss his appeal. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HIS'TQRY 
Stutr v. Loavin; On September 25. 1985, a Jury 
found R~chard 11 Lcavttt (Lcavitt) guilty of lnurdcr 
In the first degree for the brutal ktlllng of Danette 
Elg After a sentei~clilg heanllg, the cfisulct court on 
i)eeember 19, 1985, Imposed the death scntencc 
Lcavrtt appealed, and ort hlay 30. 1989. th~s  Gourl 
affimed Lravrtt's conbtctlon, but vacated hix death 
sentence Stare lt Leuvztt. 116 Idaho 285, 775 P.Zd 
599 (1989) (Leavrft l ). T h ~ s  Court upheld the tr~al 
court's findlng of the statutory aggravating factor 
that the nlulder was especially hemous. atroclous or 
cluel, rnanitesting exceptional deprt~vlty, but held 
that the trial court had failed to adequately we@ all 
mltigatlng circurnsiances against that fact01 and had 
failed to conslder altelnat~ve sentences, such as 
long-teim penal rncarccration. The case was 
icrnandcd for resentcnang. 
On rcin:tnd, Leavln was again scl~tcliced to dcath. 
The trial court fotlnd that all mitigating 
crrct~instances ilid not outweigh the aggravatrng 
factor that the murder was especially heinous, 
atroclous or cruel. manifesting exceptional 
depravity. Leavltt appealeci, and this Cotlrt upheld 
hls death sentence. State v. Leavitr, 121 Idaho 4, 
822 P.2d 523 (1991), cerl denred 506 U.S. 972, 
113 S.Ct. 460, 121 L.Ed.2d 368 (1992) 
On .4ugust 1. 2002, Lcavltt filed a motlon pursuant 
to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to con'cct "285 an illegal 
sentence. Under that rule, "[tlht: court ]nay correct 
an tllegal sentence at any time." He contended 
based upon Ring ti. Arizona. 536 U.S. 584, 122 
S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), h ~ s  dcath 
sentcncc was illegal because the judge, 1101 a ~ u r y ,  
found the cxlstence of an agFavatmg fdctor and 
detem~lneci hts  scntencc By order entered on 
CTctoben 28, 2002, the d~strlct court dented the 
motion based upon our dcclsloll in Stote v Beans. 
121 Idaho 862, 828 P.2d 891 (1992) Lcavitt 
timely appealed the denial of his nlotlon ullder Rule 
35. 
Lt*ui~irt i ~ .  Sfate. On Febntary 19, 15186, Leavltt 
filed a petlrron for post-conviction relief. Folloul~ng 
an eet.~dentiary hearing, the district court denied the 
petttion Lea5itt appealed, that dppeal was 
consolidated wlth 111s appeal m Leavzft I. and thls 
Court affrrrncd the denla1 of the pctifion 
On August 1 ,  2002, Lcavltt filed a second petltlon 
for post-convlctron rellef He allcged that under 
Ring v Arrzona, 536 U.S 584, 122 S Ct. 2428, 153 
L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), hls dettth sentence must he set 
aslde be~a~ l sc  the district court. rather than a jury, 
found the ag&vavdtlng factor up011 which the 
sentence was based and senterxced Leavltt to death 
The State moved to dlsmrss the petttlon on the 
mounds (1) that under Idaho Code § 19-2719(5)(c) 
[FNIJ thc decision m Ring couid not provlde a 
basis for post-con\ tcuon rellcf and ( 2 )  that under 
Idaho Code $ 19-4901(b) [FN2] the alleged clam 
for post-conviction rellef was forfelted hecause it 
couid have been ralsed In the d~rect appc~l from 
Leavitt's scnccnce Qn Notenlber 19, 2002, the 
distrlct court granted thc State's motlon to dismiss 
Leav~tt's pctltion for post-conviction relief It held 
that under ldaho Code Ej 19-2719(5)(c), the ncw 
rule of law announced in Rrng corlld not bc applled 
renoact!vely to provide a basis for a successive 
petihon fol post-conviction rellef Leav~tt then 
trn~elg appealed 
FN1 Idaho Code Ej 19-2719(5)(c) stares. 
"A successlve post-con\ilcrion pleading 
asseiting the exceptton [to the lequirement 
 hat the petilloil must hc filed w1th111 
fortj-two days atkc1 the judglnent imposmg 
the piin~slzn~cnf of death] sl~all bc deemed 
Saclally insufficient tct the extent i t  seeks 
retroactlvc appllcatinn of new rules of lau." 
O 2005 ThornsonWest. No Claiin to Ortx. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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FN2 Idaho Code (j 19-4901(b) provtaes In 
PW. 
Any lsst~c which could have been raiscd on 
d~rcct appeal, but was not. 1s fc>rfotcd and 
nlay nrtr Ltc consldcred In post-convletlon 
prr~cecdtngs. unless ~t appears to the court, 
on the basis of a substantd f-actual 
showing by affidavit, depos~tlon or 
nthenv~se, that the asserted bas~s for rel~ef 
raises a subslantla1 doubt about the 
reliab~l~t) of the finding of guilt and could 
not, in the exerctse of due diligence, have 
been presen led earlier. 
11. AEALYSIS 
[I] State I?. Leavitt, 111 his criminal case. Lcavitt 
filed a motion under Rule 35 of the Idaho Criminal 
Rules to correct 811 illegal sentcncc. Ile contended 
that his dcath sentence was illegal because a judge 
rather than the jury had found the existence of an 
aggravating factor ttecessary to the imposition of 
the death sentence. The district court denied the 
motion based upon State v. Beam. 121 Idaho 862, 
828 P.2d 891 (1992). fn that case. Beam had been 
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Years 
after his dcath sentence was a f fmed  on appeal, he 
filed a n~otion to correct an illegal sentence, 
contending that his death sentence was illegal 
because the district judge had not followed the law 
by weighing cach aggravating factor against all 
mitigating circumstances. This Court held that tkc 
forty-two day time limitation in Idaho Code 
19-2719(3). not Rule 35, applies to claims of 
illegality of a death seotence. That statute provides, 
"Within forty-two (42) days of tlie filing of the 
judgment imposing the punishment of death, and 
before the death warrant is filed, the defendant must 
file any legal or factual challenge to the sentence or 
conviction that is known or reasonably should be 
known." We therefore dismissed Beam's appeal. 
Likewise, in McKinnq v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 
705, 992 P.2d 144, 154 (1999), we stated, "1.C.R 35 
applies to criminal sentences in general. but is 
superseded in dcath senteilces by I.C. $ 19-2719." 
Because Rule 35 does not apply to Leavia's 
challenge to his dcath sentence, we dismiss his 
appeal from the dcnial of his motion to correct a n  
illegal sentence. State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 828 
Page 4 o f  5 
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Lcav~tt filed a second pet1tlo11 for P O S I - ~ O ~ V I C ~ I O ~  
rehef, contendmg that h ~ s  death sentence was illegal 
urtdcl Rzng v Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S Ct. 
2428, 153 L Ed.2d 556 (2002) Thc distr~ct court 
denred I~tm relief on the ground that under Idaho 
Code (j 19-2719(5)(c). Ring v Arizona could not be 
appl~ed retroactively to Leavitt's case We affirm 
the district court's holding on an alternat~ve ground 
The hold~vig In Rrng v Arzzona does not apply 
retroactlvcly under federal law Scknra v 
Summerlm, 542 U.S. 348, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 
L.Ed.2d 442 (2004); Porter v. State, 140 Idaho 
780, 102 P.3d 1099 (2004) We tbereforc do not 
addrcss Leavtlt's challenges to (j 19- 27 19(5)(c). 
[3] Lcav~rt also euntcnds that the Idctho 
Constitution requires jury participation in capital 
sentencing. During 01x1 argument on the Fist 
appeal from his conviction. Leavitt asked and was 
grailted permission to submit a supplemental brief 
addressing that issue. On September 19, 1988, he 
submitred the brief in which he argued, tiased upon 
the dissents of Justices Huntley and Bistline in State 
v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (19831, 
that the Idaho Constitution required jury 
participation in capital sentencing. He lost that 
afgument in his first appeal and now seeks to raise it 
again. 
"Any claims actually asserted on direct appeal are 
barred as res judicata. and any claims raised in a 
prior application for post-conviction 1.elief a-e 
baned by operation of Idaho Code tj 19-2719(5)." 
Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 576, 21 P.3d 895, 898 
(2001). Leavitt previously raised this same issue in 
the consolidated appeal from his denial of 
post-conviction relief and from his conviction and 
sentence. Because he previously raised the same 
issue that he now raises on the appeal from the 
denial of his successive petition for post-conviction 
relief, we dismiss Lcavitt's appeal. Porter v. Szafe, 
139 Idaho 420, 80 P.3d 1021 (2003): I.C. 4 
19-27 19(5). 
LIT. CONCLUSION 
{O 3005 ThornsodWest. No Claim to Orig. 1iT.S. Govf. Works. 
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We dlsmiss these appeals 
CIh~cf J U S ~ I C C  SCEIROEDER. ilnd Justlces TROUT, 
B W I C K  and Justice Pro Tern SCI-fltLING 
concur 
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(Opinbn - Hql/mon v. State, - P.3d -, 2005 Westlaw 2220025 (2005) 
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H 
Only the Westla\v cstatlon is currcntiy available 
NOTICE: TIUS OPIMON lIAS PjOT BEEN 
REX EASED FOR PUBLICATlOh IN TIfE 
PERMAKENT LAW REPORTS. IJKTIL 
RELEASEL), IT IS SIJBJECT TO RkVISlOn' OK 
WITHDRAWAL. 
Supreme Coun of Idaho, 
Uo~se, February 2004 Tenn 
h4axwell HOFFMAN. Petitioner-Appellar~t, 
v 
STATE of Idaho. Respondent. 
Nos, 29334, 29355. 
Sept. 14, 2005 
Background: After affirmance of hu  murder 
convlctlon dnd death sentence and dcn~al of 111s frst 
petition for post-convlitlon I-chef 123 Idaho 638, 
851 P 2d 934, d federal district couifs cicn~al of 
fedei-dl babeds corpus reI~ef, 973 F Supp. 1152, the 
dffirmdncc in pal? and reversal m pdrt of cbe denral 
of federal habeas corpus relief, 236 F.3d 523, the 
federal d~stnet court's grant, on reinand, of wnt of 
habeas cai-pus w~lh respect to meffectlcc assistance 
of counsel at sentencing. and affirmance of denlal 
of ~ccond pet~t~on for post-conv~et~on rel~ef, 
petitloner filed thitd petition for post-conv~ct~on 
rcl~ci, The D1strlc.t Court, Thlrd Judlcial Distl~ct, 
Owyhce County, Gregory M. Culet. J . d ~ s m ~ s e d  
the pet~tion, Pehtrollcl appealed. 
Holding: The Supremc Court. Trout, J., heid that 
Un~ted States Supreme Court's Ring dec~s~on. that 
the S~xth Amendment's guarantee of jury tr~al 
requlrec, tllat jury. not judge. niust find statutory 
aggravat~ng factors necessary for lniposltlon of 
death penalty, does not apply retroactlveiy 
t2ppeal dismissed. 
+gp* 
C' &>&& 4." 
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LJn~tcd States Suprcme Court's Ring decision, thar 
the Sixth Amendment's guamntee ol' jt~rq tr~al 
requires that jtlry. not judgc, must find statutory 
aggrdvat~ng factors necessary for unpos~t~on of 
dcath penalty, attnounccd a neu prttccdural rule that 
wds not a watershed n ~ l c  of u im~nal  procedure 
~tnplitatmg the fundamental falrness and acculdcv 
of the cr~mrnal proceeding. md thus, R ~ n g  dtci not 
apply retioactively ttr a death sentence that was 
imposed by a judge and upheld on direct appeal 
before the Rzng dec~s~on  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
Joan M. Fisher. Fcderal Defender. Moscow; 
Elllson M. Matthews. Boise, for appellant Joan M. 
Ftsher argued. 
Non. Lawrence G. Wasden, Atto~ney General, 
Boise, for ~.espondcnt. L. LaMont Anderson argued. 
TROUT, Justice. 
*I Appellant Maxwell Woffmm was convicteci of 
firsr-degree murder and received a tieat11 sentence in 
1989. Presently pending before this Couit is an 
appeal from the district court's dismissal of 
FioEman's Second Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief or Writ of Habeas Corpus and a Motion to 
Correct Illegal Sentence. The State of Idaho moved 
to dismiss Hoffman's appeal based on Idaho Code 5 
19-2719. That motion was argued to the Court and 
st~pplemcntal briefing was filed. Before a decision 
was issued. the State filed mother mtltion to dismiss 
the appeal, based upon niootness. After further 
consideration of the issues raised by the State's 
initial motion to dismiss, wc grant the State's motion 
and dismiss the appeal. It is, therefore, unnecessary 
to address the most recenr motion to dismiss. 
1. 
FACTUAL .4ND PROCEUUR4L 
BACKGROUND 
e' 3005 Thornson!West. No Cla~m to Orjg. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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in 1489, Maxwell I-lofSma~ was convtcted by a jury 
b r  thc first-dcgrcc murder of De~~isc  Wtlltams, an 
~nfonnvll fur Cdnyon County narcutlcs officers. On 
May 22. 1989, AoSfman filed a Motion fbr Jury 
Scntcnc~ng o~ In thc Altematibc an Adv~soty Jury 
based on the ldalio ronztit~itron and I R.G P 39. 
which was denied by rlic tfistr~ct corirf On June 0, 
1989, the drstr~ct court held a sentencing heitr~ng 
and found thdt the state had proven two statuto~y 
agb~avat~ng factors beyond a ~easo~lable (ioubt, 
~nclud~ng I )  the murder was espee~ally l-te~nous, 
awoclous or cruel, mm~fesring exccptlonal 
dcprsvlty: and 2) tlte murder was corninitted aganlst 
a witness or potent~sll wlhless in a lcgaf p~vcecd~ng 
because of such pmceeding. Aftel welghlng the 
factors and other nlitigat~ng cu-cumsta~ces. tho 
d~stxict court ~rnposed h e  death penalty 
On July 25 1089, Iloffman filed a Pct~t~on for Post 
Convl~tlun Kel~el: alleg~ng anlong other th~ngs that 
the "Idaho death pcnalty statute 1s unconst~tut~oual. 
its ~t doc% not pcm11t the partlcll?atlon of tho jury, In 
vrvlat~on of tltc I&ho Constttut~on and the Untted 
States C'onst~tut~on." After an evident~ary Iiearlng, 
the d~stnct court denied the petit~on On January 29, 
1993, this Court affirmed Hoffman's conviction, 
sentence and den~al of post conv~ct~on I-eltef. State 
v HqJrman, 123 Idaho 638, 851 P 2d 934 (1 993) In 
adciruss~ng thc qucst~on of \vhether the Idaho 
Const~tutrcln mandatcs jury ~nvol~enlcnt 111 a cap~tal 
sentcnclng, &IS Court concl~~ded, " l t  1s \velI settled 
that punlsbtncnt 111 a capital Lase 1s to bc detcmlncd 
by a judge rathe1 thaii a jury " Id at G43, 85 1 P.2d 
at 939 
Hoffinan commcn~ed fcctcral habeas corpus 
proceedings May 2, 1994, specifically alleging that 
the Idaho mture which per~nttted a judge to 
determ~ne tile elements necessary for ~lnpos~tion of
the death penalty. rather than a fury, v~is~ateci 
Hoffman's S~xth, Elght and Founeentb Amendment 
r~ghrs Uofl~~lan v Arave, 973 F Supp, 1152 
(D Idaho 1997) Tlie federal d~st r~ct  ourt d~sinissed 
thc ~ la im because ~t had not been presented as a 
federal ~onstitut~onal c l a ~ ~ n ,  before the Idaho 
Supre~ne Coun In add~tlon, the fedu'al d is t~~ct  
court relied on Walton v Arizona, 497 U S 639, 
110 S Ct. 3047, i l l  L Ed.2d 51 1 (1990) 111 
concludtng tirat there was no corlstltut~onai 
requrcmcnt that a .jury must impose the death 
penalty or make findings as a prerequtsitc. id at 
1163. 
*2 Hoffman appealed the fetierai d~rt-r~ct ourt's 
dc~ t s~on  and the N~ntb C~rcult concluded "Walton 
forecloses Hoffmitn's . cl~allcngc to Idaho's capird 
se~ltenclng scheme " HoIfman v Arave, 236 F.3d 
523, 542 (9th C1r.2001). The Nmth Cvcu~t reiersed 
on other clu~rrs and ordered the federal dtstr~ct 
court to co~~duct an evident~ary hear~ng regard~ng 
ineffectlvc asslstancc of counsel. On March 30. 
2002. the federal d~st r~ct  ouit granted the wnt of 
habeas corpus with respect to ~ncffecbbe assistance 
of counsel at sentenc~ng. but denled the wr~t of 
habeas corpus wtth I-es;pect to ~neffect~ve cissistancc 
af cout~$eI at trtal HoiTman's appeal and the state's 
cross appeal ale pending ~ i t h  tho K~ntli CZ~rcu~t 
While his federal clai~ns were pending, Hoffmm 
filed another Pctition for Post-Conviction Kelief on 
July 7 ,  1995, (Second Petition) and on May 20, 
1996, the district court dismissed the Second 
Petition based an I.C. $ 19-2719. HoKn~an appealed 
and this Coun granted the State's motion to dismiss 
the appeal in an order dated December 6, 1996. 011 
August 2 ,  2002. tioffnxan filed a second successive 
Pctitiorl for Post-Conviction Relief and!or Writ of 
Habeas COITUS and Motion to Correct Illcgal 
Sentences, to Vacatc Sentences of Death and for 
Ncw Sentencing Trial in the district court, which 
were consolidated into onc case, (Third Petition). 
Hoffnlul based his Tliird Pctitic~n on the ea5c of 
Ring v. Arizona, 536 US.  584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 
L.Ed.Zd 556 (2002), which held that the Sixth 
Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial requires that 
a jury, not a judge, rnust find the statutory 
aggravating factors necessary for imposiiion of the 
death penalty. Based on I.C. 8 19-2719, the State 
moved to dismiss Hoffman's Third Petition. 
The district court issued a decision granting the 
State's motion to dismiss, h d i n g  that thc Third 
Petition was expressly barred by the provisions of 
I.C. 4 19-2719. The district court detennincd that 
Hoffman's claims were all hiown well before (lie 
filing of his Third Pctition. that tbc clai~ns had been 
:t*, 2005 ThomsoniWest. 'No Clainl lo Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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--- 1'.3ci ----, 2005 WL 2220025 (Idaho) 
(Cite as: ZOOS WI, 2220025 (Idaho)) 
Petition aigurng frti retroaetlve applrcatton of Ring 
Becausc tills 15 a second succcaslve post-ci~nvlctlun 
petillon whl-11 does not fall wtthln the exceptions ul  
thc staattc, 11 1s spccrfically barred by I.C. $ 19-2719 
. We yilnt t l~c State's motloit and drsmics thrs 
appeal. 
Clitcf Justrcc SGHROEDER and Justlces 
EISMANN, B W I C K  and aDWELL. Pro Tern 
concur. 
--- 13.3d ----. 2005 WL 2220025 (Idaho) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Th~a iict1011 IS  PI-cscl~tly 1xlo1-u tlic Caul-t on tlic St'itc's Motions to D~smiss Zane Jack F ~ c l d ' ~  
Pchtion Tol- IJost-Con\ lction Rcllci. and ~ V I - l t  01- i-iiabc:is COI-pils, alld his hlotion to COI-t-ect Illeglll 
I 
Sclltcllcc ~lnd \':~C:~LC S C ~ ~ ~ C I ~ C C  D~atll  allil ~ O T  I < ~ ~ c I ~ ~ I . I ~ c I I ~ ~  l i l ~ d  -\lIgllS~ 2 ,  2002. 01-31 

/ I  Pet~tro~ler filed :I Kc~punsc 111 O p l i ~ ) s ~ t i o ~ ~  to Request ro Su~lrni:~r~ly D ~ m ~ s s  or 111 the Alternail\ c 
I I On Nobct~ihu~ 25, 3002, ('o~lnscl for l'ct~t~oncr iilcd a Moilon for- L~~il i tcd Ad~i~ t s s~on .  011 
I I N o k e i ~ ~ b c ~  27, 3003, this C'OLII-t c111c1cci :t11 CT)~cicr l )cny~~ig thc klot~on [or L~ti i~tcd A~l ln~ss~on .  011 
I I .!dll~lill*) 17, 2003, rhc State iilcii a Rcspit~~sc to I'ctit~oner's Ur1c1'111 Opposifton to Statc's klot1o11 &>I- 
i i Sumtnary Disn-t~ss~il. t'ct~tioncr tiltxi ;I Supplcniental Authot-iiy in SLI~POI- t  of Petition for Post- 
Conirtctloll Relrcl' on Apl-11 1 i ,  LO03 I'etit~onct filcd ;l 1Xt:ply ro Statc's Response on Apl-11 15, 
2003, iilctllg k t  1tl1 ci Kespo~lse In Oppos~t~un to Kesponcient's Motion for Summary D~s~ i i~s sa l  ot' 
I / 011 July 8, 2003,  tltc St'irc lilcd a Sirpl~lemcnr:11 licsponsc In Si~pport of State's klotion to 
I I D ~ s m ~ s s .  On .luly 14, 2003, Pct~r~ctncl- filccl a Si~pple~i~ental Rcspouse in Oppos~tion to State's 
I I Motion to U ~ s m ~ s s .  1 lie Srate Iilcd a Mol~on ro Dlslniss Successive Petition and Motion for W r ~ t  o f  
I I Habeas Corpus on Llcccmbcr 3, 2004. On .lanun~y 7, 2005, Pct~t~oner  filed a B ~ i c f  in Oppos~t~oli ro 
I I State's i'vlot~on to Il~smiss S~icccss~\ ,c  P r~tion for Post-Conviction Relief 
1. Rlilg 1'. .~11-12011~1 appl~cs retroactively to 1i11al Idaho cases, as Scl~rrro tJ. Sttnzr~zerltil \cas 
dcciclccl h,isccl on AI i ~ o n a  laif and is rl~c~-cfore inapplic~ible to Idaho. 
2. Pct~t~ct~le~- 's  sentelice was ~llcgnl as aggravating tactol-s are elements of a greater crlme 
:tnd niitst bc found by a jur l .  
1. Scl11-11-o I. Stt~~rnzci li i holiis t11,ir rhc dec~s~on  In I<irrg 11. i f  1~12011~1 s not I-etroactive to a 
defe'endanr I\ host: death penalty becanx tinal on dirccr appcitl before the Rrng d e c ~ s ~ o n  
~vas  ~ssrlcci 
2. 1 lic ~cccnr case of Poi,tei- 11. Siirfc d~rcctly contl-ovcrts Pe t~ t~oner ' s  arguments such that 
the S1;itc's k lo t io~~s  to D ~ s m ~ s s  should be $1-anted. 
I / MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 3 00295 I 
I / 
. 
s ' r - 4 K l ) , ~ l t D  01; ItE!'lI<li 
-1 he Un1lo1-1t1 I'osl-('on\ ~ctitrn P~ocedurc Act, ltiLiho C'otlc Sectlolls 19-4901 thro~igll 10- 
391 1,  p ~ o ~ ~ r i ~ s  a rnccl),~tl~s~n by \ L ' I I I C I I  ;I ~ C S S O I I  L O I I V I C ~ C C I  01'3 crime may sl-tow that 111s convrcrlon 
\\!as In ~o lar~un ot 1 1 1 ~  C ' O I ~ S ~ I ~ L I ~ ~ O I I ,  tl) '~t 1 1 1 ~  CCIII\ I C ~ I O I I  s l i ~ i ~ l d  be \ Li~;iIeJ 111 IIIC interests of ~llstlie, 




I iowe~er ,  post-con\ 1ct1o11 ~ c l ~ c l  prt)cccci~n~s ale not a subst~rurc fhr PI-occcd~~lgs 111 [he rr~al court, 01 
for an app~a l  irtl~ll thc scntcncc or C O I I \  I C ~ I O I I  1~1,1110 ('oilc AIIII Q 19-39Ol(b). "An ~~ppl lca t~on n1'i-y 
be filed '11 a114 rrnrc \\1t111n o i ~ c  ( I )  year trow thc exprr,ttloll of the t t t ~ ~ e  fbr appeal or fronl the 
12 
ll (Cr. App. 1997) I he appl~canr 111 .L pcrit-con\Icr~on c~lse has tltc b~1rde11 of pro~tl-tg, by a 
\v1tl1111 titrty-ri~o (lL~>3 Iron) the tiLitc on any ju t lg~~~en t ,  cl~cici., or decree of rhe d ~ s t r ~ c t  oul-r. Ida110 
I 
1 12 
1 ,  
l5 l l  preponderance oiLrhc c\ ~dcncc, rl~c allcyatrons \tllicIi rllc appltcanr conrends entitle the appl~cd~it  to 
A petltion for post-c011\1~11o1l ~ c l ~ c f  1s 'k spcc~al proccetllng that IS crv~l In niirure; ~t IS a 
proceed~~ig cnt~rcly I I ~ \ Y  and ~ndcpc~iiiunr i'ronl [he ~ I - I I ~ I I I ~ ; I ~  ac t~on u l ~ i c h  led to the c o n \ ~ c t ~ o ~ l  
Pcltrer I )  S f i ~ r c . ,  I I ? ,  Idaho 454, SOr( I' 2cl 373 ( 103 1 ); , \ l~~rri~~its 1 .  S~iltc, 130 Idnho 39, 936 P.2d 682 
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more than CL "shorr anti plain statement o l ~ l l c  lai111" thar w o ~ ~ l t l  suflice [or a complaint under RLIIC 
S(a)(l) of the Ida110 Kulcs of Gi\ i l  Procedure. Rather, ail applicarion for posr-convierion relief m ~ ~ s t  
be vcrificd \vitI) ~ C S I I C C ~  lo facts \\ 1t11111 tile 1x1-sonal lano\\llcdge of the applicant and afficlav~rs, 
2 0 
rccords or otl~er c ~ i d c ~ l c c  support~~lg 115 ; ~ p p l ~ c a l l o ~ ~  ~ n i s t  be attaclled, or the application IIILIS~ state 
why si1c1-1 L,i!]?)>t>it~~~s C L I L ~ C I I C C  IS  liut 111c1~1cle~i w1t11 111c ii]~i?lic:itic~~i, ~L!;IIIC> C'o~fe Aliri. 9 t9-4(10'3, 
LLrBcjii~, r S r i r r ~ ? ,  130 Itla110 1 I F. 1 l ? ,  037 I-' 3cl -1.17, 420 ((Ct, App. 1997). I n  other Lvorcts, thc 
dpplicat~un ~ i ~ i ~ s t  prc\ci~t or bcr , i cc i tn ;~mn~~i  lhy ~ i i l ~ ~ i l s s ~ l ~ ~ i :  e\ I ~ C I I C C  s ~ ~ p p o r t ~ ~ n g  its ;illegatior~s 01- tllc 
alylicLr.lttclll n 111 17c filbjoct 111 cf~'i~ll~s'sct~. / i /  ULilc ,lnd C O I I C ~ U S O I . ~  ;~IIcgatlo~~s, unsubstantiateil by ;in) 
fiicts, are ~nadcclr~tilc to ctitltlc: 1111 c ~ l t p l ~ ~ c t ~ i ~  10 rill C\  I C I C I I ~ I , ~ ~ >  I IC~II-III~.  f i  at I2  1 ,  937 P.2d at 433, 
.zigzcicrr 1 Sr i l r i> ,  120 Icl,lhu 494, Sb7 1' 3ci 39 (('1. App 1904). 
Sttnmrary di \ l tos~r~o~r L I I I ~ C I -  Idilllo Codc Sect1011 19-400O(c) is the proced~ral eyu~valen~ 01. 
'summary jiidgmcnt i111i1c1- Idaho 1<~1le o i  Clv~l  PI-occifuw 56.  l<iollit-c~z v. Sr~rte, 113 Icialro 87, 741 
P.2d 374 (('1. \PI> I OS7). .4 11-1al coi11-t 11ia) gr'111t :I ~ i i c ~ t ~ o ~ i  Ihy eitlier pirrty for s ~ ~ ~ i r i ~ ~ a i y  d ~ s p o s ~ t ~ o i ~  
ot all applrcatron for posr-con\ ~ c t ~ o n  I-clrei' whcl-c 11 appcal-s froni thc plcad~rigs, togetlrer wltlr any 
tleposrr~o~rs, attstt crs io 1ntc1-I og;iro~-ica, , ~ t l ~ i i ~ s s r o ~ ~ s ,  ngl-ccnicnts of f ~ i l c ~  and aff:da\ ~ t s  ~ibm~rrc.d, 
that no genulnc I\SIIC ot f;~cI e \ ~ \ t \  lili1110 COLIC Ann. 4 19-39OO(c). llo~vever, wl-lere Issues ol 
material fait cx~sr, .LII c\ ~ d c n t ~ ~ l ~ y  Ircan~rg must be Iieltl. I'ul.~.ort ,S'rct'rc, 117 Idaho 272, 787 P.7cl 
258 ( 1990) 
L~ISCUSSIOS 
The U111tecl St'lrcs Sup~cmc C'oul-r has held that when a "~icw I-ule" 1s announced, stare courrs 
siloi~ld hc 1)-ce h ei.~li~arc \i.lic~lrcr tlic r e  r~llc slroulii be appl~ed I-etl-oactively. D ~ i r ~ o r ~ l l  1 
I I hfii~~tesol~r. 128 S.Ct 1029 (2005). A dcc~sio~r  announces n "'~ic\\ I-ule" \vhe~i sucli dec~sio~r c eares 
precedent illat d ~ d  ~ io l  cx~s t  at thc 11111~ the deiCir<i:l~rt's co~i\~ict io~i  became final. iii at 1035 (ciri~rg 
Teiigue I Loiie, 480 I I .S  288, 30 1 . I00 S .Ct  1000, 1070 (1989) (plu~nlity opi~iion)). The Idalro 
I I Supl-cmc C'oul-t h;is rccog~l~zeii rlr.lr "[a] 11c\\l I - L I ~ ~  \\.ill be ;~pplied on col1ate1-a1 rrvlew if it  requires 
the obse~-\*;i~lce of p~occdu~-cs 'i~nplicii 111 (Ire coircepr ol-01-dcl-ed liberty."' IIZ re Gcfloid, 127 Idalro 
472, 903 2 01 { I  0 )  t i  1 -  . L)s~iciiigli. 492 U.S. 303. I09 S.Ct. 2934 (1989)); see o i ~ o  
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 5 00297 
I I 494 I/ S.  407,315. 1 I 0  S Cr. 1212, 121: (1090) 
1 1  Ut-trlel- Tciiig:.lic I L , ~ I I C ~ ,  the I!~tit~d Statcs Suprelnc Court 11m11ecl the retroactl\lc appllcatlott -. of "7nc\\ ~-ulc\" ;is rhcy dpi711cd 111 iL'1icrctI I I ; I~C ; IS  cot-~LIS pc t~ t i~)~is .  1 Ire U~ilted Srares Suprcme Cvi~lt  




! l concept O I - ~ C I - C L I  11bc1-ty." Otlrcr\v~~c, si~clr IICW I-LI ICS  \ t ' l I l  I ~ C S ~  bc appl~cabll: to tl-tose cases \;rihich 
rctroact~\cl} to c'tscs on collatc~al ~ c k ~ c \ t  L I I I I C S S  they Ltll 51 1111111 ~ t r c  of I550 C X L ' C ~ ~ I O ~ I S :  (1) 1.t' I I  
places "'ccrta~~l 1\1rr(ls o f  131 11il;11-4. pllilate I I I ~ I L  1dud1 C O I I ~ L I C ~  beqo~rci tlic power u f  the GI-11111nal l w- 
I I have beconlc final bcibl-c thc ne\b rules were ;uinouncccl. Etryz12, 489 U.S. at 290, 109 S.Ct. at 
1064 ( c ~ t ~ ~ r ~ o n s  oli~~ttctl). I'lic LJn~Lctl Sr'ttcs S~lprcl~ic Coilrr ;11s0 suggested that courts should 
conslcfc~- unctcrly~rrg cons~del-~tr~c~ns ol' li~l~illty I - ~ C O ~ I I I / I I - ~ ~  tllar "jLi]l~plicatio~~ f co~~st i t~t t io~ial  r lles 
irol i ~ r  exlatelice nr rlic tlme a co~r\  ~ s u o n  bccunrc filial S C S ~ O L I I I ~  ii11dc1*11111ies tli  PI-i~rciple of f i~ial~ty 
LC 
i 7 
which is essential ro rllc opcrarlon of our CI-inlinal jllsticc syste~n." Id. : ~ t  309, 109 S.Ct. at 1074. 
. * 
1 9  
I LZ'hcli the Idaho Sup~-cn~c  C'ourt has adciressed thc I-etroactiv~ty of ~ t s  akin consrirurional 
dccislo~~s, the Caul-r has appl~eci a 1111 cc-par-r resr: ( I ) ~l i c  purpose of tlzc decision; (2) re l~a~ice  up011 
,, 
- 
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prior la\\; and (3) rllc effccr up011 rlrc ;~cl~iri~iistration f j~lstic~: if rhe decision IS  appl~ed 
~-erroact~\elq. M!l.i I I I \  L ' J I I I I L ' I I I \  111i 11 C'ltl of I ~ O I J C ,  14 I Ida110 108, 108 P.3d 31 5 (2004) (ciriiig 





Tlro~?~l).so~~ 1) fltigilil, 90 1d;tlio 19, 52'3 P.3d 1305 (1074)). MOWCVCI-, 1111s a~ia lys~s  IS  o~rly appl~etl 
when a dccis~on announces a "~rc'\il  l-l~le." See Stare 11. T~l)tolr, 99 Idaho 670, 672, 587 P.2d 305, 307 
(1978) jlrold~iig tliat tlie rcr~-oait~\'~t}i ~nalysls 1s apl~l~eii  \\licll a I - L I ~ C  ovel-rules a precedenr upon 
\zliiclr parr~cs may Ira\ c jus~iliubly ~cl~ecl);  scc i11.w 7'e~gz1c, 498 G.S. at 301, 109 S.Ct. ar 1070 

cfcte~-~nlr~atlo~~ lh i i t  i2olg ; I I I I I ~ L I I I Z C I C I  ;I IIC\\ r~tlc: 01 J J ~ O C C I C ~ L I ~ C  tl iLtt  ~ \ o i ~ l d  ~ lo t  be ;rppl~cd 
~e t~oac t l \c ly  111rtcss 11 \\),is ;i \\;~tc:~-shecl I-ttlc of cr-lni~nizl p~occdulr: ~mplicat~ng tlre 
fillida~~ic~~t:il t i 1 1  IICSS and 'icelil JC:, of tllc crtmiital ~-troccedi~ig. 
4 / S.ct. 35 10 'llli. curkellt i9et~tiirni.~-'s : I I ~ L ~ I - I I C I I ~  s~lr~pl!; is not ~ C I - S L I : ~ S I V C  habed 011 ille b ~ ~ l d i i ~ g  1 
ihar because Cloflillan's scnrclicct mz2s lniposeti alld ~1p11cld by tllc COLII-t 011 direct appeal long beforc 
L J  I /  
, 
the ~ C C I S I O I I  111 I Z I I I ~  : r \ ~ ~ s  ; ~ I - I I ~ ~ > L I I ~ C C ~ ~ ,  Zil~g lias 11o appl~c,th~l~ty to this case. kt  at 29, 121 P.3d at 
I 
ISIIIC I I I O I ~ ~ I I S  L i S t ~ ~ -  t l l ~  I~cai-11rg In rhc pi-esent casc before thls Court, the Idaho Supremc Cou~r  
I T L  I"JOJJjtll11l 1, Sltltij. 142 Icliilio 27, 121 P.3~1 958 (3005) I I I ~ L ~ C :  it abu~~daiitiy clear that the Krl~g 
decision docs not apply ~-c~~-o:ictlvcly ~o final cases on dtrcct appcal.' The Court in JIojj~iillt fo~llid 
:z il 6 .  "Wllilc Idallu 1,1!\~ noiv rzqulrcs JLII-y I I I V ~ ~ C C I I I C I I ~  111tililt ~ ~ O C C S S ,  \ve do nut believe tlic prlol- 
/ I  process ivas uncdil- 01- suspect and \ Y I I I  1101 set aside [a] pt-operly inlposed selitence of death . . . ." lil. 
I f  Il 111 \ ICM of tlic tact tlial 'In appl~cat~on Sor post-con\~ct~o~r relief or a pcrltion for Iiabeas 




1 7  
I 1 1  - TIE S~Ipleille C * L t i  1 ILii fllc! cl'li ificcl i l l  S , l ~ l l l l l ~ ~ l  /I/! lll'll 
col-pus arc rel~icii~c:, a \  alli~blc ro cure eel-ra11-1 fl~nda~ncntal errol-s, 1111s C o ~ ~ r t  is a\val-e tllar ne~tllcr 
proccdiil-c ploviclcs a I-cnlcdja for tlre Pct~tioilcr in the t~bsence of all eri-01.. The liolding 111 121irg 
[\'l1jl~c.tl-icr o i  iloi 13e;1isC1> c\idei~cc L J I I  bc L U I I S ~ ~ Z I C ~  \tlleil delcii~liilitlg the ex i s t e~~c t  of 411 
aggidt iititlg I L l ~ t o i  15 .III ISSLIC tl ldt 15 \icp,11;11e dild C I I I I I I I C ~  t i o i r )  the iisuz of nl~etllei ~t is a judge oi d 
~ t i i y  nllo illiihcs 1l1'1i t lclciin~na~loi~ 1 Irc icieritity of the idit-ljildei (wl~ctllef rl j~ldgc 01- a j ~ ~ r y )  did not 
111 ilnc \\J> 1111111 L I ~ Z  oh j ec t i~ i~s  111.11 [ l '~ t i t~oi~ei]  c0~11(1 I I ~ \ C  illdde to the e\ idei~ce considered \nl)en 
deteiillririilg nI~li"ll>ei ail aggic1\a1iilg ~ ' I C I O ~  llaci bee11 pio\i.n 111 111s c o ~  
! l MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 8 
Secon~ily, I ' C ~ I ~ I O I ~ C I ~  , sscl-ts 111,tl lic uas only con\ rctcd ctf-the Icsser- I I Z G ~ L I ~ C C ~  offense of first 
I I scntcncc must bl: \ ac'rtcd based up011 1 1 1 ~  11olJi11g 0f'121itg IB;ISCC~ 011 t l~is  i~,s~rt iot l ,  Pet~t~oner  tiled a 
j ! I  "h4~11-dc1- IS  e~tlicr I I I L I I C I C I -  of  tllc iir\i ~icgrcc 01- 111~1r~li"r 01' the SCCC)I I~  ciegl.ee. If a detcndant 1s 
/ 
i? 
conv~cted ol ~ ~ I - S I - C ~ C ~ I L ' C  I ~ I L I I . ~ ~ ~ ,  ~ I I C I I  \hi: State ~ 3 1 1  SCCI, tllc ~$i:;ttll  pe~l;ilty if ~t f b l l o ~ s  the propcr 
? C 
1, a separate crlmc of ""capital l i~-s t-~Ic~~.cl :  111~1rde1- /'oiaic'i-, 130 Idaho at 783, 102 P.3d at 1103. 
I1 sentence, c1cfinc.s stclri1tory agg-a\,tti~lg circu~nstaiiccs, ,111ci rcclurres that at least one statutory 
aggravating c ~ r c ~ ~ l l i s t ~ i ~ i ~ c  be S O L I I I ~  to I I ~ I ~ J O S C  ;i (1~ ; t r I i  S C I I ~ C I I C O .  It1 1 
I 
l 4  / I  Co~ltrai> to  I'ct~tio~iei-'s al-gi~~ilc~lt, rhc Itla110 Si~prenle Court has held Ihar "IZzt~g did not 
elevate Iliosl: xratutory ,~ggrclv,lt~ng cclleutnstanccs I I I ~ O  i'lcnlcnts of a cnlllc, nor did i t  create a new 
Illc c o ~ ~ i t  irlay L O I I C C ~  '111 I I I c ~ , I I  ieiilcnie at ally ti~llc ~ i l i l  illit) coiiect a seilteilce that has bee11 
i i~~poscd 111 ~ 1 1  i l l cg~l  il1arlnc.i nitllill the riillt: pt01 idcd 11cic.111 hi 1 1 1 ~  t e d ~ c t i o i ~  of seilteilce The couit  
mrty ieciuce a seiltcnic \\ i t l ~ i n  120 d,~\c; '1f1i.1 tllc films of '1 jt~cignlcrlt of coil\ ictioi~ or wit11111 120 days 
~ f t ~ i  llir ~ o ~ i i t  ic"leiiics L C I J ~ ~ I L ' ~  ~ ~ i i i i d i i t ~ ~ i l  'I I1e C O L I I ~  111'14 ' I I S O  I C ~ I U ~ C  a 'rc'tlfcilc~ upoil ietocation of 
p i ~ b ~ ~ t i o i l  01 ~ipoil 111011011 111~t~ l i '  \ \ IIIIIII  fo~i i t ec i~  (14) clay\ di tci  tllc filiilg oi the older ie\okii~g 
piuba~ion \lotion\ to c o i i c ~ i  o i  i l~oti11~ \ C I I I ~ I I C C L  ~i~lilci 11114 itile I I I L I ~ I  be filcd \tithin 120 days of 
t l ~  i l t i j  of tllc 1~1~lgi1ii'l11 i~nl)oiii~g \CII~CIICC 01 oi(lc~ ic.li"~sii~g ~ t i ~ i i i ~ c ~ i  ~ i s ~ i i c t i o i ~  a i d  sllall be 
col~sidcic~l JIIJ clct~iiuincci h>  tllc couit \ \ i l l ~ o ~ ~ t  llle atlil~is\ion of ,idditioilal tcstii~loily and witl~o~it 
oidl ~ t i g ~ ~ i ~ l e i ~ t ,  L I I I ~ C ~ ~  O ~ ~ I C I \ \ I S ~  oiel~iecl bq the cotlit 111 it\ tli\cietioi~, piovidcd, llowevei that no 
d~fei ld~l i~t  i11ay iilc inoic tlldn oilc illorioil seekii~g d icd~ic~loii ot icnlencc undei this Rule 
/ I  MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 9 
crrlne." f%olftcl., 140 Itl,~ho at 784, lO2 311 at I 107.' 11) l'ori~$i-, 1 1 1 ~  Iclaho Sulo~-ct~ie Court affirrncd I I 
l l the ~~e t t t~onc r ' s  sc1itcnr.e of tfcirtli i z  11~1-e the scntcncc \vas hrtscd on the t r~a l  judge's fincf~ng of 
In the present case, Pct I~IOIIL ' I - 'S  ;issiurlpt~o~r that his scnte~rce is illegal after R~/ zg  is not 
: 
a!, 1 1  supl~orrecf by current, h ~ n t l ~ n g  casc la\\ 'Ilicrcl'o~-c, Pct~r~onel 's  Mot~on to Correct Illegal Senrencc 
jury find the exlitc~rcr: of ;ill ,lggra\ .trllrg c~rcumitancc. It/. Tlte Idalio Supr-ellie Court also found 
I /  lacks a lcgLil b ~ i ~ ~ s  IOI- f?~ici~~lg tlrc\l t l~c  scj~tc~rcc \xl;ls 111ip0se~l 11Ieg;i11y as reclu~red by Idaho Cr~mln,rl 
I- ll Rule 35. 7 hc 1)ctltionei-'s scn[c~icc oi'tlc;~rh was \1,1tl1rn the range oi penalt~es for firsr degree ~nl~rder  
I /  pursuant LO litcrlro ('otle Sccr~on I S-4004, and he mas scntcncc(1 In accorclance with the procedu~.cs 
/ I  set fort11 111 1d;llio C'ocic Scctlon 19-25 15 as the st~lrutcs e\~srcd 111 111211 rime." 
l l Baseti on the foregoing. tlus Caul-r 11~1-eby GRANTS the State's Motion to D i s ~ n ~ s s  1 I 
Success~x,c I'et~t~on ant1 Mot~on ibr \;1'11t of Mabc;~s Co~pus,  as there are 110 errors to rc~rredy and tlic 
I F  1 1  
l l  p c t~ t~on  1s cxp-cssly bn~-rctl by  Iclaho C'ocle Section 19-27 19. F~~rtlicr~iiore,, th  Court GRANTS the 
2Q l l  State's Mor~on to D ~ s r n ~ s s  Pcr~r~onc~- 's  Xlor~o~rs to Correct Illegal Sentences, to Vacate Sentences oS 
i l  Death and for a Ncixa Sentenc~ng Trial, 11s the senrelice Iias not hccn found to be illegnl. Counsel for 
' 'The Idalro Stlpic~rrc. C'oliir also ~ecogn~rccl t l l ~ t  llc " l J n ~ t c ~ l  States S~ lp~eu le  Colii t ldcks the autllo~ t y  to enact 01 alrlclrd 
state leg~slatto~l 011ly 0111 state l c g ~ s l i t t ~ ~ ~ c  Ira\ that autho~~ty ,  and ~t d ~ d  not ~iiahe the aggiavattllg ctrcittnstailces 
rlelne~lts of the c~ lnlc " Poi ic i ,  I40 lcl,lllct '11 7h-1. 102 P i d  ,I[ I I O i  
" "It does  rot iiillo\\. that. ivllcn a s~-iminal tii.i .t~r~la~~t lras lrad a l i ~ l l  irml nt-id one r o l ~ ~ d  of appeals i n  wlrich tlre Statc 
faitllfully applicd tllc C'o~rstitutio~i as n.c ~~~rcici.strtod i t  at ihe tinlc, hi: ~llay 11uvert1relt.s~ citnti11~1c to litigate Ills c1ai1-n~ 
~ndefinitely 111 hopcs that \LC \\'ill on? (lay llavc ;I i l~a~rgi:  of Ireart." .S('c./i~.r~.o 1,. S ~ I I F ~ F I ~ ~ I . / ~ ~ I ,  542 U.S  348, 358,  124 S.Ct. 
25 19, 2526 (200-1). 
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003Cld ' 
GREG H. BOWER Ada County Clark 
Ada County Prosecuting AMorney 
Roger Bourne 
Deputy Prosecuting Atlomey 
200 MI. Front Street, Room 3 13 1 
Boise Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
IN THE DISTPUCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, ) 
Petitioner, 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
1 
) Case No. CV SPOT 020071 1D 
) 
) ORDER DISMISSING 
) SUCCESSIVE PETITION 
) AND MOTION FOR WRIT 
) OF HABEAS CORPUS 
) 
Respondent. ) 








Case No. CV HCR 16259 
ORDER GRANTING 
STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
MOTION TO CORRECT 
ILLEGAL SENTENCE, TO 
VACATE SENTENCE OF DEATH 
AND FOR A NEW SENTENCING 
TRIAL 
For the reasons set out in the Court's memorandum decision and order filed 
August 5, 2008 in the above case, the petitioner's successive petition and motion 
for writ of habeas corpus are dismissed in case number CV SPOT 020071 1D and 
the State's motion to dismiss the defendant's motion to correct illegal sentences, to 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION (FIELDS), Page 1 
00305 
vacate sentence of death and for a new sentencing trial is granted in case number 
CV I-ICR 16259. 
IT IS SO O r n E W D  
DATED this 12@day of 8. 
District Judge 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION (FIELDS), Page 2 
00306 
P 
d 6t@a -3 I L tq5@ +-% 
JOAN hl. FISHER, ID Bar #2854 %e - ~3 x4'
Idaho State Bar No. 2854 L*  
Asshlant Federal Defender 4 
Federal Defenders of the 
Eastern District of California 
801 "I" Street, 3rd Floor 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Telephone: 91 6-498-6666 
Facsimiie: 91 6-498-6656 
Joan-Fisher@fd.org 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Petitioner, 
v 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, 
Respondent. 
1 
1 CASE NO. CV HCR 16259 
1 
1 CAPITAL CASE 
1 
1 
1 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: PROSECUTING ATTORNEY FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA, STATE OF IDAHO, 
AND THE ATTOWEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE CLERK 
OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. 
Pursuant to the Idaho Constitution, Article V, Section 9 and Article 11, Section 1, and 
Idaho Appellate Rules 1 1 (a)(l), 1 1 (a)(7), 1 1 (c)(6), 1 1 (c)(9) and 17; NOTICE IS HEREBY 
GIVEN THAT: 
1. Zane Jack Fields, the above named appellant, appeals against the above named 
respondent, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision and Order Granting 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
State's Motion to Dismiss Motions to Correct Illegal Sentences, to Vacation Sentence of Death 
and for a New Sentencing Trial denying relief under Idaho Criminal Rule 35, entered and filed in 
the above entitled action on August 5,2008, Honorable Thomas F. Neville presiding, which was 
filed in Ada County case number CV HCR 16259. 
2. Mr. Fields is entitled to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the order described in 
paragaph one is an appealable order pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 1 l(c)(6), among others. 
See State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 89 1,665 P .2d 190 (Ct.App. 1983)(order denying motion for Rule 
35 re1ief"is appealable under I.A.R. 1 l(c)Q6)") 
3. Mr. Fields intends to raise various issues in his appeal, including but not limited to: 
a. Whether Defendant-Appellant's sentence of death is illegal under Ring v. 
Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (2002). 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. Mr. Fields requests that each and every document or pleading filed in this matter be 
included in the Clerk's Record in addition to those automatically included pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 28. 
6. Mr. Fields requests that a Reporter's Transcript of the hearing held on January 14, 
2005, be prepared. 
7. The undersigned certifies: 
a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the court reporter for 
the Honorable Thomas F. Neville by placing the copy in a properly addressed envelope, first 
class postage affixed, and mailing that envelope via the United States Postal Service; (See Idaho 
Appellate Rule 20.) 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
b. That Mr. Fields is exempt from paying the estixnated clerk's record and 
reporter's transcript fees because he is incarcerated on death row and is indigent; 
c. That Mr. Fields is exe~npt h m  paying the appellate filing fee because he is 
incarcerated on death row and is indigent, and 
d. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant: to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 20, viz., the Ada County Prosecuting Attomey and the Attorney Cenreral 
for the Srate of Idaho. 
Dated this ~ % y  of September, 2008, 
~ d a n  M. Fisher 
Attorney for Petitioner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the of September, 2008, I caused to be served a true and 
applicable, addressed to: 
correct copy of the foregoing documellt by the rnethod indicated below, postage prepaid where 
Greg H. Bower - U.S. Mail 
Roger Boume - Hand Delivery 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office - Facsimile 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3 191 - J ~ e d e r a l  Express 
Boise ID 83702 
L. LMont  Anderson 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
Capital Litigation Unit 
700 W. State St., 4" Floor 
Boise 1D 83720-0010 
Sue Wolf 
Court Reporter 
Ada County District Court 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise LD 83702 
- U.S. Mail 
- Hand Delivery 
- Facsimile 
d ~ e d e r a l  Express - 
/u.s. Mail - 
- Hand Delivery 
- Facsimile 
/Federal Express - 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
JOAN M. FISkIER, ID Bar #2854 
Idaho State Bar No. 2854 
Assistant Federal Defender 
Federal Defenders of the 
* 1: k c  ',> 
Eastern District of California . r; 
-- 801 '"" Street, 3'"loor ;.r b @uC 
Sacramento, C 4  95814 q$y rat% 
Telephone: 91 6-498-6666 " td k~4v  
-' (*.\'r 
Facsimile: 91 6-498-6656 had La- 
Joan-Fisher@fd.org 
Anorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, 
Petitioner, 
v 
STATE OF IDA4W0, 
Respondent. 
1 
1 CASE NO. SPOT 0200711D 
1 
1 CAPITAL CASE 
) 
) 
1 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
) 
TO: PROSECUTING ATTORNEY FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA, STATE OF IDAHO, 
AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE CLERK 
OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. 
Pursuant to the Idaho Constitution, Article V, Section 9, and Article 11, Section 1, and 
Idaho Appellate Rules 1 1 (a)(l), 1 1 (a)(7), 1 1 (c)(9) and 17, NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Zane Jack Fields, the above named appellant, appeals against the above 
named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision and Order 
Dismissing Successive Petition and Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus granting the State's 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
Motion to Dism~ss, entercd and filed in the above crrtitlcd action oil August 5, 2008, Hctncrrablc 
Thomas F. Neville. 
2. Mr. Fields is entitled to appeal to the Idaho Suprelne Court, and the order described in 
paragaph one is an appealable order pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 1 l(a)(l), 11 (a)(7), 
1 I (c)(6) and 1 1 (c)(9). 
3.  Mr. Fields intends to raise various issues in his appeal, including but not limited to: 
a. Whether Petitioner is entitled to application of King v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428 
(2002) to his conviction and sentence; 
b. Whether I.C. tj 19-27 19(5)(c) violates the Idaho Constitution's separation of 
power mandate, ldaho Constitution, Article 11, Section 1, Article V, Sections 13 and 20; 
c. Whether 1.C. 5 19-27 19(5)(c) violates the state and federal constitutional 
rights to equal protection and due process, Idaho Constitution, Article I, Sections 2 and 13 and 
United States Constitution, Amendment 14; and 
d Whether failure to grant retroactive application of King v. Arizotza, 122 S.Ct. 
2428 (2002), violates the Supremacy Clause, United States Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2, 
and the state and federal constitutional protections involving the rights to a jury trial and due 
process, United States Constitution, Amendments 6 and 14, Idaho Constitution, Article I, 
Sections 7 and 13. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. Mr. Fields requests that each and every document or pleading filed in this matter be 
included in the Clerk's Record in addition to those automatically included pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 28. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
6. Mr. Fields requests that a Reporter" Trmscript of the hearing held on January 14, 
2005, be prepared. 
7. The undersigned certifies: 
a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the court reporter fur 
the Honorable Thomas F. Neville, by placing the copy in a properly addressed envelope, first 
class postage affixed, and mailing that envelope via the United States Postal Service; (See Idaho 
Appellate Rule 20.) 
b. That Mr. Fields is exempt fiom paying the estimated clerk's record and 
reporter's transcript fees because he is incarcerated an death row and is indigent; 
c. That Mr. Fields is exempt flrvm paying the appellate filing fee because he is 
incarceraed on death row and is indigent, and 
d. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 20, viz., the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney and the Attorney General 
for the State of Idaho. 
of September, 2008. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that on the & day of September, 2008, I caused to be sewed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, postage prepaid where 
applicable, addressed to: 
Greg H. Bower - U.S. Mail 
Roger Bourne - Hand Delivery 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office - Facsimile 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3 191 )/I Federal Express 
Boise ID 83702 
L. LaMont Anderson 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
Capital Litigation Unit 
700 W. State St., 4ih Floor 
Boise, ID 83720-001 0 
Sue Wolf 
Court Reporter 
Ada County District Court 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise ID 83702 
- U.S. Mail 
- Hand Delivery 
4 . s .  Mail - 
- Hand Delivery 
- Facsimile 
L ~ e d e r a l  Express 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
003l.4 
JOAN M. FISHER, ID Bar #2854 
Idaho State Bar No. 2854 
Assistant Federal Defender 
Federal Defenders of the 
Eastern District of California 
801 "I'Vtreet, 3rd Floor 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Telephone: 9 16-498-6666 
Facside:  9 16-49 8-6655 
Jaan-Fisher@fd.org 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COUKI' OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, ) 
1 CASE NO. SPOT 020071 1D 
Petitioner, 
1 CAPITAL CASE 
v ) 
1 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 MOTION THAT COSTS OF APPEAL 
) BE AT COUNTY EXPENSE 
Respondent. ) 
Zane Jack Fields ("'Petitioner"), pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17 and Idaho Code 
Section 19-4904, moves that the Court order all costs of appeal, including the costs of the Clerk's 
Record and Reporter's Transcript, be at county expense. In support of this motion, Mr. Fields 
states as follows: 
1. Since 1989, Idaho courts have determined that Mr. Fields is indigent and unable to 
pay litigation costs in the prosecution, appeals, and postconviction petitions relating to his 
prosecution in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, District Court Case No.16259. Mr. 
Fields has been incarcerated since 1988. 
MOTION THAT COSTS OF APPEAL BE AT COUNTY EXPENSE - I 
2. Undersigned counsel has represented Mr. Fields sirrcc August 2, 2002, and states 
that, to the best of her knowledge, Mr. Fields remains and shall continue to remain throu&out 
the appellate proceedings an indigent person with no mems of supporl or ability to pay the costs 
of these proceedings. 
3 .  The federal and state constitutiotial ri&ts to counsel, to due process, to equal 
protection, and agaii~st cruel and unusual punishment guarantee Mr. Fields the right to appeal the 
denial of his Rule 35 motion and petition for postconviction relief in this capital case. U.S. 
Const. Atnend. VI, V11, XIV; Idaho Const. art, I, $g 2, 6, 13, art. V, $ 9. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court enter an Order directing 
that all costs of appeal, including the costs of the Clerk's Record, shall be at county expense. 
Dated this fiY of Septernbcr, 2008. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
MOTION THAT COSTS OF APPEAL BE AT COUNTY EXPENSE - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERbrIC'E 
$1. 1 hereby certify that on the day of September, 2008,I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, postage prepaid where 
applicable, addressed to: 




Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office - Facsimile 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3 191 Federal Express 
Boise ID 83702 
L. L m o n t  Anderson 
Deputy Attomey General 
Criminal Law Division 
Capital Litigation Unit 
700 W. State St., 4Ih Floor 
Boise, lD 83720-00 10 
Sue Wolf 
Court Reporter 
Ada County District Court 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise V )  83702 
- U.S. Mail 
- Hand Delivery 
- Facsimile 
v/ Federal Express 
~ u . s .  Mail 
- Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
&Federal Express 
MOTION THAT COSTS OF APPEAL BE AT COUNTY EXPENSE - 3 
JOAN M. FISHER, ID Bar #2854 
Idaho State Bar No. 2854 
Assistant Federal Defender 
Federal Defenders of the 
Eastern District of California 
801 "I" Street, 3"' Floor 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Telephone: 91 6-498-6666 
Facsimile: 91 6-498-6656 
Joan-Fisher@fd.org 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTFUCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Petitioner, 
v 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, 
Respondent. 
) 
) CASE NO. CV HCR 16259 
) 
) CAPITAL CASE 
) 
) 
1 MOTION THAT COSTS OF APPEAL 
) BE AT COUNTY EXPENSE 
) 
Zane Jack Fields ("Petitioner"), pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17 and Idaho Code 
Section 19-4904, moves that the Court order all costs of appeal, including the costs of the Clerk's 
Record and Reporter's Transcript, be at county expense. In support of this motion, Mr. Fields 
states as follows: 
1. Since 1989, Idaho courts have determined that Mr. Fields is indigent and unable to 
pay litigation costs in the prosecution, appeals, and postconviction petitions relating to his 
prosecution in the Fourth Judicial District, County of Ada, District Court Case No. 16259. Mr. 
Fields has been incarcerated since 1988. 
MOTION THAT COSTS OF APPEAL BE AT COUNTY EXPENSE - 1 
2. Undersiged counsel has represented Mr. Fields since August 2,2002, and states 
that, to the best of her knowledge, Mr. Fields remains and shall continue to remain throu&out 
the appellate proceedings an indigent person with no means of support or ability to pay the costs 
of these proceedings. 
3.  The federal and state constitutional rights to counsel, to due process, to equal 
protection, and against cruet and unusual punishcnt guarantee Mr. Fields the right to appeal the 
denial of his Rule 35 motion and petition for postconviction relief in this capital case. U.S. 
Gonst. Amend. VI, VII, XIV; Idaho Const. art. I, $ 5  2, 6, 13, art. V, i j  9. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court enter an Order directing 
that all costs of appeal, including the costs of the Clerk's Record, shall be at county expense. 
Dated this - 9U day of September, 2008. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
MOTION THAT COSTS OF APPEAL BE AT COUNTY EXPENSE - 2 
-TIFICATE OF SERVICE 
& 
I hereby certify that on the day of September, 2008,1 caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, postage prepaid where 
applicable, addressed to: 
Greg H. Bower - U.S. Mail 
Roger Bourne - Hand Delivery 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office - Facsimile 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3 19 1 A e d e r a l  Express 
Boise ID 83702 
L. LaMont Anderson 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
Capital Litigation Unit 
700 W. State St., 4th Floor 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Sue Wolf 
Court Reporter 
Ada County District Court 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise ID 83702 
- U.S. Mail 
- Hand Delivery 
- Facsimile 
 federal Express 
4 . S .  Mail - 
- Hand Delivery 
- Facsimile 
/Federal Express 
I ?  dl dm- 
MOTION THAT COSTS OF APPEAL BE AT COUNTY EXPENSE - 3 
IN THE DISTMCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 
ZANE JACK FIELDS. I 
) CASE NO. SPOT 0200711D SEP 2 2 20% 
Petitioner, 
V 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) CAPITAL CASE 
J 
1 
) ORDER ON MOTION THAT COSTS 
) OF APPEAL BE WATVEB 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) CASE NO. CV HCR 16259 
Petitioner, 1 
) CAPITAL CASE 
V 1 
1 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, ) OWER ON MOTION THAT COSTS 
) OF APPEAL BE WAIVED 
Respondent. ) 
Before the Court is Petitioner-Appellant's Motion That Costs of Appeal be waived. This 
Court having considered Petitioner's motion, it is hereby ordered that the costs of appeal, 
including the cost of the clerk's record be waived and the reporter's transcript, shall be at Court 
Expense. 
Dated this 2c%ay of September, 2008. 
~homys  F. Neville 
District Judge 
ORDER ON MOTION THAT COSTS OF APPEAL BE AT COUNTY EXPENSE - 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been 
forwarded to the hllowing person either by U.S. Mail, ftrst class postage prepaid; hand delivery; 
courlhouse basket; or facsimile copy: 
Joan M. Fisher 
Assistmt Federal Defender 
Federal Defenders of the 
Eastern District of California 
801 "I" Street, 3Id Floor 
Sacrmento, CA 95814 
Greg H. Bower 
Roger Bourne 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise U) 83702 
L. LaMont Anderson 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
Capital Litigation Unit 
700 W. State St., 4th Floor 
Boise, ID 83720-001 0 
Sue Wolf 
Court Reporter 
Ada County District Court 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise D 83702 
Dated this a d d a y  of September, 2008. 
J. David Navarro 
Clerk of the Court 
ORDER ON MOTION THAT COSTS OF APPEAL BE AT COUNTY EXPENSE - 2 
IN THE DISTIUGT COURT OF THE F O m T H  JUDICLAL DISTRTCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF AL)A 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Supreme Court Case No. 35679 
CERTIFICATE OF EXNZBITS 
I, J. DAVD NAV-0, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 3rd day of November, 2008. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
BY 
Deputy Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF EXWBITS 
IN THE DISTHCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICUL DISTMCTOF 
THE STATE OF DAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Supreme Court Case No. 35679 
CERTFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, the undersiged authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
C L E W S  RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCWT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
JOAN M. FISHER 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
MOSCOW, IDAHO 
ii P I *  '"YL Q 4 zljja 
Date of Service: 
CERTLFICATE OF SERVICE 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE F O m T H  JUDICUL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, AMI FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
I Petitioner- Appellant, 
I Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 35679 
CERTEICATE TO E C O m  
I, J. DAVID NAVAR_IIO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true 
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 25 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
12th day of September, 2008. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 




ID Bar No. 4199 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKA'r' & BARTLETT LLP 
P.0.  Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
I'elephone: 208-343- 1000 
httomcy for Zane Jack Fields 
IN THE DISTWGT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDlCII11, DISTJUGT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, ) 
) 
PetitioneriAppeltan t, ) Ada County Case No. SPOT 020071 1D 
) (Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 25679) 
\. 1 
) 
S'T 4TE OF IDAHO, ) PETITIONER" OBJECTIONS 




STA'TE: OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff? ) Ada Count! Case No. HCR 16259 
) (Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 25679) 
\ . 1 
) 
%ANE JACK FIELDS, ) PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS 
) TO CLERK'S RECORD 
Defendant. 1 
Zane Jack Fields, Petitioner:'Appellant, by and through h ~ s  attorney of record, Dennis 
Benjamin, pursuant to Ida110 App. R. 29(a), objects to the Clerk's Record on Appeal as set fbrth 
PETITIONER'S OBJECTlONS TO CLERK'S RECORD - 1 
A. Petitioner requests that the following documenrs be included in the Clerk's 
Record on Appeal: 
1 .  Notice of Intent to F~ le  Opposition and Supporrrng Memorandum and 
Request for ffearivtg, Ada County Distr~ct Court C'dse Number 16259, filed 
September 6, 2002; 
2. State's Response in Opposition to Petitioner's Supplemental Authority in Support 
of Petition for Post Conviction Relief, dated Apr~ l  23, 2003; 
3. Notice of Hearing, dated December 27, 2004, 
4. Notice of Filing of Idaho Supreme Court Dec~s~ons, filed November 7, 2005; and 
5.  Motion that Costs of Appeal be at County Expense, Ada County District Court 
Case Nurnber 16259, filed September 12, 2008. 
B. Petitioner objects to the following errors in the C'lerk's Recard: 
I .  Page 5 1 of the Clerk's Record is Petitioner's Response in Opposition to Req~lest 
to S ~ ~ ~ ~ l m a r ~ l y  Dismiss or in the Alternative klot~on for Surnmary Dismissal, and 
while the original pleading contained case numbers SPOT 02-0071 1D arzci 16259, 
the version in the Clerk's Record has case numbel 16259 crossed out; and 
3 -. Pages 260-279 of the Clerk's Record appear to bc attachments to Petitioner's 
Supplemental Response in Opposition to State's Motlon to Dismiss, however, the 
response Petitioner filed with the Court did rzor contain these attachments. 
PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS TO CLERK'S RECORD - 2 
sf 
Dated this \ - day of. Ilcccnrher. 2008. 
Dennis Benjarnin 3 
Attomey for Petitloner Zane Jack Fields 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the -_ - day of December, 2008,I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing doculnent by the method indicated below, first class postage prepaid where 
applicabie, addressed to: 
Greg I i .  Bower U.S. Mall 
Roger Bounle Hand Dcli~ery 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office - F a c s ~ m ~  le 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3 10 1 - Federal Express 
Boise, ID 83703, 
L. LaMont Anderson 
Deputy Attorney Gerreral 
Criminal Law Division 
Capital Litigation Unit 
P. 0. Box 82720 
Boise, ID 83720-00 10 
11's. blail 
- Hand Delivery 
- Facsimile 
- Federal Express 
PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS TO CLERK'S RECORD - 3 
IN THE DISTHGT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIS 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 0 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, ) 
1 
PetitioaerlAppellan t,) Ada County Case No. SPOT 0 
) (Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 25679) 
V. 1 
) ORDER ON PETITIONER'S 




STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
1 
Plaintiff, ) Ada County Case No. HCR 16259 
) (Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 25679) 
v. ) 
) ORDER ON PETITIONER'S 
ZANE JACK FIELDS, ) OBJECTIONS TO CLERK'S RECORD 
i 
Defendant. 1 
Currently beforc this Court is Petitioner's unopposed Objections to Clerk's Record. 
Based upon Fields3 unopposed requests and being duly advised in the premises, the Court grants 
Fields' request that the following additions be made to the Record on Appeal: 
1 Notice of Intent to File Opposition and Supporting Memorandum and Request for 
Hearing, Ada County District Court Case Number 16259, filed September 6, 
2. State's Response in Opposition to Petitioner's Supplemental Authority in Support 
of Petition for Post Conviction Relief, dated April 23, 2003; 
3. Notice of Hearing, dated December 27, 2004; 
ORDER ON PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS TO CLERK'S RECORD - 1 
4. Notice of Filing of ldaho Supreme Court Decisions, filed November 7,2005; and 
5.  Motion that Costs of Appeal be at County Expense, Ada County District Court 
Case Number 16259, filed September 12,2008. 
The Court further grants Fields' request that the following eonections be made to the Record on 
Appeal: 
1. Petitioner's Response in Opposition to Request to Summarily Dismiss or in the 
Alternative Motion for Summasy Dismissal, page 5 1 of the Clerk's Record shall 
include case numbers SPOT 02-0071 1 D and 16259; and 
2. Pages 260-279 of the Clerk's Record shall be removed fi-om the Clerk's Record. 
Dated this ?%day of y-f ,2009. 
'. 
LI"_I-".*- 
Thomas F. Neville 
District Judge 
ORDER ON PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS TO CLERK'S RECORD - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the ay of April, 2009,I caused to be served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document method indicated below, first class postage prepaid where 
applicable, addressed to: 
Dennis Benjmin - U.S. Mail 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP - Hand Delivery 
PO Box 2772 - Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83701 - Federal Express 
Greg H. Bower - U.S. Mail 
Roger Bourne - Wand Delivery 
Ada County Prosecuting Attomey's Office - Facsimile 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3 191 - Federal Express 
Boise, IC) 83702 
L. Laklont Anderson 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
Capital Litigation Unit 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
- U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
- Federal Express 
ORDER ON PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS TO CLERK'S RECORD - 3 
Z 
